

Translated and Edited by Wanyoung Kim

**ALAIN BADIOU**  
**Nietzsche Seminars**  
**1992-1993**  
**I. Anti-Philosophy**

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Transcription by François Duvert

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## Translator's Foreword

Philologist, poet and musician, Nietzsche is often understood from the standpoint of his socio-political aesthetic along with his autobiographical and psychological commentary, historically and philosophically. If as we say, “madness is with genius closely aligned,” rarely, if ever are figures of his literary stature or intellect examined in their own right as psychological philosophical subjects, with a nod at William James. When we examine Nietzsche's emphasis upon psychological interpretation in politics and philosophy especially in *Beyond Good and Evil*, where it is mentioned that Drive (*Trieb*) interprets the world, some are unfortunately hard-pressed to resist the urge to turn psychological interpretation back upon its own head by examining Nietzsche of so-called ‘pathologies’ or categories, the terms of a psychologistic reduction. Life as Nietzsche states is pure Chaos, which Badiou calls “Becoming” in flux – and as such, human behavior often resists psychoanalytic analysis as philosophical interpretation. We not only create the world but our own analysands, as the very masters of ourselves. It is important to indicate that editing and translating is interpretation, along with the composition of art, literature, music or poetry Nietzsche advocated as self-reflexive *vitality* of mastery, that is, *self-mastery*, in interpretation.

I believe the true meaning of Friedrich Nietzsche is, you can only build upwards from the passive nihilism of Hinduism to The Active nihilism of Buddhism to the affirmation of Christianity. The self-alienated totality of the West is what Nietzsche calls ‘Life-denying’ as it claims to be Life-affirming. Nietzsche's description concerning not a genuine Christendom as he describes in *Anti-Christ*, but his nearly corpus-wide critique of a hypocritical

and debased or decadent Christendom similar to what Kierkegaard also described in later life in the Corsair Affair. As such, the 'Anti'- of 'Anti-Christ' is not a strict binary or diametrical opposition, but we must know that in Deleuze, as well as Hegel, dialectical opposition always resolves itself in higher synthesis.

To someone affirming in the flux of life (similar in structure to faith in Becoming), the question remains if Being "falsely" analyzed or squeezed into overly narrow categories of interpretation or Totalization as "Other" point at all to possible oppression of binary oppositions as a thing and its negation, or through identifying with overly concrete *signifieds*? Creation resists the passive nihilism in Becoming one with Void, yet its fluidity is integrated with the concreteness of active nihilism, creating as master of oneself in and despite the merely perceived shallowness of the invaluable depth as Void. This will bring in the importance of faith as a veridical perception of *substance* that one can foist onto or grasp, in order to create. What resists interpretation psychoanalytically or hermeneutically is not grounds for being a passive nihilist of Nietzsche's Camel stage as oppression. Nietzsche, with respect to his role as an observer both within and outside of Christianity, may very well be called a pastor as well as minor prophet.

With the fervency of a third, or at least a third-and-half generational Protestant Christian background (Nietzsche's father, grandfather and great-grandfather being Lutheran ministers, or those whom Nietzsche refers to as priests, and Nietzsche himself having studied with a Protestant theologian 'free-thinker' and philologist named Friedrich Wilhelm Ritschl), Nietzsche is especially qualified to identify genuine Christ-Being, as he mentions in Anti-

Christ, as well as critique the hypocrisy of Christendom. Having had this third-generational Protestant background on my own mother's side, with a great-grandmother converted to Protestantism by missionaries in 1890 [it happens to be the year of the "collapse" of Nietzsche's mental faculties shortly after a year of writings including *Anti-Christ* and *Case of Wagner*], perhaps I can closely identify with Nietzsche's gazing upon "half-Christian" hypocrisy of Western ideals, or "world-denying modes of thought with an Asiatic, supra-Asiatic and more-than-Asiatic eye," §56, *Beyond Good and Evil*, translated by Ian Johnston. I have an agnostic Buddhist father being descended from a long line of Mahayana Buddhists. I mentioned Kierkegaard earlier; whom I was reading alongside Nietzsche since youth. However, my delving into the Protestantism of Nietzsche only began the summer of 2012 after I had visited Kierkegaard's grave and began conversing with a person who was reading the Nietzschean corpus.

The Act of final Crucifixion which Nietzsche speaks of in letters, before his own death, can be identified with some chronic pain. Christ himself suffered a form of what Simone Weil calls *affliction*, the chronic version of acute psychological as well as physical pain, and Nietzsche is a true Christian, mystical at that, as far as he relates the chronic nature of his psychological suffering to that of Christ. However, even chronic pain can be transcended in the case of an *anhedonic*.

What I have translated as "Rupture" regarding Nietzsche's break in two of world history, is perhaps especially interesting with regard to psychical trauma. Even in cases of the worst rupture we see in his works, including *Zarathustra* [§15, "The polytheistic deities died laughing"],

Nietzsche always describes the importance of laughter or the comic. Gaiety or mirth involves joy amidst the tragic, the tragic as tragi-comedic. It's in those who are left-handed, including Nietzsche himself, having most likely suffered trauma in the womb, in whom we find the most hearty laughter, that is a subconscious sense of humor. Perhaps this is what we can relate to Badiou's "primordial tragedy," mentioned in New Course 5. In addition to being described clinically as one of the more mature coping mechanisms, we find laughter as a way for the soul's striving strength to overcome suffering and hardships. However, Will to power is not only active but a synthesis of active (willful) and passive (willing); for most of the body's joy, to be sublimated or raised high above the Self, is located in the Drives. See *Untimely Meditations*, regarding the phrase (in "Schopenhauer"). "Your true nature lies, not hidden deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least above that which you normally take to be yourself" (R.J. Hollingdale translation). Thus, 'Life' persists in and past pathology, even perhaps past a form of death.

The Superior Human as an almost otherworldly Superhuman in Nietzsche is one who, as the common Christian saying goes, lives in the world but not of it (John 17:1). Perhaps what we may find more helpful is Romans 12:2: "Be not conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewing of your mind." The Übermensch or Überdame as *hermeneut* is someone who constantly creates, imposing their own interpretation upon the categories of the world. Such is the very meaning of Dionysus creating or imposing new categories as a *Master signifier* for the invaluable depth of the World that one nonetheless says yes to over and against a confusion or Void.

These are the definitions that our old categories can defy. We do not stop forming new definitions and actively interpret- we will never stop being masters or to stop interpreting. That is the very essence of cooperating with Apollo as Dionysus- not doing away with values nihilistically but of imposing new definitions for old categories, expanding old categories to fit new definitions genealogically. Here is the caution against producing versus the product: clinging onto products and objects, the objectifications or historical categories in words themselves, which stops us from more actively creating. From Nietzsche's essay, "Truth and Lying in an Amoral sense," on language, we can see that words are in flux as well as old definitions of words as products continually in development. So we can never forget words themselves and language evolve with meaning imposed by new masters for the absence of *signifieds* in the chaos and fluid process of the world that is nonetheless not void. We create meanings as well as categories to fit new processes as well as phenomena socially, politically, philosophically, artistically. Such is a nature to saying yes to the world but not of doing away with an active nihilist notion of interpreting.

Imposing our own psychological categories upon Nietzsche, whether as analysts, philosophers or even translators, concerning his own person or even philosophy, psychologically, is to be a bit uncreative. I hope that static complacency with regard to roles as categories or situations, preventing *growth* in Becoming as Life, will never be found in myself or others who creatively interpret, whether it is through translating, writing and performative art. (Indeed, speaking volumes for hermeneutics in British English is the fact, one can note, that translating *is* interpreting. Art and

Western philosophy is thus infinite conversation, as the latter and former exchange the passive and active, respectfully. There may be at times be in philosophers, as in any humans in livings vicissitudes slight personality quirks, as well as trauma in philosophers, even hysteria at one point in Nietzsche—or as some may say, a high-functioning neurosis. But these are all tendencies of being human, and is of lesser importance than the effort of trying to understand what Nietzsche's own categories might signify. It is notable in Badiou's analysis of Nietzsche, he is actively reversing the standpoint of analyst as master signifier alone: for though we are questioning Nietzsche's text, it is still alive as a formal dialogue or trade.

For us to render an honest or *open-ended* dialogue with Nietzsche untainted by Elizabeth Nietzsche's fascist editorial hand, it's necessary to emphasize that Nietzschean power has been translated from the original seminars as *puissance*. German *Macht* similar to *puissance* as the *psychological* force of self-overcoming, not simply the crude physical strength of *Kraft* is what characterizes Nietzsche's Overhuman or Superman. *Macht* differentiates the *power* toward which one wills, from the mere brute force of Thrasymachus, or sheer physical *Kraft* (strength or bodily fitness) of the Nazis. It is this French designation of *puissance* that will help guard Nietzsche against any further distortions of *Will to Power* based on its historically inaccurate usage of Nietzsche by the Nazis after Nietzsche's sister made liberal or abusive edits to the texts, substituting *Kraft* for *Macht*.

Nietzsche, reverent of the will to power and noble resignation of Jews, including Jesus the Essene, is critical of Anti-Semitic Christendom and its parishioners, and would not have condoned the base indistinction between



power of the psyche, and sheer physical *Might* exercised by someone like Hitler who did not master his egoistic insecurities of slave morality such as resentment. It is "*Macht*" resulting in an overcoming of one's basic nature of slave morality, differentiating the truly noble from those who merely appropriate it to a Western European stock somewhat mythically distilled from the broader definition of Aryans. It has historically been demonstrated that so-called Aryans are actually *Eurasians*, which genetically as well as culturally includes descendants of Hindu Aryans in India, Bangladesh, and South-Central Asia, as well as the Hindus' Buddhist cultural and linguistic counterpart in China, Korea, and Japan from whom Hitler appropriated the Indo-European symbol for happiness and prosperity. The added distinction made by *puissance* makes clear that Nietzsche's will to power is not simply the striving toward destructive mastery or power exercised over others, but the power of mastering oneself before mastering, and leading others nobly. In Nietzsche, self-mastery is a trait of true nobility or the generous magnanimity of those superiors qualified in character to guide the rest of the crowd. *Macht* in its early stages designates the soulful skill and strength of the character of a being, not merely a destructive force of *ressentiment* arguably found in crude, brute, and extremely conservative spins on Nietzsche.

Alain Badiou often uses the word *regime* to discuss 'order', or structure, scheme. I have left it as 'order' to be true to the historical usage of 'order' such as for example, in Foucault, *The Order of Things*, or in Badiou, "the order of truth," "the order of the address," "the order of the argument." Furthermore, I have rendered "*précipitation vers la folie*" of the Nietzschean

act as a 'rushing toward', or 'rush of', when we speak of Nietzsche's madness, or The Act of final crucifixion as Dionysus or Nietzsche.

And perhaps, the most unique aspect of Badiou's treatment of Nietzsche as an anti-philosopher, is in his distinction of the "anti" in anti-philosopher from mere opposition within dialectic, which precedes a meditational synthesis. This is part and parcel Deleuzian as it transcends a Hegelian notion of opposition. Such a feature relates to the discussion of the noncontradictory 'against' in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Course, as well as in the Appendix discussion of Nietzsche against Wagner.

Badiou, in the 6th Course, renders the pure multiplicity of "il y a" distinct from Being as *l'être*, or *l'étant* as a state. My use of "state of being" for *l'étant* designates Being (*l'être*) within "il y a" 's pure multiplicity. Being is merely faithful to Heidegger's distinction between Being and beings, but those familiar with Badiou will find interest in the Nietzschean supplementation of *Becoming*, *devenir* in "il y a", within the vital force or power of *puissance*.

There is, at last, a parallel aspect between Being and art in this work's Appendix, devoted to Nietzsche and Wagner. In New Course Five, I have chosen to translate *l'apparaître* as "appearance," distinct from *l'apparence* as well as semblance (same in French) which is distinct from *semblant* (seeming). I have rendered the translation of "theatralisation" in French to "drama", or dramatization, which, in addition to a hysteric drama, carries the more suitable nuance of Nietzschean "truth" or anti-philosophy as not strictly, or in binary opposition against truth as a falsity, or even a diametric of Veritas in the flux of Truth as Becoming. But will to power contains the truth of

poetry, art, psychology, and rhetorical advice as thematically situational, that is historical within Life as Becoming, as is the adequate means to express our situation in life. Truth expressed by poetry, art and politics as historical themes of expression are not strictly opposed to the conception of Life and Becoming as philosophical Truth. Such is the nuance of Against or “Anti”-Philosophy in Badiou’s Nietzsche.

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### **ALAIN BADIOU - SEMINARS 1992-1993: NIETZSCHE I, ANTI-PHILOSOPHY**

Nietzsche I, Seminar 1992-1993. Translated & Edited by Wanyoung E Kim

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**1<sup>st</sup> Course - Triple Objective  
(Heidegger, Deleuze, & Madness)**

3 Goals

How to Question Nietzsche's Text

Status of Mad Utterances

Heideggerian Interpretation

Deleuzian Interpretation

**2<sup>nd</sup> Course On the Dionysian "Yes" -  
Nature of Affirmation**

The Function of Proper Names

Usage of "Against"

Act as an Event: Breaking in 2 World  
Histories

Question of Revolution

Complications: On Eternity

On "Anti-Christ"

**3rd Course**

Reminders

The Crapshoot: Nietzsche and  
Mallarmé

The Act: Superimposition of Rupture  
and Eternity

Chastisement of Christianity

Law against Christianity of "Anti-  
Christ"

The Hellhound and the Silent Event

**4th Course - On the Creation of  
Being**

Nietzsche and Politics

The Ambiguity of the Word "Life"

Dionysian Dithyrambs

The Circle

The World and Language:  
Historicized Sophistry and Anti-  
Theatrical poetics

a) The World

b) Language

4 Questions Addressed to Nietzsche

Question of Being in 6 propositions

a) First Statement: "il y a" has the  
name of "Becoming" or "Life".

b) Second Statement: Being is a  
fictitious designation: The "il y a"  
ought not be named.

**5th Course - Arch-Politics**

The State, the New Idol

a) First Thesis: Disjunction between  
people and the State

b) Second Thesis: God is Dead, Death  
of the State

c) Third Thesis: the State is  
Corruption

d) Fourth Thesis: the State changes  
Art, Science and Philosophy into a  
cultural magma.

e) Fifth thesis: Humanity is always  
beyond the State

The ontology of Nietzsche in 6 statements

### **6th Course: Dialectics: of the Creation & Void**

Reminder: The 6 Anti-Philosophical Ontological Propositions of Nietzsche

The 6 Philosophical Ontological Statements of Alain Badiou

1<sup>st</sup> proposition: the “il y a” in Nietzsche is named the Becoming or life 2<sup>nd</sup> proposition: Being is a dramatic designation: it isn't necessary to name the “il y a”

1<sup>st</sup> statement: The Name of “il y a” as multiplicity or pure multiple

2<sup>nd</sup> statement: naming the multiple Being of “il y a” perhaps innocent if one splits this designation, i.e. if one parts Being and truth from all continuity with meaning.

3<sup>rd</sup> statement, Logic is what philosophy retraces in itself due to mathematics.

4<sup>th</sup> statement, since there is pure multiplicity, there is no relation.

5<sup>th</sup> statement: The means of philosophical thought will overlap or combine or articulate the ideal of adequate language and that of intense drama.

6<sup>th</sup> statement: The element of intense drama in every philosophy is, in truth, what is traced in philosophy in its artistic condition.

The Act and Nihilism

a) Introduction

b) The Release of Three Orientations (Hegel, Heidegger and Deleuze)

First interpretation: The Act would have the essence of creating new values against reactive nihilistic values.

Second interpretation: The Act is a promotion of everything that is of maximal intensity.

Third interpretation: Foucault's Nietzsche: the question of interpretation

Exposition of Foucault's thesis

Critique of Foucault's thesis

3 Metamorphoses

### **Appendix : Wagner's Anti-Philosophy**

**New Course 1** - Poetry, Theater & Nietzschean Act

**New Course 2** Badiou, Nietzsche Art

**New Course 3** - Apollo & Dionysus [Drunkenness and the Dream]

**New Course 4** - Wagnerian Art

**New Course 5** - Knottings [The Penultimate Course]

**New Course 6** - Philosophy, Subjectivity & Art

## **First Course: The Triple Objective (Heidegger, Deleuze, & Madness)**

Good evening. Tonight I'd like to talk about what might be called the strategy of this seminar in terms of questions, problems, and, indeed, difficulties, not to mention its methodology. As announced, the topic of our seminar will be Nietzsche. But saying that we will talk about Nietzsche is in itself quite indiscriminate. What to see right away is that there is a complexity of the target, and that this review of Nietzsche, this passage of Nietzsche, carries at least **3 goals** that may not immediately be superimposed.

**The first goal is to attempt a qualification of the Nietzschean text.** What is the exact status of the Nietzschean text? Obviously, this will in part be measured by the question of philosophy and of eventual definitions of philosophy taken up and left to guide the question: In what sense was Nietzsche a philosopher? And is he really one? One can also pose the question another manner, i.e. Ought philosophy let us state that Nietzsche is a philosopher? Or even yet: if Nietzsche is a philosopher, what consequences are there for philosophy? From the point of view of the immediate Nietzschean text, this question is extremely complex, because Nietzsche both claimed the identity of a philosopher in some passages, and radically distanced from it in others. For example, he argues that in reality, the philosopher has always been a masked priest who is hidden. But in contrast to the formulas of this kind, there are others which show what he views the true philosopher to be. However, he will also use a few other names. He is far from designating his undertaking under the name of philosophy. Also, the immoralist will be one of the names of the true philosopher. It is therefore what I would call a topical question: from where is the Nietzschean text uttered?

**The second question can be described as such: to what extent was this century Nietzschean?** After a topical interrogation, we would conduct a historical

one. Was there something essentially Nietzschean in this century? Recently, a number of people got together to write a book titled: *Why We Are Not Nietzschean*. A book that made a slight commotion. An account of what they are, a question no one had asked them! But at last, they found it necessary to respond and say, with thunder and lightning, why they were not Nietzschean. Which, of course, is removed from the assumption of a general Nietzscheanism to which they made a glorious and collective exception. We can thus say that the question of what it means to be or not be Nietzschean is comprised a little like a question which is actually asked by the century. When we see the group in question state so decisively: "Why we are not Nietzschean," I would like the first idea we have of it to be that perhaps we should be Nietzschean. Besides, it is for me a relative surprise to discover myself, *willy-nilly*, as Nietzschean. This has enabled, I must say, my relation to Nietzsche, that I had by all means anticipated, as I announced this passage of Nietzsche before the publication of this book, but it has accelerated the need to go see more closely in what sense perhaps, what part of the century and its thinking had indeed received a Nietzschean touch.

At the other extreme, since we are investigating particular instances, I would like to point out that the beautiful book by Sarah Kofman, titled *Explosion I*, is an extraordinarily careful assessment of *Ecce Homo*, an almost perpetual commentary on that book, paragraph by paragraph, and nearly line by line. A book that we have to traverse several times. *Explosion I* was nothing but the first part of this undertaking, which in its own way, also establishes or re-establishes the question of Nietzsche as a question that is immediately essential and contemporary. So the historical question would be: Can we think, or let ourselves think that something in the century was Nietzschean, and that it would be necessary to reformulate this position, whether we're opposed to it one way or another?

Indeed, in the path which I suggest to you, we will find two essential questions concerning this question, which are the interrogations of Heidegger and



Deleuze: To what extent has this century been Nietzschean?

**For Heidegger, as you know, the main referential texts are the two large volumes published by Gallimard: *Nietzsche I* and *II*,** which reconstitute, without doubt reshaping the courses given by Heidegger between 1936 and 1946 - a peculiar time. There are of course a number of other allusions in the texts by Heidegger on Nietzsche- in particular, the text that has achieved something completely remarkable, and has the title: *Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?* But the massive corpus of the Heideggerian assessment of Nietzsche comprises two large volumes.

For Deleuze, the main book is *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. And as we'll see, I think Heidegger's interpretation and Deleuze's reconstruction draw a kind of maximal deviation around the question of Nietzsche's contemporaneity.

**The 3rd view will have to do with the determination of the relation of philosophy to art** as I mentioned near the end of last year, i.e. taking Nietzsche as support for an active or current determination that philosophy, provided that it persists or insists, converses with artistic activity. In very broad strokes, what has happened to the proper order of philosophy in this regard? You know that Hegel announced the end of speculative interest in art (let's use this phrase). One has often concentrated upon the form of the end of art, but it is not exactly the end of art as a factual end of artistic activity; this is not what Hegel means. Hegel believed that what was at stake in the form of philosophy no longer has a relation of immediate interiority to art. So we can state that art as such, no longer offers philosophy truth about the question of the mind. That said, it is quite true that this Hegelian judgment has placed on the day's agenda another question, which is the question of the end of art. It has placed on the agenda a perspective of a kind of interiority with which philosophy converses with art.

Opposed to the Hegelian movement, there has been from the beginning of the 19th century a vigorous promotion of art as a condition of radical thinking, even in some cases as the sole condition for thinking. A position taken by German

Romanticism, certainly continued by Schopenhauer, where Nietzsche is the principal figure of this reconfiguration of the question of art in a central interiority of philosophy, not in the least ultimately because of the philosophical type that is his, in his very terms, the type of philosopher-artist. For Nietzsche, art is primarily a subjective type. Before and essentially in the work, art's figure is that of the artist, and in such a regard, Nietzsche depicts the kind of philosopher, namely the artist-philosopher who is basically the philosopher and not a priest, or no longer a priest. Art will serve as a crucial paradigm, including the essential Nietzschean gesture of the reversal of all values, and especially what you might call a change of type for the philosopher. Nietzschean mutation is ambiguous in the sense that we can immediately say that Nietzsche is both philosopher and anti-philosopher, because it offers a de-typing and retyping of the philosopher. So in this type of philosopher as an artist-philosopher, there is a reconfiguration of the essential connection between philosophy and art, which is why Nietzsche proves to be a decisive author on the question of the relation between philosophy and art. It is a question that goes beyond Heidegger up until today. This question for us will be this: what is the natural mode in which philosophy retraces art, i.e. what is the mode in which philosophy is under the conditions of art, in the sense that it retraces it, and renames it. For example, we can say that Nietzsche retraces art in the figure of its type and not in the figure of his formal configuration - but in the figure of its type. The question of art as a form of truth - we can say it is so in the eyes of Nietzsche - how is it traced in the contemporary philosophical gesture? And as in my jargon, art is a generic procedure, like any procedure of truth. We will say that this question is a generic question, i.e. the question of the generic quality of art with regard to a philosophical disposition.

**The strategy of this seminar will entangle, or concern three questions:**

- **Topical Question: Status of the Nietzschean text**
- **Historical question: Was the century Nietzschean, and how so [in what**

sense]?

- Generic question, centered on the question of art

### The Way to Question Nietzsche's Text

The entanglement, which is already a fairly complex problem in itself, will be redoubled in another **difficulty**, recurrent in the assessment of Nietzsche, which is linked to Nietzsche, and precisely suited for Nietzsche, and it is the question – a fundamentally simple one – namely, **What exactly does it mean to utilize the Nietzschean text?** What is the protocol for a possible use of the Nietzschean text? More precisely, which of these questions can be addressed in such a text? And can one even ask such a question? And does it have to do with a text that is inherently exposed in the question? Those who have truly read Nietzsche know that his text does not appear to be open. It is not in the form of the proposition: it exhibits more than it proposes. The text is not available for questioning as such, for reasons that are internal to himself and are quite essential. To describe it in a very superficial manner, the text usually oscillates between pamphleteering and angry destruction, the text of which is an animation, and an affirmative order, which by no means is in dialectical relation to the previous order. The affirmative order is by no means a dialectic correlation of destruction. Nietzschean assemblage is not an assemblage where negation would precede or constitute the possibility of affirmation. Instead – and this, as Deleuze points out is highly relevant – there is a kind of stalling that is quite singular between the negative or critical dimension, words that are also too weak for Nietzsche words, in the destructive dimension, so to speak, and then in the structure appointed by Nietzsche as the High Noon, i.e. the system of affirmative serenity of the return. But whether pamphleteering destruction or Dionysian affirmation, neither one nor the other are proposed to the questioning assessment. This is not its status. Or, if you want, the Nietzschean text is not dialogical. It does not fit in the recurrent form of Platonic philosophy as dialogue. Nietzsche is

essentially a thinker who exposes his thoughts in a form exempted from dialogical character, as in dialectics. With this connection we may recall the subtitle of *Twilight of the Idols* that everyone knows of: "*How to Philosophize with a Hammer*." Obviously, a hammer is hardly something with which to address a question. One can certainly receive it to say why, but philosophy taken in the image of hammer indicates precisely that it is not dialogical. This is the essential point. The hammer is both what will destroy what deserves to be destroyed, and possibly enforce the paramount affirmation. This is not what will be the subject or object of the form of the question. In particular, it cannot, at any time, be examining evidence or even the will to probation in the Nietzschean text. One can even say that the Nietzschean device is that of undoing the argumentative structure. Basically, even when there are apparently arguments or sequences, philosophy is hammering against the slope of the argumentative structuring. Thereupon, the final maxim is in the *Twilight of the Idols*. It is with great strength, when Nietzsche said, "What needs to be proved is not worth much," **Aphorism 5**.

For, indeed, the general order of what is thought is not in the structure of the argument or that of evidence. It is therefore necessary to hear it in the strong sense: When Nietzsche said, "What needs to be proved is not of much worth," it is an essential judgment, because, of course, the value, or evaluation is precisely the key operation in Nietzsche. As we shall see in detail - the Nietzschean philosophy is fundamentally a philosophy of assessment, and transvaluation, as its two operations are the two operations key to this thought. It addresses what is essential or it questions everything as it is. So you could say - this is an anticipation of what we have to say about Nietzsche's ontology - what needs to be proved, more generally even evidence, question even which is not of worth. The essential weakness for Nietzsche from the system of evidence, it is not so much whether the argument is strong or weak, or quibbling, but it is that once you are in the element of proof you are vis-à-vis in the light of what is, what has been lacking in worth. What is of value

from what is by itself exempt from the evidence. Thus, no questioning of Nietzsche can be an argumentative questioning of assemblage, a logic of consecution, or even a standardized articulated demonstration of what it is. Those who read Nietzsche truly know that the text does not appear as open. It is in the form of the proposition: it exposes more than it offers. The text is not proposed to questioning as such for reasons that are internal and essential. To describe it superficially, the text oscillates in a general manner between pamphleteer and angry destruction, where the text is animation, and an affirmative register, which is in no way in a dialectical relation with the previous order. The affirmative structure is not the dialectical correlation of destruction. Nietzschean assemblage is not an assemblage where the denial would precede the possibility of affirmation. On the contrary –and this Deleuze emphasizes with great relevance: There is a sort of extremely unique stalling between the negative or critical dimension, words which are otherwise too weak to describe the work of Nietzsche, so we say the destructive dimension, then the structure which Nietzsche names the High Noon, i.e. the system of affirmative serenity of the return. But whether destructive pamphleteer or Dionysian affirmation, neither one nor the other are proposed to the questioning assessment.

But for now, in any case, let's not see this as a thesis of irrationalism, save but to think that any reason is part and parcel a calculative or argumentative reason. Let's just say that if there is reason for Nietzsche, it is an *evaluating reason*, i.e. a reason offered or disposed from the angle of what it is worth. And the evaluating reason is not a *compelling* one. However, of course the question of knowing what question Nietzsche addresses in the evaluating reason is a blurred question, because, as we shall see, there is always that feeling of being in discord to non-relatable principles of evaluation, i.e. which does not even come to establish a common space. This is why the reason is evaluating, and philosophy cannot be dialogical. But there is yet a more essential reason for the question which is so difficult to address in the Nietzschean text: that the central argument of Nietzsche's

business is nothing besides Nietzsche himself, which presents a very striking philosophical singularity. Nietzsche introduces himself in the heart of the device as a principle central to evaluating his own project. And the more time passes, the more this is so. In the texts we will mainly retain, namely the texts of 1888, for reasons that I will justify later, this approach is omnipresent. Everything happens as if Nietzsche himself is summoned as a principle of evaluation of the project where, moreover, he takes us left to be witnesses. Nietzsche not only functions as an author, or an author more or less removed from the universality of the text, but Nietzsche is part of the text itself, and strategically a centerpiece. One will obviously say, and one has said it again: but this here is madness! Especially if you take 1888 into account, as this is a year that seems to rush to the catastrophe of January 1889, which will finally tip Nietzsche in silence, and into dementia. But this argument, I believe, is weak, especially as is this argument, which, let's say, is pathological. Nietzsche, in these days has stated, in my view, just what he had to say. You find it at various points, but particularly in the text, *Nietzsche against Wagner*: the psychologist makes a speech: "Madness can be the mask of a fatal, all-too-certain knowledge."

This statement by which Nietzsche himself falls into the evaluational device assessing his own project, in other words, what is deposited in Nietzsche's text as a principle immanent in its assessment; is a certain structure of absolute subjective certainty, that is, *life* itself as a stretching of thought, a knowledge too certain, knowledge in excess of itself during its own stretching, which is proof, the central argument of the layout of the text itself. Or, if you prefer, we can say that the Nietzschean text is the provider of excess. It is properly that which traces or how this excess is deposited, and basically, Nietzsche sees no harm in naming madness insofar as it is nothing but "the mask of a fatal knowledge, far too certain. "This excess is a surge of truth, i.e. a truth exposed to a quite radical structuring of appropriation or if it is stretched so that it is itself its own provocative exhibition. And the text is only there to both welcome and calm part of this excess. It welcomes

it. It will be the dimension of stretching and internal evidence, but it will soothe it, i.e. include it anyway in the order of the address, which is quite particular in Nietzsche and we shall return here.

Previously, I had the opportunity to write that any philosophical text, properly speaking, superimposes on its form a drama of knowledge and drama of art. What characterizes the discursive structure of philosophy and makes it impure, as well, is that it entangles a drama of art and drama of knowledge. In this regard, we can say that in Nietzsche, there is a sharp break and that the drama of art has a radical influence on the entire philosophical text. But I indicate that this influence is simply the trace of convincing excess of the truth about oneself, i.e. the trace, not of the truth, but the power of the truth. And what will serve as evidence for the truth is precisely this power such that prose captures it or organizes it in the order of its form, all of this comprising, on one hand, folly, which bears the same structure of the text where the challenge is to have Nietzsche himself at the heart of his own project. Hence the absolute imperative of the poem on the text, the correlation of philosophy to the poem as an imperative, which is not an exterior or ornamental gift. It isn't just to make it beautiful, but it is in the inner logic of this self-exposure of the subject in the text, as stated in countless passages. For example, in *Ecce Homo*: "How could I endure being a man if the man is also a poet and decipherer of signs and redeemer of chance?"

Then, as long as the text is confident of an excess of self-truth, which is that in some sense the enunciation of truth is convincing, the evidence in excess in the text will attest, in the eyes of even Nietzsche, to everything first of all in form, i.e. in its style. What is exempt from the argument will end up or be deported as excess of itself, truly in the power of the form. Basically, this kind of ambivalence that I pointed to earlier, which is that the poetic surge of the text makes both truth in excess of itself, and is evidence for itself, and at the same time, the text is also what allows one to bear this situation, to calm it, to confer to it an address. So Nietzsche's textual

poetry in its organically philosophical role is both the possibility of truth and the possibility to support it. This is its power and the ability to endure this power. And this will arrange the text around the form of Nietzsche as one who, precisely, is exposed to this double movement: to be crossed by or to be the carrier by the excess power of truth, and at the same time to endure it, tolerate it, and be the confidant who is both crazy and patient. Nietzsche is a poet, i.e. the philosopher artist, so Nietzsche is prey to his own writing, and one can say that life is the truth it proclaims.

This is thus why it must be there in person: *Ecce Homo*, here is the man! He is literally there, not as author, unless exempt, but now deployed, unfolded in the text itself as a life of the truth it proclaims. And the life of truth it proclaims makes sense, and will thus replace the order of the argument. The argument, or evidence is what questions Being from outside as the only thing that matters, that has worth. But if one asks it in evaluating reason, i.e. from what is to be, or as it may be worth, then we must expose the truth as life, and not as a convincing argument. But exposing it as life, is to expose itself, and there is no other way. And this exhibition will consist in poetic style as the life of truth. From where this poem will inscribe Nietzsche as such in the text, and when you understand this crucial point, it must in my opinion, be a method of reading, taking literally the most emphatic, most amazing, most extraordinary statements in the letter.

Nothing, I believe, is more damaging to an in-depth understanding of Nietzsche and thus, the question: Are we or are we not Nietzschean, than of attempting to define excessive statements, where the mark of insanity is obvious, from statements we say are calm or ordinary. In reality, this is not the way it works, because madness itself or an emphatic statement or statement which seems extravagant, or as we say delusional, well this statement is only that establishing of Nietzsche himself as the living truth it proclaims. And if you read this, its emphatic character apparently bloated, it takes on another dimension, where we see that in a



certain sense it may even be modest. Even when Nietzsche says statements of the structure: "I carry the fate of the century", they are less - in my view - delusional statements, even if they are so- but in a sense, it doesn't matter! - Statements that I would call utterances establishing the structure of the text, i.e. the Nietzschean text is only possible if similar statements are also possible.

If it is really the approval of a truth in its own life, it is necessary that the exposure is radically subjective, and therefore such statements must be co-possible with the truth that says that because, in fact, one had absolute responsibility - one must solitarily carry absolute responsibility. That's why I think we should take these statements at face value, and make them work as philosophical statements, rather than as symptoms. This point of method is very crucial to me. So what is it in these utterances?

### **Status of Nietzsche's Mad Statements**

**Firstly, it shall have to do with speaking on his own behalf (speaking as himself).** Nietzsche is a complete philosopher who has pushed to the extreme limits the need to speak rigorously in his own name, i.e. speaking as himself. It is also quite striking that between what Nietzsche understood as "*speaking as yourself*" and what Lacan means by "not giving into his desire", the connection is extreme. From this point of view, the maxim "not giving into his desire", if it means something in the history of philosophy, this is what Nietzsche meant when he said it himself and settled in the heart of his own saying, to the point that the phrase "not yielding" will come very naturally from his pen in *Ecce Homo*: "My instinct irrevocably resolved to do away with this habit to assign, to do like everyone else, to take myself for another." It really is not to give in, so that one is convinced that what utters, one utters it as oneself, i.e. the desire in which one is coextensive. The real challenge will be to take himself for himself, not for another. Or, of course, what Nietzsche is well aware of is that the common system of speech is always the order of anonymity for everyone, i.e. the system of anonymity of the "we", or the serial order of opinion. So,

indeed, conquering the possibility of not giving up his desire to say, that's the stretching or the exception. The ordinary structure is: I am like everyone else, and therefore I take myself for another. However, conquering the opportunity to take oneself as oneself, that is really the question of "philosophical saying," with all the quotation marks you want.

**Secondly, that truth is always in the order of the decision.** Speaking under his own name, taking himself as himself, will go with what is called the truth in the form of deciding and not in the form of exteriority or rally. Take for example this statement that is quite emphatic from *Ecce Homo*: "I am first to behold the criterion of "truths." I am the first who can decide." "I am the first". This here is madness as a "mask of a fatal and too sure knowledge," and nothing else. But the heart of the question is to establish that the truth is the order of the possibility of decision. And that one is, in reality, in the question of truth if and only if it is the structure of the possibility of the decision. "I am the first who can decide." It is indeed a power itself dependent to take oneself for oneself, i.e. the ability to speak in his own name. We say that Nietzsche's philosophy is projected into a hysterical order of truth, prior to the conceptual development of this system in the course of analytic discourse.

And that is really the establishment of the truth to his hysterical structure: "I, the truth I speak," which always means: me, the truth, I speak first, or I am the first who speaks, and I decide not to plan approval or argument, but in the structure of utterance, because it is the utterance that binds truth to its power. This also means - and this is an essential point - that Nietzsche is the first to establish his speech in the thesis that **there is no truth but the truth**. There is a decision to truth, but nothing comes overlooking this decision to authorize or guarantee it. The truth, as far as a decision which ruled, since I take myself as me, and not for another, only authorizes itself precisely as pure structure of decisive utterance.

**It follows** *that truth itself is given in the form of a risk*, i.e. unlike any figure of wisdom or contemplation, and the whole problem is that we are able to bear it. The

fundamental question of the truth is: what can I bear? It is not the question of its research or contemplation, but of the manner in which we endure, which is also very close to the subsequent teachings of the analytic discourse. It is clear that the truth is to share in the question of suffering. Nietzsche often repeated, of course not in the redemptive or Christian sense, i.e. in the sense that he must suffer so that at the bottom of this suffering comes the saving redemption, but in the sense of the question of what animal am I to bear, endure or suffer such and such amount of truth. It's very clear in this page of *Ecce Homo*: "What dose of truth a spirit knows he can bear, knows he can risk? This is what has increasingly become for me the true test of values" (Preface, 3).

Thus: decision, risk, exposure of oneself, taking up action for oneself-- all these themes refer to a poetic connection or speaking around a textual configuration, where we see that it is the Philosophical Act according to Nietzsche, a structure which makes truth never what is argued or discussed, but the truth as truly what it states. All truth is in the form of a statement of risk, where the main witness as well as the main provider of evidence is the subject of enunciation itself in its ability to endure, to bear what it says. *Ecce Homo* concentrated all upon this quote that I am closer to this projection of the hysterical structure: "*It is the truth that speaks through my lips, but my truth is terrible.*" And, as always, Nietzsche implies that it is overwhelmingly terrible for him. It is not simply that it will terrorize the world, the first reason that it is terrible, it is the subject which endures in the modality of the fact that it is Nietzsche who speaks.

These is a series of things to keep in mind in order to refer to the Nietzschean text, in order to know what can or will be asked of it:

- **Be absolutely oneself, i.e. break with a series of opinions**
- **Risk and decide whatever the cost**
- **Face the terrible as far as it is to speak the truth, i.e. from being directed to utter it**

We can say that for Nietzsche, truth is first of all a terrible rupture in a

declarative form, where the person who breaks and declares is the true witness. It is also the one who testifies for the declaration he has made. You have to take "testimony" in its strong sense, i.e. it is convincing evidence for the statement that he made, because he describes how he endures the break that he declares. We'll see how this figure, despite the resemblance, is actually the opposite of the martyr figure. It is not that the martyr is the truth that one says, as it would be inadmissible interpretation in the eyes of Nietzsche, but that the martyr is the joyful witness insofar as this joy is precisely the terrible as such. This great afternoon of testimony to the statement of truth is also terrible, attesting that this dose of truth is suffered by the subject who has consented to be oneself, to speak as oneself and not another. It is only by having all this in mind that we can understand phrases such as, for example, in *Ecce Homo*: "I bear upon my shoulders the destiny of humanity." We can say *a priori*: a delirious paranoid sentence, and yes, it is. But how to understand it? How must we understand its philosophical projection? This is what interests us, i.e. what is its non-symptomatic operation, if it is evaluated other than as a sentence of madness? Well then, I think it means this: Immediately, between what is said and the person who speaks, there is no difference, because the reactive, the priesthood, the vassalage and the lowering, begins, in Nietzsche's eyes, when one establishes a standard between the one who speak, and that which is spoken.

This very gap is almost the origin of the negative in the history of humanity as far as it is a disjunction, albeit small, between what is said and who says it. Nietzsche's radical thesis posits that it is one and the same one who said and he who says. When we talk about art, we see the particular approach to Nietzsche, for whom there is no difference between the art and the artist, which is very difficult to understand in the productivist logic in which one conceives of art. It is not simply that the author is in his work and that only his biography counts; this is not meant at all, but strictly between the artist type and art, there is no gap, there's no need to create a gap. Generally, authentic speech that is genuine, so to say, philosophical, is

the exposure of enunciation as a rupture, and thus it engages all of humanity, even if this engagement only brings one of its points. But whenever this happens, it involves whole humanity: each time there is full exposure of the utterance as a rupture, then this commits all mankind, even if this commitment covers only one of its points. The fact that it engages in one of its points does not matter, because nothing in Nietzsche is numerical or statistical or multiple, but is typological and can be localized.

And if in one of its points there really is no difference between what is said and the status of the *who* that states something, and anywhere that this occurs, the fate of all mankind is at stake. This is why Nietzsche can say: "*I bear the fate of humanity on my shoulders*," except that in his own eyes, this sentence becomes emphatic or delusional, and simply it is Becoming this - especially in *Ecce Homo* where it's: Here I am! -establishing a system of discourse, in fact, without any difference between the one who spoke and what is spoken. And Nietzsche has a deep, modest, and rigorous awareness that doing that, doing so, even in one of these points, the fate of humanity, is entirely at stake. One can also say, and for my part I am very sensitive to this in every sense of the term--is that in Nietzsche nothing is given in the form of generality. There is no generality. What exists, i.e. that involves the destiny of humanity, never has a general status. It is always something that is in a point, i.e. always resorption at this point, from a gap prevailing elsewhere. This difference is a disjoint between what is said and who says, and then, in the history of writing, of art, of thought and of humanity, it can occur that at a point this gap is circumstantially or temporarily canceled and so there is exposure of the utterance itself.

This is what Lacanian language calls the anchoring point of the history of thought, i.e. what counts as a point where the history of thought returns toward its Real, because there is a termination of the gap and the occurrence of the terrible, terrible if given the status assigned to Nietzsche, i.e. the primary attribute of a truth

whatsoever. In other words, when there is full exposure of the enunciation, a disjunction is absorbed at one point, the fate of humanity is at stake, and whoever is there, i.e. a person who is same with the text, and not the author or the innocent product, carries on his shoulders the fate of humanity.

Faced with all this - and to return to the starting point of this very first crossing - we might ask: how do we question the work of Nietzsche? Basically, one could be tempted to say that with regard to Nietzsche, there is only the taking action of what takes place. Nietzsche himself says very bluntly that before anything else, it is an event, himself, Nietzsche, i.e. the same as the text. Thus we can say that there is only the taking of action in this Event, from the fact that it takes place. **The only connection that one can support in Nietzsche, is to acknowledge that Nietzsche took place, and make free use as we wish to make of an Event, i.e. to enroll in its wake, or on the contrary, to abolish its effects.** But I believe it would not really make any sense to be Nietzschean or anti-Nietzschean from this point of view, for Nietzsche would refer to the idea of a doctrine, where one may share the main argumentative thesis. However, **the Nietzschean text does not fit in a doctrinal configuration, but in a declarative Evental form.** This Evental declaration took place, so it fits into the overall scheme of what took place. So there is no sense in being Nietzschean, but there is simply meaning in taking a position with regard to this: there was Nietzsche, if we bend to Nietzschean rules.

At this point, what has happened, and what has taken place, is first and foremost in the power of a form, i.e. the capturing of the taking place (*avoir lieu*) is not a doctrinal capturing, and does not require a rallying or belief. It demands to be known, as is also the case in any Evental situation, what we think of the formal power of this taking place. And Nietzsche, in addition to what we have just said, the main argument of saying what is revealed where language is capable. Nietzsche is the declaratory Event that reveals what language is capable of. It reveals a previously unperceived capacity of language, which is thus the same thing as the

statement of truth, as the absence of any distance between the subject of the utterance and the subject of what is uttered. Thus, in the eyes of Nietzsche of course and at last resort, Eventality is a declaratory Event of the truth, where the most obvious sign has revealed an unprecedented dimension of the capacity of language.

I give you one final quote from *Ecce Homo*: "Before reading myself, one knows not what can be done with the German language, or what can be done in general with language." Another "crazy" and emphatic statement, but that means that taking place in a Nietzschean manner manifests as an Event in an unperceived capacity of language. But indeed, this is true of any Event, because in my opinion, any Event always summons a formerly unseen capacity of language-- otherwise it remains nameless, and thus undecidable, i.e. a non-Event. There are only facts that can be named in the available resources of language. Events themselves require - that is to say that we are following traces - that language is called to its own inner emptiness, i.e. to a nominative resource itself, previously unperceived. So here, Nietzsche only repeats what must be read as an Event, and not as a doctrine that the right relation to its intervention is. We will say that the discovered power of language, i.e. what one discovers from the power in language, demonstrates the absolute exposure of the subject to risk and to the pure decision of the declaration of the truth.

This is the manner in which Nietzsche arrives. He says that there was a power previously unperceived in language, and this is of what it is capable, and this unperceived capacity demonstrates for this that I, myself, Nietzsche, am absolutely exposed to risk and to the decision of the declaration of truth. In light of such a configuration, one can finally recognize or not recognize the Nietzschean event, which is quite different from "to be or not be Nietzschean." It could be of this Event in the sense that it is recognized, i.e. where we recognize the Evental dimension or not. Notice that in light of what we have just said, recognizing it is the one and only thing than recognizing what has made language capable of what it was previously

incapable. In other words, again, recognizing that Nietzsche is an Event of thought is, to the eyes of Nietzsche himself, the same as admitting that he has made the German language (but actually language in general) capable of what it was not capable of before. Or we could say, the stylistic reading or artistic relation to the Nietzschean language is the same thing as the recognition of its declaration of truth or its subjective exposure in language. Moreover, Nietzsche, in the last year, absolutely intervenes with an argument in favor of the text that is recognized as such by the crowd--it doesn't matter by whom.

These are quite moving passages, and one might also say, extremely insane ones, but you see how they arrive at the heart of what we were saying, as Nietzsche has such a strong sense that what he asks is an Evental recognition and not a doctrinal rally. He asks you to take literally the events documented in the language dimension, that he came to believe that it doesn't matter who in the street is recognized as such, i.e. as Nietzsche who saying indivisibly he who says and he who is said, recognizable even in its anonymity, since it is he who is exposing himself as such in the text. This argument is, in fact, the most generic, namely that it doesn't matter who recognizes in Nietzsche, not at all a savior to one's belief rallied as a prophet, but what he willingly calls a prince of truth, i.e. nothing but what is exposed, naked in the text that became previously incapable, at the risk of its own statement.

Again, in the chapter of *Ecce Homo*, titled, *Why I write such good books*, thus as an argument in favor of its text. Imagine Nietzsche in an absolutely lonely time, virtually unknown in the city of Turin, fleeing Germany, for which he has a devastating hatred, so that when it is remembered that German nationalism has claimed him, we are still stunned because nobody hated Germany and the Germans so excessively. Nietzsche himself in his beloved Italy, writes (I love it): "What is for me most flattering, is that the old Market of Four Seasons never ceases to choose for me the ripest grapes. Here's how one must be a philosopher." It's beautiful, it's



funny, it's very crazy and quite beautiful, because there we expose the generic vocation of philosophy itself, i.e. if it is really what Nietzsche says, i.e. the exposure of saying anyone who simply consented to be oneself without giving into The Act of taking oneself for another, hence endured the terrible truth, when philosophy is addressed and recognized by anyone, regardless of whether they read it or not, because something is for Nietzsche himself able to be read from this naive exhibition that he endures, not once again, as an extraordinary character by birth or vocation, but simply as he agreed to not differentiate between one who speaks, and what is said. If you do not make a distinction, well the market of four seasons will give you the ripest bunches of grapes. I find it beautiful. Nietzsche said that in winter 88, and Nietzsche will collapse if we talk of collapse, on January 3, 1889, canonically considered the date Nietzsche entered dementia. Well this point that there is a generic recognition of philosophy, if it is conceived as he conceives it, is very important, for on December 21, 1888 he writes to his mother: *"There is no name that is now pronounced with more consideration or respect than mine. No name, no title, no money, I am treated here as a true prince by everyone, starting with the Market of Four Seasons."*

In relation to such a configuration, we can finally recognize or not recognize the Nietzschean Event, quite different from "being or not being Nietzschean." It may be this Event in the sense that we recognize it, i.e. where we recognize the "Event or not" dimension. Note, that given what we have said, it is to recognize a single thing to recognize what made the language capable of what she could not do. In other words, again, to recognize that Nietzsche is an Event of thinking is, in the eyes of Nietzsche himself, the same as to admit that he made the German (but in reality language in general) capable of what he could not. Or: stylistic reading or artistic reading compared to the Nietzschean language is the same as the recognition of his statement of truth or that of his exposure in the subjective language. Moreover, Nietzsche, in the last year, completely intervenes as an argument in favor of the text

that is recognized as such by the crowd, by anyone. Let's look at the text, and see how things go in this extreme over-stretching of the generic definition of philosophy. It starts with this: "*There is no name that is now pronounced with more consideration or respect than mine,*" which means: today I am so inseparably between "what" I say and the "I" who speaks, whose name is Nietzsche, that this same name, which is nothing, is pronounced by everyone with consideration and respect. So this allows us to return to our insistent question: if the Philosophical Act seeks recognition, what question can be addressed to him? If there is a declarative Eventuality that eventually the Market of 4 seasons can recognize without knowing it, where it knows the name because it has no name. What is the question addressed to the Act?

A first element that adds a second, which is that in the name, Nietzsche, there is nothing other than the name itself. It is not a name that was appointed as a name that came to him from outside, and in this respect there is no name, i.e. he is "without name, title, or money." This Nietzsche is a name without a name, an anonymous name, a name without nominal recognition, and it is this name without name that recognizes the merchant of four seasons, i.e. the name of the person who is unnamed because his name is solely what he says, and in this indistinguishable point itself, only in the shelter of this name without a name; whom anyone can generically recognize as such and constitute a prince. This metaphor of the prince is very important: the philosopher as prince, as a little prince, is one that is recognized by everyone as the unnamed name, and an anonymous name is a name that has endured its own exposure without reward other than the terrible arrival, the risk and decision. This is essential because it will allow us to gradually qualify what I would call the Philosophical Act according to Nietzsche, in the heart of Nietzsche's text. For now, we know, in any case, that this Act is without name, without title; but it is radically subjective, i.e. it establishes the subject at the heart of the text which is also poetic. Finally, and very importantly, it is generically recognized as such. The

emblem of the generic is here, as Nietzsche says, the market of four seasons. Let's also say that the gesture of the Philosophical Act is not likely to be studied, but it is fundamentally likely to be recognized, which is why this is a paradoxical act that does not require a review or rallying, but a recognition. So that we return to the insistent question: if the Philosophical Act seeks recognition, what question should we ask him? If it is a declarative Eventality eventually the market of 4 seasons can recognize without knowing it, that she knows the name because there is no name, which is the question addressed in this Act? It is here, in its preliminary title, that we will look at works by Heidegger and Deleuze on Nietzsche. We see at which point this is embarrassing, at which point Nietzsche is not an author who asks a question, because he asks for recognition. It is quite complex. **I simply wish to establish my own method, by difference and by confrontation.**

### **Heideggerian Interpretation**

Heidegger's view is actually the Event, and this is the point where it is true to Nietzsche. Anyway, at first, Heidegger actually discusses Nietzsche as an Event, and he agreed to consider it as such. The movement of Heidegger will be to examine the Event in its Eventality, i.e. to examine the radical nature of this event. How far is this Event really an Event for thought, i.e. to what extent does he argue for the radical nature that he agrees with? Heidegger is going to question the Nietzschean Event through its innovative power and exceptional singularity. The method will be immanent for Nietzsche, because it does not at all deal with anything outside his philosophy as a body of doctrine, but will treat Nietzsche as he wants to be treated, i.e. in the recognition of an Evental statement, but Heidegger is going to bring the assessment of a manner that increasingly closes in on the question of knowing whether this Event is as much Event as he states it is. In other words, if Eventality of this Event measures left to what it claims, i.e. that Heidegger will attempt to assess the rupture: What is the Nietzschean rupture in terms of Event?

Let's frame things in large: this evaluation by Heidegger of the Nietzschean act

follows a dual approach:

This dramatic reversal is The Act on behalf of which Nietzsche is set up and described. Heidegger looks under that name and that name as may be appropriate to the Nietzschean reversal of all values.

Clarifying the conditions of The Act of thought, i.e. the form of thought of Being which allows The Act to have this name. This question will be raised: what is actually the relation of thought to Being in Nietzsche, that the fundamental act on behalf of which he asks to be recognized can be called the transvaluation of all values? The bafflement is as follows: we will take action, the conditions of this Act, and examine the conditions in thought of the name of The Act; a consideration will revolve around two concepts, that of the will to power, and that of the Eternal Return of the Same. We can say that the Heideggerian path will be to welcome the Event's dimension, understanding the name of this Act, examining the conditions in thinking in terms of destiny of the being of this name under the double heading of will to power on the one hand, the Eternal Return of the Same on the other. And, as we know, this movement will conclude that the novel Event of Nietzsche novelty remains relative, i.e. that The Act of Nietzschean rupture can be assessed as still remaining within metaphysics. But it will be, nonetheless, by memorization of the Eventality of the Event that the Nietzschean act will be said to remain internal to what he claims to be in ruins, namely Western metaphysics and Platonism. Heidegger will at best condescend in stating that Nietzsche is the edge of the completion of metaphysics. In its conclusion, it is framed by two propositions:

1) "Nietzsche's thought is metaphysical, in accordance with any Western thought since Plato."

2) "The age of the completion of metaphysics is seen when reviewing the basic features of Nietzsche's metaphysics."

**Statement One: Nietzsche's Thought is of a Metaphysical Structure.**

However, in the second statement, a review of its basic features allows us to say that

one is situated in the **era of the completion of metaphysics**. I present here the principle of its course. In a completely primary approach, we can say that the evaluation of the Nietzschean Event by Heidegger is the assessment of the form of an endpoint as what is at the extreme edge, i.e. the end of the recapitulation of where it is the edge. At bottom, this Nietzscheanism will be the protocol of what Western metaphysics draws as its endpoint, the point which is not beyond, but in interiority recapitulative at the same time as it is an extreme effect. Note that this is nearly the opposite of the representation Nietzsche has of himself. I'm not saying that this invalidates Heidegger's interpretation, but the fact is that if there is one thing Nietzsche says, it is although it is not an endpoint, a summary, or a completion.

The representation that Nietzsche has of his act, and which will be the phenomenological question in the next session, is first of all a rupture, a break, a break in half, and not at all something that comes from a topological board in a species of the effect of closure, which would at the same time be the ultimate disposition of all that it closes. This figure would honor Nietzsche in terms of the representation of its act, even though strictly speaking there are all sorts of arguments to say that it's still like that. But in my opinion the essential point is when Nietzsche speaks of his own act, and he conceives it as primarily a political act. This Philosophical Act conceived as a policy instrument is held in the face of breaking in the entire history in two, and not at all like arrival to the transgression of its limit.

Among the numerous texts on this topic, perhaps the most striking is a draft letter to Georg Brandes, the Danish scholar of Nietzsche, dated December 1888, and so a few days before what would be called the collapse or start of his breakdown: *"We have just entered high politics, even the most high. I am planning an Event that will most likely break history into two sections to the point that it will require a new calendar where 1888 will be '1'."* Here is Nietzsche's representation of his act, or madness. But we have once again, axiomatically, madness as simply *"the mask of a knowledge, fatal and far all-too-certain."* And what is certain is that Nietzsche sees his Philosophical Act in the

image of breaking into 2 sections of history of all mankind, so that he sees it as an absolute opening of a new era, as a "new agenda" and thus Nietzsche is measured by the French Revolution, the single previous undertaking to have had, in effect, constituted a new schedule. We must begin again the question of Year 1. In short, the Philosophical Act is designed by Nietzsche as a revolutionary political, radical and foundational act. This is a key point for me because, from there, I have an opportunity to argue that Nietzsche is perhaps the thinker who tried to bring philosophy to the tune of a revolution. It is in the age of revolutions, but it is in thought. Nietzsche hates the French Revolution, hates socialists, but in thought, Nietzsche is anything but a counter-revolutionary. In his ideological hatred of figures of the revolution, what he reproaches in them is the being of aborted and petty revolutions, packed into Christianity, and of missed revolutions.

And what he proposes is veritably the first year, i.e. the Revolution such that the thought of the Revolution is on the level of the Revolution, or once again thought is on the level of its act, or thought is even indistinguishable from its act, and this will occur in the break in two of world history. Thus Nietzsche at not at all the immanent thought of a fencing-in. I believe that the representation that Nietzsche has given himself is actually the thought of a break. But Heidegger finally missed something in his evaluation, refined as it is, namely the true characterization of the Philosophical Act according to Nietzsche, in this point: Heidegger questions why The Act had the name "the transvaluation of all values," without noticing that the qualification of The Act is not exhausted by the name given to it. The fact that Nietzsche says that the Philosophical Act by which he is about to break in two world histories is the transvaluation of all values, which Heidegger relates to the eternal problem of values, is finally a problem of unconditioned subjectivity, which he states very strongly from the point of the name, as if, in this area, it were the name of the Philosophical Act according to which Nietzsche could bear or endure the entire interpretation of this Act. I do not believe this. I think that in the Nietzschean

configuration of The Act, there is something rebellious in the name he gave it, i.e. in the name of the transvaluation of all values, i.e. in the name of values. We will try to make this point work, because the question of Nietzsche's philosophy must start from the extraordinary representation that Nietzsche gives to The Act. But Heidegger shares too much of the name of The Act and practices a sort of intra-Nietzschean nominalism, in which he remains true to Nietzsche, because that is the name that Nietzsche states, but that's not why the name exhausts the substance of The Act by its circulation throughout the whole of Nietzsche's thought.

For Heidegger, the appropriation of the name Nietzsche, since it is always by him, is available in the metaphysical category in the precise sense that thinking like Nietzsche's philosophy text will be related or placed in the subsuming of metaphysics. However, the metaphysics appropriated by Heidegger in the case of "Nietzsche", it is metaphysics taken up in the form of its completion, which itself has the name of nihilism, and one can say in an all-too-summational fashion, but which tries to point the open way, in Nietzsche, nihilism is completed in overcoming it, once again properly metaphysics, of nihilism even of nihilism, which for Heidegger is strictly metaphysical nihilism. This is the nihilism completed in the separation from its own essence, as Nietzsche claims to have the means to overcome nihilism from within, which, for Heidegger, makes Nietzsche the emblem of completed nihilism, as defined where it is ultimately blind to its own essence. In the undertaking of thought represented by the two volumes of Nietzsche by Heidegger, the passage that is perhaps most synthetic is found precisely in the 6th part of Volume II: *The Metaphysics of Nietzsche* (1940), which is descriptively the most representative of the operation of Heidegger's thought on Nietzsche. And, in light of the specification as Nietzsche as the enterprise which achieves it from the inside of nihilism that ends up blind to its own essence, the most striking passage is found on page 301 of Volume II, which is in the seventh section of the book entitled: *The ontological-historical determination of nihilism* (1944-1946): "When the metaphysics

of Nietzsche not only interprets Being from the being in the sense of the direction of the will to power as one value, but until Nietzsche will think the will to power is the principle of an establishing of new values and he attempts and wills this, it as what is supposed to overcome nihilism, and thus the extreme embarrassment of metaphysics in the inauthentic nihilism comes to rule by the same desire to overcome it, so that this embarrassment is hiding from its own essence, and so, as a reduction of nihilism it simply transposes it into the efficacy of its originating essence which is unleashed."

The movement of this text is clear once Heidegger's jargon is internalized. He says that overcoming nihilism, which in Heidegger's eyes, is the program of Nietzschean thought, i.e. the reversal of all values, but above all the introduction of new values, unleashes nihilism itself, since, in claiming to overcome it, it establishes the opacity of its essence, which is precisely nihilism that cannot be overcome, for the essential historical determination of nihilism is that which, from within ourselves, does not allow itself to be overcome. One could almost say that this is his definition, in some respects. But when nihilism, i.e. Nietzschean metaphysics, is expressed in the program of overcoming it, thus stated as its ultimate ability precisely when it is incapable, then nihilism is actually unleashed, because it is no longer even retained in its own essence, what Heidegger calls "the unleashed de-essences" of nihilism. In this sense, for Heidegger, Nietzsche is the one with the program of nihilism, the destructive agenda of the reversal of all values, but also the program of the establishing new values in the form of the great afternoon of affirmation. And as with Nietzsche has endowed the nihilism of such a program, and has delivered it from the prescription of the visibility of its own essence, and unleashed efficiency, if one means by revolution a programmatic vision of historical rupture, namely the program combined from destruction from what is an Event of a radical innovation. This is where essence comes to be darkened to the point of hiding from its essence, when liberated, under the form of pure efficiency, or the



arrest of Being, the sheer power of nihilism itself. In passing, I would like to make the following remark: when Heidegger grasps and thinks like Nietzsche concerning the programmatic dimension of the revolutionary element of thought, what is interesting is that this is truly what he criticizes, i.e. not as the generic idea of a rupture because after all Heidegger calls it also establishes the form of a reversal, but he criticizes the idea that this reversal can take the shape or the form of establishing a program, even the introduction of new values. Heidegger argues, instead, that nihilism provides a program of exiting from nihilism, and essentially accomplishes the principle of releasing one from nihilism. This is the way of a consistent power in the appropriation of the text of Nietzsche. The question is whether it is relevant, i.e. if the Nietzschean text is left to be exposed to this appropriation, is another matter, to which we will later return.

### **Deleuzian Interpretation**

In contrast, what Deleuze places at the center of his perception of Nietzsche, his main qualification, is not the subjective exposition in the first plan. This is not the starting point of Deleuze, which is no longer the revolutionary dimension of The Act, but what Deleuze will attempt to specify in full, is Nietzsche as a tragic philosopher. Deleuze addresses in Nietzsche the following question: what is a tragic philosophy in the sense that Nietzsche himself understands it? The context of Deleuze's assessment, which will be employed in an extraordinarily orderly manner - Deleuze's book is constructed quite systematically and stringently compared to the Nietzschean corpus - has as an emblem the designation of a type of exemplary philosophy, which is of the tragic kind, where Nietzsche himself claims the naming. So we share intra-Nietzschean words. ». *Ecce Homo*: "I am entitled to consider myself as the first tragic philosopher, i.e. as the opposite extreme of a pessimistic philosopher." The key coupling will be that of tragedy and pessimism, which is naturally also in the opposition between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. What is meant by tragedy in the Nietzschean sense, but ultimately, too, in an almost

universal sense? Tragedy seems to have two essential references:

The first is that there is tragedy when an **inevaluable depth** is found, a bottomless bottom or something reduced to the standards he founded, inaccessible from departing from what depth grounds. In Nietzsche, the invaluable depth is from one end to the other of his thought called life. And in a first sense, Nietzsche's philosophy will be tragic because life, which is the principle of any assessment, is itself invaluable. *Twilight of the Idols*: "The value of life cannot be assessed." This maxim established despite all subtracted depth, denoted at the same time it is totally affirmed in the order of assessment.

The second reference which characterizes tragedy is that **chance is irreducible**. The occurrence that happens in the face of the terrible does not let itself be subsided by anything. There is a crash, which will give it quite beautiful comparative pages of Deleuze between Nietzsche and Mallarmé. And even as Nietzsche says in *Ecce Homo*: "I'm always left to chance." Nietzsche's a tragic philosopher because he is "always living in the height of chance." Tragedy is the correlation of an inevaluability and the chance supplementing it.

On the bottom side, something slips away, evading the assessment and, in addition, there is the chance of the level of what it requires to be in the incalculable manner. If you wish, the tragedy is the correlation of the depth and excess of chance, which constitutes the tragic as fate, as destiny in its Greek sense. We must not take any of destiny as a form of necessity, the fate of the Greek tragedy is the exposed correlation between the lack of assessment of the foundation, and what establishes, and the incalculable excess of chance. Such is the fate that works in Greek tragedy, and not at all formal requirement which precedes, or a determinism. The tragic hero is one who in a double binding is at once exposed to the hiding of the assessment in the depth at the same time that he will strike a supplementary chance at the heights which he desperately tries to reach. The tragic philosopher is also the one whose declaration of thought is that the value of life cannot be evaluated, but that it is

required to try to be worthy of life. The tragic fate in the Nietzschean sense dictates two statements that you find in an entire chapter of *Ecce Homo*, entitled "Why I am a Destiny" – why it is "I" – and in the *Twilight of the Idols*, seeking to know what one is, i.e. what that anyone is. Nietzsche will say, "One is a fragment of fatality." If one takes fatality in the sense I have just mentioned – what one is, when one is something – it's a fragment of thought that crosses the concealment of the depth and supplementation of chance. But although he does not say so, it is "I" who has to reconstruct, it is the center of gravity in Deleuze, who concerning Nietzsche, deploys the layout of the tragic philosophy: How, once this is said, does the philosophy arrive at an establishment in Nietzsche?

Deleuze discusses this point on two levels:

On the first level: He immediately explains **why all tragic philosophy replaces the question of meaning with that of truth**. This will be his first essential interpretation. The opening sentence of his book goes: "*The more general project of Nietzsche is this: introducing in philosophy the concepts of meaning and value.*" Nietzsche establishes the philosophy in the system of the question of meaning, precisely because he evades the depth of the hazardous supplementation demanding a problem of meaning. So tragic philosophy contains a problem of meaning.

On the second: **Tragic philosophy will examine the multiplicity of meaning**, because from the moment we leave the singularity of truth, we are in the plurality of meaning. Thus the questions that Deleuze will address to Nietzsche will be essentially **typological** questions, i.e. what are the different identifiable types from which meaning is granted? This will be the axial matter traversed by a logic, i.e. the typological question will be crossed by a logic of active and reactive forces. If you wish to specify the types from which meaning is given, one must use a logic of forces which distributes The Active forces and reactive forces as the first binary logic of forces. So if you had to summarize in one word the question that Deleuze asks Nietzsche, the usage that Deleuze makes of it, it could be said this way:

Nietzsche is tragic philosophy as a logic of the typological multiple.

- **Tragic philosophy: randomness and unfounded grounding**
- **Logic: a logic of forces, active and reactive**
- **Multiple: there are multiple donations of meaning, never one**
- **Typological: this crystallizes into types (the priest, Zarathustra, the superman, the last man) and finally, Nietzsche himself is a type, the type of tragic philosophy.**

For Deleuze, the appropriation of the name "Nietzsche" is carried out under the central category of tragic philosophy. So it is the name Nietzsche designates philosophy in its tragic type, since Deleuze assumes the typological principle of Nietzschean thought. And thus Nietzsche, in an exemplary way, names philosophy in its tragic type. However, as much as tragedy is the correlation of a depth that is hidden, i.e. of a founding naming subtracted in this as it establishes, and a coincidence that supplements, thus the crossing of exposure of its foundation, and of the supplementation by coincidence, which of course, does not fill what it finds, "the value of life cannot be evaluated," life being the possible name of depth in Nietzsche, but precisely something from which value remains absolutely inevaluable and, as all thought is evaluation, in a certain sense, life as such is only a name, a name robbed of its grounding.

In this last maxim, Nietzsche says of himself (but this itself is a category of his philosophy): "*I'm always left to the height of chance.*" Tragic thought thus stands at the crossing of what it cannot evaluate which founds it at the same time it always to be at the level of the unfounded. From this point of view, tragedy is the correlate of a lack and excess, and the point where something missing is given in excess, an excess which never fills this gap. This logic of the lack and excess frames Nietzsche's logic.

From the determination of philosophy as a tragic type, Nietzsche is engaged in an interpretation that provides a coherent theory of multiples in addition to the theory of the multiple of what gives meaning, namely of types. The Deleuzian

interpretation consists, then, of a typological path of Nietzsche that is settled by **the non-dialectical correlation between active forces and reactive forces**. Instead, in Heidegger, the entire focus is on the program of thinking attributed to Nietzsche by Heidegger, i.e. the program of **overcoming nihilism**. Deleuze's vision will be attached to the essential descriptive style in Deleuze, in the description of a path related to the typological multiplicity in the work of Nietzsche. Deleuze touches upon a significant and real point, not only in stating that there is a great Nietzschean typology of homes, of principles or intensities of meaning, which is obvious, but because this leads to a question that is fundamental, in my view: which is, in Nietzsche, the question of proper names. What is the function of proper names in Nietzsche, given that we have already met with a principal name that is Nietzsche, but it is not the only one? Well, it is in light of all this that I will try to draw out my own way in contraposition and review these points during the next session.

## Second Course: The Dionysian "Yes" - Affirmation

Last time, I'd begun speaking of the difficulties that are very peculiar to the appropriation of Nietzsche's texts. This was a way to enter Nietzsche's singularity, i.e. of not treating the text as a philosophical reference as any other, but to understand what is absolutely specific as soon as we attempt to develop a protocol of any appropriation of his text. I told you that the central difficulty converges towards the fact that Nietzsche does not ask his textual proposition to be a submission to an assessment or a commentary, nor does he demand, strictly speaking, rallying. What the nature of Nietzschean text requires is a form of recognition, i.e. the very fact that this text has taken place. It is necessary and sufficient to note that taking action is the true relationship that Nietzschean text requires and this is the form of what I might call his singular authority. Nietzsche calls for this existence to be acknowledged, but one notices quite soon that what Nietzsche requests to be acknowledged is the very existence of Nietzsche. It must be mentioned that this is what Sarah Kofman suggests in her recent book on *Ecce Homo*, titled *Explosion I* – that we must distinguish "Nietzsche" and Nietzsche. Thus there is a Nietzsche who is, in fact, the circulating proper name to which we are accustomed, and then there was the "Nietzsche" that could, in fact, punctuate or emphasize something, and that is where Nietzsche's text asks to be acknowledged. Or we can say that Nietzsche himself is presented, i.e. Nietzsche presents "Nietzsche" as the name of an infinite power of thought and that this name as such should be recognized. Let's indicate in this passage that this demand for recognition is not actually a narcissistic demand, but a categorical demand, i.e. that Nietzsche asks that the category "Nietzsche" is listed as it is in the flux or Becoming of thought. One can also say that the main argument that Nietzsche displays in favor of his text, is the validation of what this proper name recovers: "Nietzsche" as immanent category of the textual device. We can also say: the proper name "Nietzsche" is what is immanent evidence for Nietzsche's text. It is an even greater difficulty, which of

course we should not hear: "Nietzsche", *the* "Nietzsche" as a category of Nietzsche's thought, as a signature of the author, i.e. as what the text would refer to as its absent cause, but one must rather understand "Nietzsche" as a central category of the work itself. If we wish, we can say that "Nietzsche" is explicit in Nietzsche, and it is not the underlying quality of the author that is abolished- an author who is dead where his text is most vibrant. "Nietzsche" is presented in his own life and not in his or her erasure, or in his death, in the Nietzschean text.

Finally, I had indicated that this recognition Nietzsche requires, i.e. of "Nietzsche" as a category of Nietzsche's text, is a generic recognition. It is not intended, nor addressed. It is arbitrary in the sense that Nietzsche can and should be recognized by anyone as "Nietzsche," and the rest of it is in part independent of the text, despite independence in relation to the text no longer being the recognition of a person or of a psychological subject. Let's say that in everything he does, including, of course, his writings, Nietzsche bears the emblems of "Nietzsche". This is expressed in the text that I have read you: *"What has flattered me so far the most, is the old market of four seasons have never ceased to choose, in my opinion, the ripest clusters of grapes."* It is here that the market of four seasons attests to and recognizes the emblems of "*Nietzsche*" in Nietzsche. And Nietzsche adds, "This is how one must be a philosopher," saying that being a philosopher is not about being the author of a doctrinal test, but about wearing convincing emblems of life itself, where the text is the text. Since there is a portrait of the philosopher Nietzsche, I would say that the philosopher is this princely anonymity which is generically known and called "*Nietzsche*," which Nietzsche himself deems "*Nietzsche*". Obviously, this form of the philosopher and of his relation to his text, and, for example, "Nietzsche" is an immanent category of Nietzsche's text, meaning that the relation to Nietzsche as a work, as writing, as disposition to thought, seems to exclude the commentary. In any case, Nietzsche's text as it stands and such as it is related to this exposition is not a proposition for commentary. In fact, if one is Nietzschean, and I noticed the

last time he is now well worn not to be, we must look at the text of Nietzsche simply to verify that it is Nietzsche, i.e. to ensure it is consistent with the central explicit category it contains and which is "Nietzsche", rather than comment that it excludes the text calls a process of verification. The text is in check and it is not there for us to clarify or interpret. Besides, if you look closely, Nietzsche himself keeps for its own account to verify that the very thing he writes is "Nietzsche", i.e. homogeneous, transitive, the immanent presence of Nietzsche in the extraordinarily ambiguous status of the concept of the book. What is a book? We were just saying that the use of the use of a book in Nietzsche is at best a verifying use. But more generally, Nietzsche states in *Ecce Homo* that "no one can take from things, including books, more than he already knows." So, strictly speaking, the book teaches nothing. And we can no longer force the book to confess latent knowledge that is not already explicit in its reader.

In referring to Nietzsche, one must really expect that we cannot draw upon anything other than what has already been known. But what should we already know? What is this prior knowledge that makes the ownership of the book possible? One will respond that it's necessary to know in what is the sense of the word "Nietzsche"- at the least this, for what opens the book in the possibility of being verified (and the verification is always the verification of what one already knows, in knowing it has to do with Nietzsche's art). It is a basic mastery or control of the proper name, "Nietzsche," as an opening category of the book.

From this point of view, Nietzsche's thesis is extraordinarily opposed to the posterior theses which are attested to in the text either by the erasure or the death of the proper name of the author, something that the text induces, i.e. it makes the subject of writing an induction of writing. In Nietzsche things work in reverse: it is the minimal control of the proper name "Nietzsche" which depends on what can verify the writing of the Nietzschean book, and thus explain its existence. Let's add that what makes available the name "Nietzsche" is not of the structure of discourse,



but still in the order of style. It is from the way of style that the minimal recognition of the word "Nietzsche" as an opening capacity of the book operates. Nietzsche says, "Communicating through signs, including the tempo of these signs, a state, or the internal tension of a passion, this is the meaning of any style. And if we consider that the diversity of inner states is exceptional in me, so there is in me many possibilities of style. One must then understand style as communication by the tempo of signs of internal tension. A comment I already made: Let's try to understand, once and for all, the 2nd sentence of this quote as the sentences pronounced in Nietzsche's most rigorous modesty. If you hear the outset as emphatic or delusional statements, I think that we lack the effective interiority of Nietzsche.

When he says that there are in him "a variety of exceptional inner states," we must credit him with the greatest integrity. I will have the opportunity to say that there is an inner holiness that is indisputable in Nietzsche, and that this element of exceptional integrity is what one must understand from the declarations of what Nietzsche thinks, which are so obviously paranoid that they may seem to us immediately so from the outset. But to return to the meaning of "Nietzsche" as the working principle of the book, the instruction that you may have stuck it in style, which is itself an immediate striking of the book, i.e. its rhythmic beginning. It is very important to remember that for Nietzsche, style is the tempo of the signs. There is a metaphorical element but also a rhythmic element, which is that entering understanding of the word "Nietzsche" is first of all letting oneself fall into the rhythm of the tempo of signs, and therefore in an image very central to Nietzsche, the potential reader is first a dancer: it is necessary that something of thought enters the dance of the tempo of signs so that the style is existing, and when the style exists, then we can grasp the uniqueness of the uniqueness of the word "Nietzsche," grasped from the singularity which is the operation by which the book opens itself to be verified. Here we have it. Evidently, all this makes a philosophizing

appropriation of the Nietzschean text extraordinarily difficult, which would be something different than the entry in the category "Nietzsche" from the dance in the stylistic tempo of signs, themselves working a simple process of verification of the homogeneity of the book in the category "Nietzsche" as a central category.

### **The Function of Proper Names**

In reality, understanding Nietzsche involves, for a good part, if not all, understanding the function of proper names. To take up the Deleuzian lexicon again, it is a thought that exemplarily proves a philosophy of conceptual characters that hinge and concentrate upon the crucial points of the Nietzschean device. There is a first reason that this is quite clear, namely that in the eyes of Nietzsche, a proper name has the immense advantage of initially lacking an underlying idealism, i.e. that it is a proper name. And he'll have to state what he names, and that the name, proper, does not only name in its proper name. In Nietzsche there is a real hatred of the common names of philosophy: truth, the good, the beautiful, the just, the unjust, and the entire network of common names of philosophy. Nietzsche proposes to destroy the gesture the reversal of all values, which is largely a reversal of the common names of philosophy. And there is on Nietzsche's part, an attempt to substitute these common names with new proper names. And where we have the true, the good, the beautiful, we will have Dionysus and Ariadne, or "Nietzsche," more than anything else. I would say that there is a Nietzschean movement, which is that the reversal of common names results in the profit of the proper name. The common name is not affected at all.

In Nietzsche's view, the common name organizes nihilism, i.e. the will to nothingness as a fundamental maxim in Nietzsche, that man prefers to want nothing rather than not wanting, hence resulting that in the age of nihilism man wants to be under common names that communicate only nothingness. Only the proper name will thus be able to designate the intensity of a sense, for all the common names are definitely worn out, and their usage is precisely the annihilating aggregation which

now specifies them. One cannot hope to recode, or rename the new intensities arriving in the form of the proper name. From this moment, one is always tempted to question the Nietzschean text from the question of who is it as such? Who is Dionysus? Or as Heidegger says in a famous text, *Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra* (Essays and conferences)? It is striking that he himself is established in this logic of who: Who is Ariadne, who is Socrates, who is Wagner. And then, of course: Who is Nietzsche?

Only I ask at this point whether this is really the question relevant to the proper name of Nietzsche. Under each of these names, is the right question: who is? And I would even say, are these proper names really the names of a type? Do they designate through themselves the likelihood or intensity of a unique form in the granting of meaning? This question is very important and, in my opinion, quite difficult.

The first thing to note is that proper names don't have insular operations. Paradoxically, names do not work on their own, but form a network, and it is rather the disjunctive correlation of proper names which is the location of meaning. I'm not sure we can respond in an operational input text from Nietzsche, for example, from the question: Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra? Or, more generally, from the question: Who is it? because what really works is a disjunctive correlation in a network, which rather makes it necessary to have the canvas, or starburst of proper names, or the coat of arms of names. To put it in another register of image, one can say that proper names are the algebraic dimension of Nietzsche, i.e. coding in the network and in operations of what is given, moreover, in fact, as networks of intensity. There is in the proper name a recapitulation, an element of the point of capture and also, between names, and quite complex operations-- it is for this reason that the idea of algebra, i.e. the size topological Nietzsche would be of another nature, as it falls within the system of intensity of meaning, and also in the historical system, but the proper name is an encoding and also a cut or a stop in this circulation of the system

of intensities. I would like to give a few simple examples, which we will find hidden, and much more complicated. You know *Ecce Homo* ends with the famous words: "Do you understand me? Dionysus against the Crucified ...".

Notice: "Dionysus Against the Crucified" could have been the title of the book by Nietzsche, or all the books by Nietzsche. Or, if you like, "Dionysus against the Crucified" is Nietzsche himself. So if we understand, this is what we understood, i.e. we understand a disjunctive correlation of two proper names. That's what we understand, because this question of the correlation of names is an ultimate instance of the Nietzschean text. But obviously, "Dionysus against the Crucified" is not the question, but rather: Who is Dionysus? Or: Who is the Crucified? This is decisive, but the apprehension of "Against".

### Non-Contradiction in "Against"

Part of understanding "Against" depends, in fact, upon understanding proper names that are placed there, in disjunctive correlation. We know that "against" is not the "against" of contradiction. It is not: "Dionysus against the Crucified" in the sense where Dionysus would be the element that contradicts the crucified, or the antagonistic element which would relate *Dionysus* to the Crucified. In the correlation of proper names, one must thus understand a non-contradictory "against". That is the Nietzschean operation: the operation of "against" that one will also find in the title, *Nietzsche against Wagner*, the very last writing of Nietzsche.

Since this is an exercise of the entry in the Nietzschean text, what about the meaning of this "against"? These letters of madness are very revealing. One commonly refers to the letters and notes of madness written by Nietzsche between January 3, 1889 and January 6, 1889. These final texts are considered to be at Nietzsche's limit. But what is striking about these letters is that most are signed Crucified, and sometimes, Dionysus. But if we remember that "Nietzsche" is the central explicit category of the Nietzschean device, one can also say that what these

notes of madness attest to, is that Nietzsche is simultaneously the two, and that in any case he is in the power of simultaneously being the Crucified or Dionysus. Or let's say that he can place himself under two names. *So we can say that Nietzsche is against himself. In "Dionysus against the Crucified," Nietzsche is at the point of the "against". And there is the distinction of two names under the "against" in the letters of madness themselves. Naturally, one can see nuances.* When the letters are signed *Dionysus*, it is certain that "Nietzsche", since it is "Nietzsche" as the "against" between Dionysus and The Crucified, is particularly the power of creating. This is not so much the coupling of creating and destroying, as it is another tonality, another color.

*Letter to Paul Deussen, January 4, 1889:* "It has been proven as an irrevocable thing that I have, strictly speaking, created the world. Dionysus". But Dionysus is also preferentially the destroyer of infamy. Dionysus is the proper name for something that couples the power to create and the power to destroy.

*Letter to Franz Overbeck, January 4, 1889, Turin:* "... I will have to shoot all anti-Semites. Dionysus". However, when Nietzsche signs "crucified", it is preferentially the serene transfiguration of the world.

*Letter to Meta von Salis, from 3 January 1889, Turin:* "The world is transformed because God is on Earth. Do you not see that all the heavens rejoice? The Crucified." But perhaps more essentially, when Nietzsche signs *The Crucified*, he is one who should be lost, not one who proposes or supports radical affirmation beyond destruction; but one who is in the half day of the resurrection he'll have forgotten as well.

*Letter to Georg Brandes on January 4, 1889.* Hear Pascal's tone: "After you had found me, it was not hard to find me: the challenge now is to lose me ... The Crucified". It is an admirable - statement- admirable. Perhaps especially in its beginning: "After you got me open, it was not hard to find me ...". Obviously, all this is sprinkled with Pascal's Meditation.

Let's take the opportunity to state in passing that Pascal is one of the great proper names of the Nietzschean device, a constant interlocution. It is interesting to see that Pascal is the Nietzschean proper name designating, most exemplarily, a loved victim, as Pascal called the Great Spirit, where Nietzsche is the brother, and was eaten alive by Christianity. This is an example of a Christian victimhood. But Pascal does not sum up Christianity; he names what attests to its power of destruction from within Christianity. It is obviously in counterpoint with Pascal that Nietzsche states: "The challenge now is to lose myself." So: in these so-called notes of madness, there is a specification of "against", "Dionysus against the Crucified" which appears at the same time, since "Nietzsche" can also signify all these notes under the name or under the other, and at the same time, establishing between them an essential nuance. But "against" which designates "Nietzsche" himself is an extremely fine operation of nuancing between what is evidenced under the name of the Crucified and what is attested to by the name of Dionysus. That is to say, that when stating, "Dionysus against the Crucified," we must immediately deliver ourselves from any perception of the contra which would not replace it as a Nietzschean operation, or as Deleuze would say, an absolutely non-dialectical operation. If we wish to summarize it, we will say that "Nietzsche" is the intimate contra of Dionysus and the Crucified situated in reference to creation "destruction", on one hand, and secondly the transfiguration as "loss": this is Dionysus and the Crucified as far as possibly "Nietzsche," which can appoint both creation as destruction and transfiguration as loss and the contra which relates them. Also, this will be developed in the system of alternative possible names, this will migrate into the complete system of names. In the notes themselves, Nietzsche will say that he is also Ariadne, or with Ariadne.

Letter to Jacob Burckhardt from January 4, 1889, Turin: "... For me, with Ariadne, I need only be the golden medium of all things ..." One could say that Nietzsche is "*the golden balance*" of proper names - "all things" is primarily this:

"Golden balance" of proper names. And in this golden balance, each of them will turn into a delicate weighing of sense, whose evaluation will eventually assume the full network of names. And, indeed, Nietzsche, from the signature in terms of the account: Dionysus -The Crucified will migrate in the full network of these names. You will also find it in the letters of madness to Cosima Wagner from January 3, 1889: "To Princess Ariadne, my beloved." I read you all the tickets that begin: "It is a prejudice that I am a man," and yes, because it is "Nietzsche" and "Nietzsche" is not a man, but a category. "It is a prejudice that I am a man. But I have often lived among men, and I know all that men can experience, from lowest to highest. I've been Buddha among the Hindus, Dionysus in Greece- Alexander and Caesar are my incarnations, as I was Shakespeare the poet, Lord Bacon. Finally I was also Voltaire and Napoleon, perhaps Richard Wagner ... [Laughs!] But this time I arrive as Dionysus, the conqueror who will transform the land into a day of celebration ... Not that I have much time to ... heavens be glad that I was there ... I hung on the cross myself...".

To my knowledge, this note is signed neither Dionysus nor the Crucified, because both are intimately in the text itself: We move from "*I come as the victorious Dionysus that will transform the earth into a day of celebration*" to "*I've also been hanging on the cross.*" But what will we remember here, is the migration in the full network of names that makes the integral algebra of Nietzschean proper names, the migration from name to name, which is here represented as successive reincarnations, operates a route which are coded as close to the intensities of inevaluable life, of life exempted from the evaluation, which is given closest to the fundamentally subtracted basis that is in the full path of the network of proper names. That's why I'm not entirely convinced that we can treat the names as the question of who is? Rather, the network of names as a principal traveler through which the algebraic version of inevaluable life is given, i.e. its encryption in operations. From that moment, the last known text, the letter to Burckhardt on

January 6, 1889, shows that the "Nietzsche" that interests us as an explicit category is the result, the production in the way, beyond Nietzsche as a person or as subject. We can say that "Nietzsche" as the name is the name of names, i.e. the name of the entire network of names. That's what he says in proper terms: "I was Dionysus in Greece - Alexander and Caesar ..." etc ... We can build "Nietzsche" if we have the full network of names, which itself, finally, is the algebra of inevaluable life. We must therefore understand that "Nietzsche", the "Nietzsche" where Nietzsche said, "*Ecce homo*" - there it is! - This is something which, being itself the home network, is where Nietzsche the person, and Nietzsche the topic, is the victim, and not at all the cause. And this is what Nietzsche will try to explain in the letter to J. Burckhardt on January 6, 1889, after which there is only silence. A letter that starts:

"Finally, I would much rather be a professor at Basel, than God." So here, the "I" who speaks is the common Nietzsche, the Nietzsche as a common name, not the "Nietzsche" as a proper name which will unfortunately be in the position of having to write between others who are God, Dionysus, the Crucified, or against the Crucified and Dionysus. But there is another Nietzsche, like you and me, quite sincerely, still of a perfect honesty, because I know not a statement of greater integrity than "I would much rather be a professor at Basel than God." Let's absolutely believe that when he says this, he says it because it is his preference. Let's not doubt for a second that he much preferred to be a teacher in Basel than God. In fact, by the way, all this is not his preference; all this is what constitutes the categorical "Nietzsche" as what the Nietzsche-subject is ultimately the prey. And the statement that will balance this one is: "What is unpleasant and embarrassing for my modesty, [is that deep down I am every name in history] ..." I quote these two statements because they pinpoint the difference between Nietzsche and "Nietzsche". Basically, we can say that Nietzsche is the common name, which is, as he says himself like everyone else, or one who is abandoned to be like everyone else, it is he who says, "I would much prefer being a professor at Basel than God. By against,



"Nietzsche" as a proper name will say, "I am every name in history."

"Every name" means that "Nietzsche" as a proper name is also the name of names: the name in the ability to be the name of each name of history, and thus the name of all names. From this point of view, "Nietzsche" in its own name is not the name of the naming. It is the naming itself, not just a name--it is the name that allows each name in history, which is the power of naming as such. Here we see before us a primary status of the category "Nietzsche" in the works of Nietzsche. It is the category of naming as a power of civilization in each name in history, being understood that the path of all names of history are marked by a singular algebra where there are names more significant than others, and between names of extremely complex operations. Thus, the ultimate problem is going to be the question: naming of what? Certainly a naming authorizing names, but from what, where the names are in the subsequent network? The name of names, yes. But from what network of names the operation? Whereupon, in what part, and in what terms does it operate? Initially, the true gateway to grasp Nietzsche, is to grasp what the nominal network such that "Nietzsche" is in the name or the naming, operates upon. What is affected by these operations? The "against," for example--what does it operate it upon? Naturally, it operates between the names, but operates between names, and it defines an algebra which operates elsewhere - so where, in what place, and in what? That is the question of The Act: what is Nietzsche's Philosophical Act as such, which is the [nominal] home network and the route where "Nietzsche" is the last name, the name of the naming, and ultimately the name of The Act itself?

To enter this question, I do not believe we can depart from a historical situation, i.e. from an operation of historical placement. I want to say that the question of Nietzsche's position in the movement of metaphysics seems to me to inevitably miss the unique nature of The Act in Nietzsche. The power of interpretation of the operation of the historical placement of Nietzschean discourse is indisputable, but this power of interpretation, other than what ultimately does not

take the text as it is exposed, i.e. is exempted from interpretation-- it lacks, more essentially, The Act, and consequently what is ultimately meant by "Nietzsche" as a proper name, i.e. as a proper name in operation.

### **Act as Event: The Break in Two of World History**

In order to arrive at this question, I do not think we can from a historical status, i.e. an operation of historical placement. I mean that the question of Nietzsche's position in the movement of metaphysics seems to inevitably miss the singular nature of The Act in Nietzsche. The power of interpretation of the operation of historical placement on the Nietzschean discourse is undeniable, but this power of interpretation, besides that, ultimately, it does not take the text as it is exposed, i.e. removed from the interpretation, it missing, most essentially, act, and lack, therefore, what is meant ultimately to "Nietzsche" as a proper noun, i.e. as name operation. I no longer think that one can depart from a primordial logic, and despite everything, this is Deleuze's path.

What forms the entryway into the Deleuzian interpretation of Nietzsche, is the logic of The Active forces and reactive forces as the logical organization of the question of meaning as a question primordially established by Nietzsche. Oddly enough, there in the Deleuzian approach something I would call systematic: it is a reconstruction, certainly the most attentive reconstruction, the most descriptive one which made in Nietzsche, but it is partly too controlled by a first logic, by a logic matrix: the non-dialectical correlation of reactive and active, which allows the path of types, so that it is built too well to be able to understand the discord of The Act and its singularity.

But I do not think we can purely and simply leave the home network, i.e. depart from the description of the course of names, although I do know this: I know very well how one could say there are seven primary names, e.g. Zarathustra, Dionysus-Ariadne in tandem, Christ, the Crucified, Socrates, Saint Paul the priest, Wagner, and "Nietzsche". From these 7 essential names and their internal

correlations and operations that govern the network, it could very well show how one begins a crossing of the Nietzschean exposition of the text, and how we can infer from this matrix the manner where this matrix is joined by other names, for example German, Jewish, Russian, French, or Italian, or Buddha, Schopenhauer, or Kant. But I do not think you can do it, because if we do that we will, indeed strongly algebra-cate Nietzsche, i.e. reduce the network of its operations. While the network Nietzschean operations turns out capital - we'll get there - and it is true that its sensitive surface is the system of proper names, but this Nietzsche algebra-cation give us a structural version of which it would be very difficult to exit, because its descriptive power is also very great.

It's thus up to Nietzsche as the naming of an Act, i.e. to ask: What is it that Nietzsche refers to under the name, "Nietzsche," by The Act of the philosophical thinker or artist - no matter what common names these are? What matters is the determination of The Act. This also means that you need to understand, first and foremost what Nietzsche states of himself, i.e. why am I destiny? But fate is the fate of The Act, and is not the form of the operation of discourse. We must understand the Philosophical Act where Nietzsche is for himself the proper name. But there is a point to my decisive meaning, which is that this Act is conceived as an event. Nietzsche does not represent the Philosophical Act as an interpretation nor as a discursiveness, nor as access to wisdom, etc. ... He conceived it first and foremost as an Event. The Philosophical Act is an Event, and the scene of this Event is the total historical world. There is in Nietzsche a definition of the Philosophical Act, which is both the most radical there is, the most discontinuous, and also the one that has the largest amplitude, i.e. whose space of exercise is conceived as the most vast. And this Event, as any Event, is a radical rupture.

Letter to August Strindberg December 8, 1888: "... Because I am strong enough to break the history of mankind in two." He is strong enough to commit The Act. The force is related, measured by the size of The Act, and The Act is in its form

- nothing is said here of its contents - is to break the history of humanity into two sections. This is echoing the letter to Brandes from the same time which I read to you last time: "I am preparing an Event that in all likelihood will break history in two sections ...". So here we see first a final determination of the representation of the Philosophical Act by Nietzsche. This signifies that for Nietzsche, the thought gathered from itself is not speech, and it is in this sense that we must understand, in my view, what he says in a posthumous fragment in Spring 1888, prior to these two statements, namely that his philosophy is experimental. Experimental is here clearly opposed, not only to the conceptual, Christian. etc.... but to the discursive. Philosophy must first be grasped in The Act of its experience. In this fragment, Nietzsche speaks of "Experimental philosophy such as I am anticipating even tentatively the possibilities of radical nihilism." "Experimental philosophy" means two things: - It is referred to in The Act, i.e. not simply falling from experience, but that its act is in the Event-like form of its emergence.

It is structured in the preparation of this Act, which will result in obligations and considerable complexities. Note that already in the above formulas, we would have "I prepare an event", so that one is in the preparation of this event, which Nietzsche also calls its anticipation. So experimental philosophy is the Event in its anticipation. What is the anticipation, which eventually becomes an essential element of philosophizing in Nietzsche? The anticipation as far as this incredible Event that breaks world history in two. Anticipation occurs in radical nihilism, which anticipates even the most advanced of radical nihilism. As Nietzsche says, adding: "I will anticipate the possibilities of radical nihilism to achieve the inverse of a Dionysian acquiescence to the world as it is without taking away, excepting or selecting anything." So one anticipates in experience of the most radical nihilism after the Event-like emergence of the inverse, i.e. - "The Dionysian acquiescence to the world," nihilism being, roughly speaking, the acquiescence to nothing. The philosopher is thus both the perpetrator of the Event and the person who prepares

it. However, it is as if it opened a small crack. I hold that it is in this gap that Nietzsche was literally lost. This flaw is experimental philosophy itself, as far as it is simultaneously and jointly about The Act and its preparation. We will have to return there, but what does preparing an Event mean, exactly? The Event in the dimension of radical break, breaking in two, which are the images under which Nietzsche attempts to apprehend it, the Event does not seem structured or structurable in a preparation. Yet it is this experimental philosophy, namely the preparation of the Event and, in a sense, the Event itself, because, as Nietzsche says, "I'm strong enough to break the histories of humanity in two."

So this involves both the strength of The Act and a preparatory exercise of this strength. This means that experimental philosophy is always in a position to advance itself, because it is always in a position of anticipating its act. Experimental philosophy is at the same time The Act and the Actual anticipation of this Act. This dimension of anticipation of itself characteristic of the Philosophical Act in Nietzsche is absolutely uttered as such in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in a well-known passage formula called *From Virtue which shrinks* (3rd part, aphorism 3 of the passage): "*I am my own forerunner amongst this people, and the song of the rooster announces my arrival in the dark alleys*" (Kim translation, Badiou). So you see, the Event arrives, and if it comes, is it a magnification? For Nietzsche, the philosopher is his own precursor, i.e. both his coming, the arriving of the Event that breaks world history in two, but also the song of the rooster announcing this arrival and thus anticipating his Act. The status of experimental philosophy in Nietzsche's sense is that of being his own precursor, i.e. being the anticipation of the Event that is what guides us to Nietzsche's definition of the Event itself, of the Philosophical Act: in anticipatory experiment the most radical nihilism, bringing in a break, a cut, an absolute rupture, the acquiescence, the Dionysian affirmation. And philosophy is the philosophy of this event, insofar as it is the Event itself and the song of the rooster who announces it-- it is thus its own anticipation. Such is the characterization of the

Philosophical Act. But there is one thing to immediately point out, which is evidently the underlying relation in all of this in the question and contemplation of the French Revolution.

### **Question on the Revolution**

The Philosophical Event can also be conceived as breaking into 2 world histories in a radical experience of nihilism which was itself anticipated as an Act and which anticipates the assertion that it is the most extreme nihilism-- is this not a revolutionary form of philosophy, or the Philosophical Act as a revolution in the strict sense?

I believe this. I think Nietzsche is an exemplary thought of the Philosophical Act of the time, or in the element of revolutions. Or even that the revolution is what measures philosophy. And the revolution is always still the French Revolution for Nietzsche. There is a point to note that quite essential, that the large systematic features of the 19th century were related to the French Revolution in the element of a stabilizing balance. Whether it is Hegel, the first great attempt at synthesis of this type, or August Comte who is the second. This is the Franco-German filtering of the question. In the two cases, the philosophical problem is namely what proposition in thought could be done to restore the appropriable foundations of the world fractured by the revolution. Whatever its degree of appreciation or judgment on the revolution, it apprehends the revolution from what philosophy must offer as the firm ground of the new age. So we can say that there is an element of restoration, not in the sense of restoring the front, but in establishing stability of The Action to the extent of revolutionary hyphenation, but from everything in the imitation of this caesura. This is not revolutionary per se, but it's in stock of the revolution, a systematic proposition in the founding thought of a new order.

And so it seems to me that Nietzsche is a thinker who maintains a completely different relation to revolution. His question is not at all to stabilize things after the revolution or to take the counter-position, or to advocate the new age of thinking

beyond the revolution, etc ... In fact, I would argue that Nietzsche maintains in the revolution a relation of rivalry, i.e. that his problem is to show that the Philosophical Act as he sees fit is the true radicality, the revolution is in reality only the semblance. And this is a completely new relation, a relation which does not balance or incorporate the thought of the historical and political revolutionary rupture, but is related to a supposed paradigm, the revolutionary paradigm, which it reverses or remove, not at all because it is revolutionary, but because it is not, in the eyes of Nietzsche. It must be understood that the contra-revolutionary aspect of the Nietzschean text, which is obvious, is a dimension of depreciation of the revolutionary dimension of the French Revolution, which, for Nietzsche, was well below what it claimed to be or announced, namely, exactly, breaking into two world histories. Nietzsche's thesis is that the French Revolution did not break in two world histories, for the basic reason that it remained Christian, i.e. that it remained fundamentally in the element of old values. That is how we understand the many contra- or anti-revolutionary texts of Nietzsche. I cite an example, in *The Antichrist*, 62: "Equality of souls before God," this false pretense, a pretense that offers all the vile souls of rancor, this explosive concept, which ultimately has made revolution, the modern idea and principle of decline of any social organization is Christian dynamite." When looked at closely, the text is, indeed, very complicated: it begins by saying that this was the equality of an explosive notion that this explosive notion made revolution, and that the revolution was the principle of the decline of all social organization, but ultimately, the final judgment is that this explosion, this dynamite, remained steadfast in the space of the old values. It was only an internal explosion of what it caused to explode - which focuses on the explosion "*of Christian dynamite*." But the whole problem for Nietzsche is to find a sort of non-Christian dynamite. Nietzsche is not at all contra-revolutionary in the sense that he would defend the values of the restoration, of the old world, or of the stability against revolutionary values, but rather that the French Revolution was not revolutionary

for the reason that the explosion that it blew up the head of the ancient world was the old world, for the dynamite forming a part of what there is. The whole problem is to find a dynamite which is not in the evaluation of what there is, thus finding another explosive. And then, Nietzsche will resume and compete with this idea of the explosion, his problem being to find his own explosive concept. And his act, the Philosophical Act, will also be explicitly modeled by an explosion. Formally, it will be identical to the Revolutionary Act, except that the Revolutionary Act failed to break into two world histories, because its explosion is a form of the world itself.

Thus, the French Revolution is not Revolution. Only the Nietzschean revolution in the element of the Philosophical Act will be one, because it will result in an unknown explosive. From this point of view, Sarah Kofman was quite justified to call her book **Explosion I**, for indeed, what is at stake, in destiny, in terminal Nietzsche is detection, construction, proposition of a previously nonexistent explosive. In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche writes: "I conceive of philosophy as a terrifying explosion that puts the entire world in jeopardy." **One must not mistake it for a maximalist definition of the philosopher.** Nietzsche's problem is thus that of two explosives, two dynamites, two revolutions, of two breaks, in two histories of world history, given that the first explosion, the first dynamite, the first break, has only fulfilled a further step in the nihilistic disfigurement of humanity. In short, Nietzsche will not be reluctant to increase the explosive metaphors, for example, in a letter to Franz Overbeck from October 18, 1888, in Turin, "[This time, as an old soldier, I pull out my big guns]: I am afraid to shatter the history of humankind in two." The mimetic revolutionary will offer up or indicate the methods of terror in its revolutionary sense. Nietzsche is going to appear before his own court, a court that is a revolutionary tribunal, when broken in two world histories, and before which Nietzsche is going to make the names of the old order appear. We've already seen the statement: "I will have to shoot all the anti-Semites", which was already a first clearing, and then, to Meta von Salis, one is closer to the edge of the notes of



madness, January 3, 1889 in Turin: "I just took possession of my property, I throw the pope in prison and I will shoot Wilhelm, Bismarck and Stöcker. The Crucified." The determination of Fouquier Tinville from Nietzscheanism leaves no shadow of a doubt.

At this point, one could argue that the Philosophical Act in Nietzsche's sense is ultimately a mimetic process under the strict sense of the revolutionary act, which, little by little, despite the efforts of Nietzsche to keep distance it takes, least formally, the system of main attributes:

- Metaphorical aspect of the radical break
- Explosive dynamite-like style
- The implacable figure and simultaneous legitimacy of Terror

The hypothesis could thus be: Was Nietzsche the singular case of a philosopher - use the name you want - a thinker, entering into mimetic rivalry with the historical and political revolutionary theme, of such a sort that he would have determined the Philosophical Act from the formal attributes of the revolutionary act? If we support this hypothesis, we would say that there would finally be a loss in Nietzsche, from the singularity of the Philosophical Act, and such that it would be made of nets or in the image, or taken in mimetic rivalry from a relation of rivalry with the theme of his century, as a theme of the revolution. Many things are going in this meaning, and would allow us to argue that Nietzsche is an attempt that is both captive and desperate to saturate the Philosophical Act from all mimetically generated attributes from what we can moreover despise, and which in an exemplary fashion is at the end of ends, the French Revolution.

### **Complications on Eternity**

Nonetheless, there are a number of major complications that disrupt this simple structure, and which would determine the Philosophical Act in Nietzsche with a mimetic of revolutionary configuration. Why? Well, because the idea of a radical rupture: breaking world history in two, is superimposed by another topic

that's a little quirky, which is that of timelessness almost conquered by the reverse of the explosion, by indifference and distance. I would definitely argue that the system of the Philosophical Act in Nietzsche is this superimposition itself: the superimposition of the theme of the absolute break and the theme of timeless distance, which requires the solitude of indifference.

Let's take *Case of Wagner*, and you'll see how these formulas become ambiguous and subtle (still in 1888), with the Foreword, "What requires a philosopher, first and last, from himself?" One would expect: to be strong enough to break the history of humankind in two sections. But Nietzsche writes, "To triumph in himself from his time, to be timeless."

I'm not saying that this statement is exactly contradictory to the other; I'm saying it is superimposed on the other manifestly, by a clearly shifted prescription. This is not to say that where Nietzsche says that one must overcome one's time in oneself, and be timeless, and one statement where he said that the philosopher must break the histories of the world in two, there is a formal contradiction - the rest is the location of the formal contradiction which in Nietzsche is of no interest. The logic of "against" is not the logic of contradiction. I will only say it is a superimposition, another theme which we can conceive almost musically, as if two quite heterogeneous themes were superimposed in a transitional sequence. He will also states in the *Twilight of the Idols* as a maxim for philosophy: what the philosopher must do, and what is it that he wants to do (himself, Nietzsche): "Creating objects upon which time would break its teeth, tender in form and substance, to a little immortality." I would say that the superimposition operates between a principle of rupture, where the space is maximal, and the theme of timelessness or immortality is a gain in the work - i.e. "to create objects upon which time would break its teeth" - i.e., we shall see it in the element of Eternal Return. However, there is this superimposition: "I think it is extraordinarily readable in this book and in this book is the *Antichrist*, taking it more heavily, less sampling. We must realize that the

*Antichrist* is an absolutely crucial book in Nietzsche's eyes, and is not a book among others.

## On the Anti-Christ

Let's recall some elements that are now very well-known in the history of the non-existent book which has long been called *Will to Power*, and on which, Heidegger, continues to share in building, while denying its existence in his interpretation. A book which Deleuze continues to refer to in his book on Nietzsche. There has been a tremendous existent tenacity of this non-existent book. Today, we know quite well how things have happened. I'll tell you in two words, for it is better to know them. Nietzsche has had a time, indeed, the project of writing a summarizing book which would be called *The Will to Power*. However, from 1887 to 1888, this title was explicitly abandoned in favor of another that is *Reversal of all Values*. Thus, now, what we'll focus on is The Act of breaking in two world histories. This is *The Reversal or Transvaluation of All Values*. The first chapter or almost the introduction of this supposed or proposed book, is called *Antichrist*, and ultimately it seems that Nietzsche believes that *Antichrist* is the right thing, since it itself is the result of this labyrinthine process, which at one point was virtually called *Will to Power* because of the transvaluation of all values, and which is called *The Antichrist*, and is ultimately where we find nothing besides debris.

The *Antichrist* holds the subtitle "Chastisement of Christianity," and so Chastisement is a specific literary genre. And it begins with an introduction that outlines what is required by the reader to understand the *Antichrist*. Once again, we have from Nietzsche a description of the reader: What is expected from the reader? This is a persistent question in Nietzsche's text. We read in the *Prologue* that for the reader to open the book, once again, he must "...Be exercised to feel as if he is above the wretched chatter of contemporary politics and national egoism. He must have become indifferent ... "So what is required for access to this book, in a sense, focuses

itself on The Act of radical break in two in the history of humanity. It is a principle of indifference. And at exactly the same time, Nietzsche wrote in a letter: "I will commit the oddly solitary act of the inversion of all values." There, in the triumphant and programmatic vision of breaking into two world histories, and in the mimetic revolutionary it detains, we see there is obviously superimposed another plan that is the system of loneliness and indifference, as what is required to be in order to understand and participate in this Act. Any part of the things that I will try to retain, concerns understanding this superimposition. How does an act that is so obviously a mimetic revolution also be determined as an indifferent solitude? I think if we can address and resolve this question, it stands within a Nietzschean exhibition itself. It is in this that the point of The Act will deliver its most intimate sense.

Another way to phrase this question is to say, why the hell does *The Antichrist* end with a law? A letter? Finally, this proposition which announces the radical act of breaking world history in two is given in a project of the word against Christianity, which is, of course, deposited before any meeting, in Nietzsche himself, such that those meeting are those who recognize that there is Nietzsche himself. I have always thought of the disappointment one feels - in any case what I think, let's not go into what one feels- about the end of the *Communist Manifesto* of Marx, where we find the final project. It begins with the monumental history of the class struggle, the workers who have only to lose their chains and a world to win - then after the program (in a very ironic tone): reducing labor time ... etc... There is disappointment.

But really, I think that between the *Antichrist* and the letter against Christianity at the end of one side, and programmatic final reforms of Marx's *Communist Manifesto*, I sense a mimetic analogy, if I may say. We will not have the time to comment now, but after there was just the Antichrist, which is strictly in the eyes of Nietzsche, the concentration of new explosives that one has found (this is non-Christian dynamite!), the book ends with a law. But when you must leap over something, it is not a law you'll find. Between the logic of dynamite and the logic of

the law, the pairing is not clear, nor is it between the preaching of the Communist Revolution in the Manifesto and the government program at the end. The connection is not evident in the two cases. I read to you this abbreviated law against Christianity, enacted the day of salvation, the first day of the first year (September 30, 1888 of the false calendar).

### **War Against Vice: Christianity as Vice**

*Article 1: Anything against nature is vicious. The most vicious sort of human is the priest.*

*Article 2: Any participation in a divine service is an affront to common decency. It will be harder for Protestants than Catholics, harder for liberal Protestants than towards those of strict obedience. Being a Christian is more criminal all the more we approach science. The criminal of criminals is thus the philosopher.*

*Article 3: The place worthy of execration where Christianity has hatched her eggs from basilicas, will be razed. This chastised place on earth will inspire horror for generations to come. Venomous snakes will be bred on top of it.*

*Article 4: Preaching chastity is a public incitation against nature. Despising sexual life, defiling the notion of impurity-- such is the real sin against the holy spirit of life.*

*Article 5: Eating at the same table that excludes a priest: one is excommunicated by those of honest society. The priest is our Chandalah - he must be quarantined, starved, and banished in the worst of all deserts.*

*Article 6: One will give "holy" history the name it deserves, that of chastised history. One will use the words "God," "Messiah," "Redeemer," "Saint" as insults and to designate criminals.*

*Article 7: All else follows. Well, this is where we'll pick it up next time!*

## Third Course - Arch-Politics (GrossePolitik)

### Reminders to All

The Philosophical Act that Nietzsche argues for, especially in 1888, which is our way into the Nietzschean project, is an absolute rupture; pure Event. So philosophy, in the sense that Nietzsche understands this word, is capable of producing a break in two of the history of humanity and in bringing about a fully affirmative novelty, with regard to the interpretation of the old world, or of old values. Contrary to what is contended for by Heidegger, this Philosophical Act is not one of overcoming nihilism. The determination of The Act is not a type of overcoming, but a kind of rupture. As Nietzsche himself declares, "I am preparing an Event that in all likelihood will break the history of the world into two sections." I have also pointed out the evident aspect of mimetic rivalry with revolution, particularly with the French Revolution. Mimetic rivalry means that in the determination of his Act, Nietzsche is at once in a relation of fascination and formal rivalry with the revolutionary theme as precisely the story broken in two, and also in the relation of revulsion and denial that consists in the belief that the revolution was not what it was announced to be, i.e. a breaking in two of the history of mankind. It is in this sense that we can say that the Nietzschean Act -- I introduce here a word I will back a variety of ways - can be designated as an arch-political conception of philosophy. By "arch-political concept", I don't mean a theme that is above all traditional, about a foundation of politics in the element of philosophy, or even a determination of the essence of the political in its revolutionary determination. By arch-political, one should rather understand a tearing of everything that is foundational, and, much more, in everything concerning ethics, i.e. regarding everything that would be about, let's say, a philosophical monitoring of politics. However, one must understand a determination of the Philosophical Act itself. This Act, in fulfilling the break in the history of mankind, is determined as

"political" in a principal and radical sense that politics itself does not support. It is the Act itself which will be the rupture in the history under the opacity of a proper name which is "Nietzsche" himself, recalling what I said about the difference that should be noted between Nietzsche as subject or author banished from his project, and "Nietzsche" as a categorical proper name, i.e. as an organizing proper name in the inside of the device thought within thought itself. Thus in the opacity of this proper name: "Nietzsche," philosophy is an arch-politics. It creates the break in two of the history of humanity.

However, I'd like, here, to introduce a clarification. The fact that the Philosophical Act is arch-political designates both an unprecedented expansion of power and the capacity of politics, on one hand, and on the other hand, the dissolution of any politics, in a sense of the word that is not arch-political. So Nietzsche will sometimes state that his act cancels any politics, so that it itself is the supereminence of the political. For example, in the draft of the letter to Georg Brandes that we read, he says, "We have just entered high politics; even the most high." This is the side I call supra-political or radically political. Then, in the draft of a letter to William II, he writes: "[The concept of politics has completely dissolved in a war between minds. All the images of power were shattered] - There will be wars as there never were before." So we have a kind of constituent oscillation in determining the arch-political act between the idea of a radical extension of politics itself, and a move that dissolves the effectiveness of politics. Note that these two texts are drafts, and that none were sent. Indeed, in arch-politics, there is something that is essentially unaddressed, because the arch-political is the same torment of the Nietzschean act in its improbable relation to politics. That said, the rough side in all its terminations of this oscillation between the supra-political and the dissolution of the political, this Event-like arch-political coexistence of greatness and dissolution, goes against Heideggerian hermeneutics on this question. Heidegger, like Nietzsche, admitting that under the immediate name of politics, only modern

nihilism is presented at the last resort, a point on which there is no disagreement between the one and the other. Nietzsche will also have the particular lucidity of temporarily assigning nihilism as the Actual content of the word politics, in Germans.

The German use of "political" [*Grossepolitik*] designates, for Nietzsche, a crossing out of any affirmative event; an erasure or failure, but, more precisely, the redaction or collection, or concealment of any effective Eventality. This is effectively German. For example, in *Antichrist*, aphorism 61: "The Reformation, Leibniz and the alleged German philosophy, "the wars of liberation," the German Reich--every time the word was written in vain about something that already existed, something irreplaceable." In the general system of Nietzschean namings, the German word is actually the word written in vain "about something that is irreplaceable." One can say that the political, in its ordinary meaning, i.e. for Nietzsche in its German sense, is precisely the erasure or concealment of the irreplaceable, i.e. its dimension of imposed denial in any Event-like affirmation. On this point, the German sense falls apart! Heidegger and Nietzsche converge in determining that the political is a failure of Eventality. But Nietzsche is not going to suggest overcoming or addressing this situation. He will be excepted from any dialectical treatment of this provision, **for the Nietzschean act could additionally be defined as follows: it is the will to reaffirm the irreplaceable, not in the form of a contra or reversal, but in the form of a dissolving excess** - which will be sustained in the dimension of political excess, in excess of itself, i.e. the political as supra-political, "dissolving" designating that this excess is properly and simultaneously the dissolution of all politics. And it is this dissolving excess which is by itself the reaffirmation of the irreplaceable, which the current politics has erased. Heidegger, on Nietzsche, wrote: "The anti-metaphysical and inversion of metaphysics, and also the defense of metaphysics practiced until then, form a single conspiracy by which the befallen omission has been conveyed for a while, from the lacking remains of Being itself."



Thus, for Nietzsche, Heidegger states that the inversion of metaphysics, the return of all values, the anti-metaphysical, is fundamentally originally, or co-originally, in the same element as metaphysics, i.e. perpetuated by the history of the being of concealment "from the lacking remains of being." Now, in this description, I think there's a point of misunderstanding, which is that the Nietzschean act is not substantially in the form of the "Anti"<sup>1</sup>. Despite the explicit metaphor of the reversal or return, despite the "anti" present in the Antichrist, the agonistic and antagonistic form of the anti is not in the most profound, singular form of Nietzsche's representation of The Act. The Act is not in the form of the anti, nor in that of the opposite, or even in that of defense. The Act is a rupture which reaffirms the irreplaceable without having to replace it, i.e. the reaffirmation of the irreplaceable is supra-political, and the dissolution of the political is not in the form of replacement, but in the form of the reaffirmation of what is already there, but erased and obliterated by the political in its German sense. The Nietzschean act will break into two the history of humanity, where politics has erased the existent break. It is obviously in the sense that the gesture is made and held as the element of Eternal Return, because the rupture is already there, such that because it is obliterated by politics, it constitutes the site. And we can say that the irreplaceable break is for the Nietzschean act, the site of the Event. The Event is situated in an already obliterated location which makes the reaffirmation of its irreplaceable character not required to pass through nor succeed, by replacement. That's why we can say the following- a point which Deleuze correctly insists on. Nietzschean arch-political act is in the form of a crapshoot.

### **The Crapshoot of Nietzsche and Mallarmé**

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<sup>1</sup> Translator Comment: We noted the non-binary or non-dualistic structure of stark opposition applies to Against in "Dionysus Against the Crucified" as well as Anti in "Anti-Christ". But it also applies, as I mentioned, to the anti- of Anti-philosophy as a form of truth in flux or creation.

The crapshoot really comes to mind as an image or denotation for what is not only in the form of the *anti*, a reversal or replacement, but in the form of the reaffirmation of the irreplaceable. Deleuze rigorously addresses the question of Mallarmé's crapshoot, just as you would report in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Chapter 1, § 11. One can simply summarize the characteristics of the Nietzschean dice in Deleuze, a crapshoot which is, in one sense, The Act itself.

- The roll of the dice is unique: it is not a stroke of probability, i.e. a tendential following of the crapshoot, which would tend toward an average (mean) or a statistical result. It is at once exactly as it was at one time, that Nietzsche will reaffirm the irreplaceable break in two of the history of the world.

The crapshoot affirms randomness: it is both an affirmation and reaffirmation of chance, and therefore it is a necessity, i.e. the need is none other than the affirmative element of chance, and this is why the gesture of the dancer will utilize a number, or as Mallarmé declares, "the only number that cannot be another."

The roll of the dice is an inhuman gesture in the form of a will. From this point of view, arguing that the Nietzschean act is in the form of a crapshoot that is also an inhuman gesture, which constitute the two faces of chance and of necessity which he affirms, will make Nietzsche escape the subjective prescription or prescription through the metaphysical form of the subject, which Heidegger tries to keep captive in its fated correlation in Descartes. The fact that the roll of the dice is an inhuman act, such as the chance of being affirmed as necessity, and finally coming to reaffirm the irreplaceable, means that Nietzsche, as we have already noted, can also state the two disjointed formulas we mentioned, which we will now assemble. One the one hand: "I'm always left up to chance" and on the other, "I am a destiny," formulas that mean in plain language from Deleuze's analysis of Nietzsche, which seems to me absolutely founded: "I am a crapshoot," i.e. I am the very act of a crapshoot by which the obliterated irreplaceable will be haphazardly reaffirmed, and history broken into two. This is also why Nietzsche, as we

specifically quoted from this passage, says he is "not a man", which does not directly or immediately signify that he is the Superhuman (Übermensch), but that the non-Being of a man is an intrinsic condition of the inhuman act which forms the crapshoot. Nietzsche writes, exactly, that "It is a prejudice that I am a man," i.e. a prejudice of Nietzsche who is not "Nietzsche." There is always this essential operation of properly representing that "Nietzsche" is an opaque proper name for The Act of naturally distinguishing from the Nietzsche who by reasonable prejudice, we can indeed state is human.

*Parenthesis:* On this point, Deleuze formally resembles Mallarmé. It is obvious, but at the same time a profound resemblance. Deleuze's text carefully addresses both the Nietzschean and Mallarmean crapshoots. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze is quite violent against Mallarmé. He will vary a bit on this later on. But there he considers the interpretation of Mallarmé's crapshoot as the proper nihilistic interpretation of the Nietzschean crapshoot, or a nihilistic recovery. I quote Deleuze: "Mallarmé is the crapshoot that is reviewed by nihilism, interpreted in the perspectives of bad conscience and ressentiment." You can well imagine that this statement shocks me! That Mallarmé is assigned to the "outlooks of bad conscience and ressentiment" is something that strikes me as quite rude, and I would argue, but not right away, for the opposite view. But what does the opposite view signify? We will not say that it's a good conscience or acquiescence. The opposite view is the following, with regard to the Nietzschean crapshoot: Mallarmé is the crapshoot that is fully exempt from the crazy impasse of his will (for we will see that the trace of will remains in what I will call the circle of the Nietzschean act) to be poetically conceived as the pure "il y a". In other words, Mallarmé will not take up The Act itself under his own name, but will poetically assume the "il y a" of the Act. And we must distinguish the crazy effectiveness where Nietzsche himself has finally arrived, instead of The Act, and the Mallarmean gesture which incidentally is neither philosophical nor anti-philosophical, but purely and fully poetic, by which

the “il y a” of the crapshoot will be delivered, without pretending that its effectiveness is questioned, i.e. without pretending that its effectivity would be delivered there, i.e. without pretending that this “il y a” of the crapshoot is the breaking into two of the history of the world. In other words, Mallarmé says, there is The Act, or there is the possibility to affirm chance, and this statement will result, in fact, in “the only number that cannot be another”, i.e. the constellation, but the Event itself will be left in the suspense of the “il y a”. Mallarmé offers the poem of Eventality that arrives to the place of what Nietzsche offers or supposes, and which we must say, is the madness of an arch-political act. Let's also say that the poem of Eventality replaces the arch-political determination of The Act. To this we will later return.

That being said, it remains that the Nietzschean act, in my opinion, doesn't have much to do with the metaphysics of a reversal of the metaphysical will. This is another logic that is situated, as far as it is the crapshoot or breaking into two of the history of mankind. We say that the Nietzschean act, on the side of chance, will dissolve any politics, and will be destined to establish politics in its irreplaceable grandeur with regard to the affirmation of chance. You can see that in the two-sided act of the pure crapshoot, we can reread this seemingly ambiguous determination between the dissolution of the political establishment of its greatness. In fact, to reference Mallarmé, as far as chance is involved, it will have to do with the dissolution of all politics. However, as far as the affirmation of chance, it will, on the contrary, have to do with its irreplaceable greatness.

### **Act, Superimposition of the Rupture, and Eternity**

However, once all this is recalled, I would say that for Nietzsche, The Act also has a subtractive dimension from itself. Basically, so far we have given it the inherent logic: in the assumption that The Act takes place, we see its determination. But there is a purely subtractive dimension, which is that Nietzsche has to endure

that The Act has never occurred in its general space, which is, as we know, the history of mankind. And here we enter extraordinarily tight quibbles which prove that The Act took place, i.e. What is the test of the probation of The Act? What is the sign of recognition of the effectiveness of the arch-political act? the roll of the dice? It is both the question of what signals his very being, and also, it must be said, the question of his witness, or his potential witness. Can, and should it be designated by the same opacity of the name of "Nietzsche" to testify to The Act, that this name names or nicknames? In contrast to the first determination that we just mentioned, which is the emphatic or arch-political effectiveness of The Act, Nietzsche will also argue that The Act is lonely and silent, and that in this silence and solitude, we enter the indecipherable problem from its effectiveness or the testimony of its reality. We mentioned last time in the letter, "I will commit...", always this "I will," always this difference of The Act, which is imminent, but the inevitability is still distant, so that the statements, *"I'll commit the strangely solitary act from the inversion of all values,"* and in the prologue of the Antichrist: *"One must have become indifferent" to both The Act and to testifying. Solitude, silence, indifference, and ultimately timelessness.* What will be drawn in this other figure is superimposed in the form of the first act - this solitary figure, silent, unattested, and indifferent - it's timelessness that initially appears to contradict the same time of The Act, namely of breaking the history of the world in two. Nietzsche will say in the foreword to the *Case of Wagner*: "What does a philosopher require first and last of himself? to triumph in himself from his time, to be timeless." And in the prologue of the Antichrist: "... To strive to feel himself above the wretched chatter of contemporary politics ...". The question then is the following: how can the break in two of world history be attested to by the timeless? How does the explosive Event (we spoke last time of Nietzsche as the seeker of a non-Christian dynamite in relation to the Revolution, including the French one, which is still the Christian dynamite, how does the non-Christian explosive Event, the one who has found the un-Christian dynamite and is at the

heart of the explosion, can he be above what he will ruin everything except for what is given, including the break? This is what I call the superimposition. It seems that the immediate definition of The Act as a break in two of world history, which assigns to philosophy the task of arch-politics (GrossePolitik), is indeed superimposed with another definition, another determination, which affects The Act of silence of timelessness, and in an element of invisibility, or latency, or difference, which is absolutely of a different structure than the shining or proclaimed historicity of the first figure. And I would like to find the key of this superimposition, and by that, sink us further into the paradox of Nietzsche's determination of philosophy.

### **Chastisement of Christianity**

For me, the superimposition is related to The Act, insofar as it is the arch-political act of philosophy, necessarily has a declaratory nature, i.e. that in its essence - and here it is received on two edges of the superimposition - the Philosophical Act is a statement: something comes to be said, and what is declared as such will, and should break the history of the world in two. But what is declared, this Act? What is uttered? We've already seen that Zarathustra is always seen as his own precursor, or declares himself as such, that in some way, what is declared is precisely the imminence of the deed. This is the first version. So The Act as a statement expresses itself as a coming. Zarathustra will explicitly say that he is the rooster who precedes his coming. Here it is advised from the happening, and is finally something of that order. But you see that the first possibility is circular, because it establishes the Philosophical Act in antecedence to self. And like this figure is recognizable as Nietzsche, it is unsatisfactory, including himself. We must therefore arrive to "what is said in the philosophical statement as an act?" Apparently, seemingly, the content of the statement is the judgment of the old world and its old values. And we know the generic name of the old world and its old values, Christianity. So the content of

what is said is the judgment of Christianity, so that The Act as statement is descriptively, and almost phenomenologically, first as a verdict, i.e. the philosopher as an act is presented as a verdict of the order of the old world, the old values subsumed under the generic name of Christianity. This is exactly how the conclusion of the Antichrist is presented. I recall that for the final Nietzsche, the Antichrist, the book or pamphlet which bears the name Antichrist is in a sense The Act itself, since the last time I had recounted the story that leads from the project of the will to power to the project of the transvaluation of all values, in the preparing for its first part which is Anti-Christ.

The surrounding correspondence indicates that in the eyes of Nietzsche, the Antichrist forms the declaration itself which is in a certain sense The Act itself. But how does the Antichrist conclude? With this peroration: "I come to my conclusion and now I pronounce my verdict. I condemn Christianity, I raise against the Christian church the most terrible accusation an accuser has ever delivered. It is for me the worst conceivable corruption, she has knowingly wished to fulfill the worst possible corruption. The corruption of the Christian Church has spared nothing, it has made all value non-value, all truth a lie, all sincerity, baseness. "Such is the verdict. The Act finally seems to in the public dimension of the verdict or statement, because Nietzsche adds a little further, a point which in my opinion is very important, in the same aphorism, 62: "This eternal indictment of Christianity I want to display on the walls, wherever there are walls - For this reason, I have letters that would make the blind see... ". The arch-political in terms of the Antichrist is the public proclamation of public execration or verdict. The availability of cursing or verdict on all the walls. So we can say that The Act in its first or descriptive determination is the judgment of the old world brought to the attention of a generic public, because "all the walls" signifies that the address is universal to whomever - "on all the walls."

We shall note two things, which are a sort of problematic hesitation of the determination of The Act as a publication of the verdict:

**1st: "... I raise against the Christian church the most terrible accusation an accuser has ever raised."** The Act is not only the verdict, the prosecution or execration but they can be certified as the worst ones that have been brought against them. This point is consubstantial. The verdict against Christianity and against the old world, must be able to be attested as the most terrible judgment that ever occurred. We will return to this point, where we will find the necessary dimension of excess, i.e. that the accusation is not the substance of The Act, insofar as it is the accusation in arch-politics, i.e. a separate and surpassing charge with regard to all those that have previously been brought upon the Christian church.

**2nd: "This eternal indictment of Christianity"**, where we find that The Act is still in the form of a reaffirmation, i.e. that The Act has always taken place, and Nietzsche is the reaffirmation that is both hazardous and fated, as is any affirmation in the form of a crapshoot.

But I would say that in remembering all this, namely that the Philosophical Act would eventually bring a radical judgment on the old world, and publicly proclaim the eternal execration, I feel that the dice have not really been thrown, i.e. that what really was there, and which I understand in its radicality and stretching, it seems to me, rather, to be once-more virtual form of the crapshoot, the real dice roll. The form seems to me to still be retained, or, let's say, the loathing, the verdict, seem to be the form of the crapshoot, rather than his gesture or launch. I would compare it to the Mallarmean moment of the crapshoot, where the dice are shaken in a closed fist. You see that in the Nietzschean fist which is clenched from execration, from the vituperation of Christianity. But what will be said here, the stellar number that will come out of there, the fated gesture of what chance of this reaffirmation will be destined, we have not yet deciphered. We're still at the moment, as Mallarmé says, where the teacher hesitates ancestrally "not to open the



clenched hand across the useless head." There it is. And then, I believe it should be said that in its Nietzschean form, the statement is still captive in the circle.

It bears the execration of old values so that it assigns philosophy to a radical break, but it doesn't carry the kind that it should be the statement itself which is the only active content of this chastisement. In other words, the affirmative element of the verdict, this affirmative element that we view as the other side of the break in two of the world's history, is in fact the intensity of the verdict itself. This is why it is so important that Nietzsche can state this is the most terrible judgment ever delivered against Christianity. We can say that The Active validity of the declaration is to exist as a statement. Nietzsche himself is ultimately still the only affirmative dimension of The Act, and it makes him arrive in person to occupy the board. And I think that's why, in Nietzsche's writing available at this time, the *Antichrist* and *Ecce Homo* are coupled and are absolutely a unit of proposition, for how does *Ecce Homo* begin? Like this: "Providing that I must soon address the most serious challenge humanity has ever received, it seems to me indispensable to say who I am." "Anticipating": We always find the "I will," "soon," immediately, and "it'll be". "We are always on the edge of The Act. And the person I am comes later as an integral part of the declaratory approval. A little further, Nietzsche will make this heartbreaking statement: "Listen to me, because I am such and such." It is as if between reporting a loathing of Christianity, killing the old world, and committing The Act itself, i.e. The Active power of the statement, there is still the irreducible question of the witness. Witness, public, audience - hearing - someone - there must be someone. And there is someone in the sense of one who understands, who speaks in the statement. It is not the statement itself that is concerned, for it is legible, it is there. So the deed is explicit as far as it is a declaration, which declares, but it does not suffice to say so, and it still takes someone to know who it is. So I would say that the question of the public or the question of someone, or the question of the other, let's call it what you wish, ultimately intervenes in Nietzsche's motivation, between

the declaration and The Active dimension of the declaration, and thus between The Act and himself. The question of the public, the question of someone, does not consist of linking the content of the statement, but it is in relating to the person who declares. This is the circle of The Act as declaration, that the subject of enunciation is himself, and has stated that the declaratory statement is addressed as a dual statement. And thus any statement that is presented as an arch-political declaration in the Nietzschean sense, is twofold: The declaration must also declare who declares? and the declaration does not itself have the power to declare the declarer.

It takes a redoubling of a second declaration by which the person I am is stated, but of course, it is absolutely required for this 2nd declaration to be heard. Approval of who I am is no longer suspended in the intelligibility of utterances, and it is addressed or non-existent; it is heard or not, and it is why Nietzsche's cry, "Listen to me because I am such and such," involves The Act itself in its effectiveness. It is not possible that the Philosophical Act in the sense of Nietzsche taking place, if the person I am is not heard and if the second statement does not come in the result of his address to validate the first statement where we find a theme that I had introduced from the start, which is that an acknowledgment is required. Recognition is required, and this recognition is the point, and not the fact that the declaration must be recognized, but that for there to be a declaration, it is required for the person who declared to have been recognized. The recognition of Nietzsche may only have an Event-like form: it will arrive. So, one wonders whether this recognition of who is not finally the Event itself, the Event in its irreducible emergence, the real breaking point in the history of humankind. Is it not ultimately definitive, not ultimately the loathing of Christianity, which is, if one might say, a critical result, but the person who declares? and the intensity of which states? that is actually recognized? And how can it be recognized? This is where Nietzsche is at the wheel, because *Ecce Homo* is written to earn or to extort recognition. But in reality, it is clear that this is what is presupposed, because why must the focus be upon it? Especially if it is not

exactly so, that person makes the statement? But the person who makes the statement should, in turn, be identified so that the declaration works, and thus an unconditional recognition is sought: Nietzsche must be recognized. The recognition of Nietzsche may have only an Evental figure: it will arrive. This is what Nietzsche finishes by saying early in the Prologue of the *Antichrist*, "Perhaps my reader is not yet born." But if the reader is not yet born, and the birth of the reader is actually the real Event.

The real Event, the real emergence, the real innovation is not so much that there is a declaration of abhorrence of the old world, but that someone arrives, who says, "Nietzsche has taken place," Who speaks, and recognizes that "Nietzsche" has taken place? In other words, one can say that the recognition is Event-like because, in its lawlessness, it is incalculable. It cannot extort, and it is not the product of the facts of declaration. And to what Nietzsche's entire project is thus suspended, is that someone comes up who says: there is Nietzsche, there was Nietzsche, and Nietzsche has been, or here we see the statement such as it hangs over the irreducible identity of Nietzsche. In the meantime, what shall we do? Because we see that there is an expectation, an expectation that Nietzsche states as a deferred or unresolved suspense of the possibility of the declaratory act.

However, in the meantime, we will occupy the land by the law, precisely because the element of recognition is lawless. This is why, as we said last time, there is this amazing thing, where the execration against Christianity is presented as law against Christianity. So here is the question: what is a law? One will respond with a very general definition of the law: **a law is what comes to be when recognition has not taken place**, i.e. when there is one that could not be delivered by the other. This is properly the generic definition of the law, while the other does not deliver the "whom," when there should have been a law which closes the awaiting, perhaps indefinitely, of the recognition of the *whom*. We can also say: the law is when no one recognizes who I am, and it is necessary that the anonymous distribution is made in

the element of the law. And it is in the lucidity of this point that Nietzsche, in awaiting the reader who can state that Nietzsche took place, will formulate a law against Christianity. It is with this law that we left off the last time. We will review it in the light of all this, punctuating the peculiarities and problems it raises.

### **Anti-Christ's Law Against Christianity**

I recall here the title: Law against Christianity.

- Law: The Law definitely seems to contradict The Act, i.e. contradict Eventness, because if the history of the world is broken in two, there is certainly no need for the law against Christianity. This seems self-evident, but the law has, in fact, closing the temporary absence of the conditions of The Act, which is the lack of recognition of "Nietzsche".

- Contra: The contra would also seem to contradict the affirmative essence of The Act, because the essence of The Act such that Nietzsche determined is not anti; it's not a reversal, not agonistic or antagonistic. It is an affirmative breaking, or what I call a dissolving excess. I remind you that the definition of philosophy by "Nietzsche" is the following: "[Philosophy to be achieved] by a Dionysian acquiescence to the world without removing, excluding, and selecting anything" (posthumous fragment from Spring 1888). This is the philosophy on the affirmative side of his act. So there is a paradox of the contra. Christianity: Christianity is the generic name of old nihilistic values. We cannot take it any differently. But what will interfere in the text of the law, then, is that Christianity will not work in the text of the law as the generic name of old nihilistic values, but in a rather practical religious sense. This is a problem to which we will return, but I point in passing: there is a decisive question of names in Nietzsche, or a double form. This is an ambiguous name:

- In its generic sense, Christianity is the name of nihilistic values, or it is the name of Becoming nihilistic from the evaluation, i.e. the historical name of the will to nothing.

- In another sense, Christianity is a singular configuration, a singular Becoming of the form of the priest. It's not quite the same thing, because the law against Christianity will be to some extent a law against the priest more than a law against the will to nothing. What for? Because it is a law, specifically, and not The Act. The Act itself will break from the will to nothing. The law which is finally The Act in the default of The Act or which is that is still inactive, the law will instead target the concrete form of religion, i.e. the equipment of the priest. So much for the title.

Then there is the statement, "enacted on the day of salvation, the first day of year one (September 30, 1888 of the false calendar)." There, I do not believe it, since we last spoke at length, simply emphasizing what I have called the revolutionary mimetic. This law is fully embedded in the mimetic conventional decrees, including the foundation of the new calendar year and the new first year, which Nietzsche founded. That said, the problem is whether you can open a time by a law. This law was enacted on the day of salvation, the first day of year one, and you can clearly see the circle: What determines this day as the first day of year one? It is precisely that it is the day of the enactment of the law and nothing else - nothing else attests it except that we are on the first day of year one, except that it is precisely on this day that the law was enacted. There is thus a fairly clear circle, which is that the dating of the law is nothing other than the effect of the law itself. The law can be said to date itself as original. And there again, this is obviously because the law takes the place of the event, that it is the substitution of the still awaited event, and can be the basis of its own date or the Event that relates it to its own date.

Then we have the subtitle: "War on vice: the vice is Christianity." Again, one must note that vice is apparently not quite beyond good and evil, for if it were, we

would not proclaim that Christianity is vice. It should be said that there is an element of pure and simple commutation [switching]: what was sacred is vicious, and what was vicious is sacred; or what was affirmative is negative, and what was negative is affirmative. But this switching element is not at all homogeneous to the idea of breaking the history of the world in two. If we must complete only a permutation or a reversal of each term, we have in fact reached it, in a raising or a combination. So the fact that we have: The all-out war on vice, or the vice being Christianity--what does it express? Well, expressing that we are again prior to the Event itself, i.e. that we are in the negative declaration, but not in what this declaration establishes as the power of The Act. Let's quickly examine these 7 items, one after the other, i.e. the statement itself in its concentrated form:

**Article 1: "Anything against Nature is vicious. The most vicious species of human is the priest: he teaches against Nature. Against the priest one has no reason, one has hard labor."** Let's pass over this quickly. I said the bulk of it, i.e. that the law will move towards The Actual form of the priest, and not just to judgment or the rupture of the generic thing, i.e. the will to nothing. It will be in a natural normativity, "viciously against all nature." So there is of course an unspecified normativity. We will be in doublets of Nature and contra-Nature, vice and no vice. And we will adopt the terrorist mimetic. Last time, I had already given you examples to tell you how the mimetic revolutionary would assume the form of terror in statements such as: "I will shoot all anti-Semites." Here is the promulgation of a decree condemning the priest to forced labor. The fact that there is no argument - we will return to the question of reasoning and proof, a central articulation to Nietzsche - he refers to the determining statement in Nietzsche that: "What needs to be proved is not worth much. "It is therefore not surprising that against the priest, there is no need to prove his vicious character that goes against nature. There is forced labor for that.

**Article 2: "Any participation in divine service is an affront to common decency. It will be harder for Protestants than Catholics, harder for liberal Protestants than for Protestants of strict obedience. Being Christian is even more criminal than the one closest to science. The criminal of criminals is consequently the philosopher."**

The recovery of the concept of indecency is in line with the recovery of vice and of everything else. One is in the face of inversion. I will come back to this question of the reversal of names. Then comes a dimension that leads gradually away from the philosopher, in the idealistic sense of the term; accompanied by a settling of accounts with the Germans. As for the philosopher, it seems that for him the hard labor would barely suffice, although the text makes no reference anywhere, I will come back to it under pain of death. Unlike Plato in Book X of the Republic, when he addresses the question of the Sophists, Nietzsche, when he addresses the question of the philosopher, does not brandish the death penalty - we make him act. However, "the criminal of criminals is consequently the philosopher," i.e., Article 2 designates what I would later develop under the name of anti-Nietzschean philosophy. We have to distinguish the proper mode in which Nietzsche is an anti-philosopher, under a singular category. You know that it is the general strategy of this seminar to deploy the constituent figures of anti-philosophy in this century. And it is certain that Nietzsche is the first founder of modern anti-philosophy, contemporary, because the first great modern anti-philosopher is Pascal, with whom Nietzsche is quite fraternally related, quite essentially, in a manner that is quite severe and complex. We have here a first determination of what is meant by anti-philosophy in Nietzsche, who himself declares, moreover, which he himself declares living thought, so that it is, indeed, from religion, i.e. from nihilism. From this point of view, anti-philosophy is primarily what is made visible, i.e. it is placing the religious element in visibility, such that philosophy disposes it in a form that is dissolved, or absent from itself.

What is meant by "philosophy" in Nietzsche's anti-philosophy, is specifically religion disguised as science in its broad sense: religion disguised as rationality. Philosophy is actually disguised or covered by the rags of scientism [scientific religion]. So, and this is a very important point--it is indistinguishable religion, or religion in an element that is not itself. And from Plato, we can define historical philosophy, not as a service of religion, not as something that is just like religion--no, not exactly like a disguised religion, which would be too graphic--but as religion that is in such a manner rendered indistinguishable from what it is not; religion parasitically housed in something that at first is heterogeneous to it. To take an image that is absolutely contemporary, philosophy is like a virus, i.e., it is in a state of invisibility in an organism, as a parasite; where identity is no longer decipherable, but borrowed. In the eyes of Nietzsche, philosophy is the religion in the state of the virus. It is housed in an apparent homogeneity in the living organism thought, then it is, indeed, religion, i.e. it is nihilism. From this point of view, the anti-philosophy is first made visible, i.e. it is increasing the visibility of the religious element as the philosophy has dissolved form, or lack itself. It is in this sense that Nietzsche always called himself the greatest psychologist of Christianity, i.e. someone who knows how to discern Christianity where it is indistinguishable. Here we see philosophy in its first Nietzschean sense, descriptive, and anti-philosophical. And then, actually, when it was discerned, we will decide that "criminal criminals, is consequently the philosopher."

**Article 3: "The site worthy of execration where Christianity has hatched her eggs from basilicas, will be demolished. This chastised place on earth will inspire horror for generations to come. Venomous snakes will be brought forth."**

I will make two comments on Article 3. Is "this chastised place" Jerusalem, or is it Rome? I do not know. In any case, it will be brought down, but there has been an initial destruction of the temple in Jerusalem ... There is really the question of



where "Christianity has hatched her eggs from basilicas". It is an obscure point, a question that is not entirely clear to me: the Christian who broods over eggs.

The second point I wanted to make is that obviously one is also there in the revolutionary mimetic: mowing symbols, hammering the shields, removing the tombs of kings and scattering the bones is strictly the idea of the mimetic revolutionary. Now, this specifically contradicts a passage where Zarathustra criticizes the revolutionaries for engaging in something as ridiculous as overthrowing statues. Where he even takes this as an example of the futility of political revolutions, in the non-arch-political sense. Now in the law, precisely because it is only a law in the failure of the Event, here is where the revolutionary mimetic takes over, and "Nietzsche" surrenders himself as well to something that is completely the reversal of statues or, say, the destruction of symbols. We will now see that this point is not only condemned by Zarathustra as characterizing the frivolity of political revolutions, but also that Nietzsche supports the view that this will strengthen the thesis that one has destroyed the symbol, i.e. that the Church is constantly regenerated by the persecutions of this kind; that any symbolic persecution is still an essential revitalization of its device. It is therefore quite curious to see that not only is there a contradiction, but a change of device. I would see for myself the sign of mimetic instability of the Nietzschean relation between the Philosophical Act such as he sees the revolutionary paradigm, which for him remains the French Revolution.

**Article 4: "One is excluded by eating at the same table as a priest; excommunicated by those of honest society. The priest is our Chandala, and he must be quarantined, starved, and banished to the worst deserts."**

Let's return to the priest. What strikes me in Article 5 is its relative moderation, so that when one considers that in the eyes of Nietzsche it has to do with carrying the most radical and terrible accusation ever brought against Christianity. But honestly, in this fifth section, next to the anti-Christian texts of the

French Revolution, it is not a big deal, we should say. Because if it has to do with the priest and the banishment of the priest, it is certain that the French Revolution in its anti-clerical wing, which has not shrunk from exile, the guillotine, and systematic persecution, is of a violence regarding where there was finally Nietzschean bonhomie: eating at the same table as a priest is not good, not honest company, we will quarantine him, good, after he hardens a little: starve him, banish him to the worst deserts, but it feels great that the metaphor of the thing remains partly in the metaphor of who wants to make an outrageous statement rather than a murdering one. However, the adequate murdering statements in the form of the priest, were found in the literature of *Father Duchesne*, and moreover not just in this newspaper published by Hébert from 1790-1794. Regarding Marat and others, we have very little. It was therefore a weakened revolutionary mimetic which lies in a small scandal and refers to what? This may be anecdotal, but it must be remembered, referring to the extreme kindness of Nietzsche. In fact, in reading Nietzsche carefully, and I spoke earlier of the inner sanctity of Nietzsche, there is this man, including the movement by which he is exposed more and more to the folly of his act, a great kindness. And every invective was conquered by "Nietzsche" on the goodness of Nietzsche. Each fury is the fury which disposes of a depth that is never exhausted of basic goodness. And there, I feel this kindness, when one must really decide, there is finally a retention of the mere statement in the moment where its logic would be of establishing a murderer as a stated. But the Nietzschean statement never fails to be a murdering statement even when it is in the apparent glorification of cruelty.

**Article 5: "One will give the "sacred" "the name it deserves, that of chastised history. One will use the words, "God," "Messiah," "Redeemer," and "holy" as insults and designations for criminals."**

So "a kind of messiah, dirty redeemer, pig of God." This is the tradition of the chastisement. We've always used those words there in exclamation and insult.

Finally, Nietzsche is situated there in the classical nominal ambivalence between sacred names and excremental names, which are always in relations of commutation or of identity, so that God is both what we pray to, and a horrible thing we will exclaim: "Name of God, what has he done (or: what have I done)! Here, Nietzsche stands in this thread, i.e. in the ambiguity of names. He simply suggests handling the ambiguity of names unilaterally, i.e. to switch once and for all, every sacred name in its excremental form.

**Article 6: "All else follows."**

So this is truly the enigma of the law against Christianity, i.e. the rest follows from the general system of his arguments? I tend to think that everything which follows is the Event itself, i.e. the same thing. These are not the consequences of the law, but only the execution of articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 would result ... what, if anywhere else? Everything else follows from it, and it is the silent Event by which the law ceases to be law. What may arise from the rest as a law is the Event as a non-law, or the Event incised from the law, or the Event as the effectivity where the law only gives a law. So what follows from all that is the taking place of all that the law leaves in absolute suspense. Or we can say in other words: what is The Actual coming of the first day of the first year. We saw earlier that the fact of whether we are on the first day of first year cannot be wagered without a circle around the enactment of the law. Year 1 must occur: Year 1 is his coming. And maybe when it will arrive, it will arrive with the law and everything else that follows. But there, nothing came, nothing came but the declaration, which is not in itself the stated act. So I would say that "everything else follows," i.e. that Article 7 is the event-like Article event, which states that the effectiveness of all that requires an arrival. We need Year 1 to arrive. But precisely the year I as it would arrive, or as it will have come, is simply what is left of the law. We can summarize all of this in a relatively stable form: in Nietzsche's conception of the Philosophical Act, we ought to consider: **1<sup>st</sup> Point: The statement.** What is announced cannot be the chastising of the old world. I remind you that this

is the subtitle "Antichrist": chastising Christianity. What is declared is the chastising.

**2nd Point: Who makes the statement?** This chastising only acts under the condition of identifying someone. It is necessary to have someone who announces, which is in turn said. But the "whom" that states cannot validly be declared except by another. There is thus an anonymous third party, who must decide whether the statement has been declared. And anyone who identifies him, Nietzsche himself, walking in Turin, like the one that makes the statement, Nietzsche finishes by seeing him everywhere, even in walking in four seasons reserving their ripest fruit. The story is admirable. There reads this essential point that he who declares must in turn be declared by the other. And as Nietzsche awaits the other in another such tension, in such a need, that he sees in the ordinary gesture of anyone around him.

These first two points provide the declaratory slope of The Act, i.e. the sum of statements of imprecation against the old world and of the eventual resolution of the question: Who is making the statement, insofar as it involves a third party? The third is perhaps not born as Nietzsche himself puts it, but to whom one stated everything that could be said for there to be recognition in *Ecce Homo*. The declaratory slope of The Act is the coupling in the work of Nietzsche of *Antichrist* and of *Ecce Homo*. The Antichrist is the chastising itself, and thus the immediate content of the declaration. But of whom is *Ecce Homo* the record? It is not the recognition of someone, as it requires the other, but at least it's the record of someone.

- **3rd point: the Event is not yet formed.** But we are still antecedent to The Act itself: the Event escapes again, as in Article 7 of the Law against Christianity. But how to show innumerable clauses such as: "I will", "it is for the sake of", "I will soon", "I make" ... etc, i.e. what makes The Act even remotely from the declaration of The Act. So in this triplet there is

- A term consisting of: chastisement

- A term of basis: what will it declare? The element of recognition
- A real point that is deferred: the event-like dimension of The Act.

Once more, we can say that there is

- A declaration
- Recognition of its intensity
- Its taking place

This I believe, is in the most radical sincerity and commitment reaching madness, and thus in its purest test, the device of any arch-politics in the sense that I have named, i.e. that any provision that assigns the political to the principled preparation of a radical Event or which assigns the political to thinking, i.e. to philosophy. So if we also understand arch-politics, we can say that its inescapable device is that of the triplet of a declaration of recognition and a point of even-like leakage. Once again, we can say that the arch-political articulates a law without managing to prescribe The Act. And this articulation will draw a particular representation of the event. As it escapes, the Event will be returned or recaptured in a singular theory of the event, which will be there to give reason from its breakaway. So I would say that the device of the arch-political in the form of the triplet in the statement of the law, the curse from which, and the unattested and unattestable Event, will eventually produce in self-legitimation an unattestable form itself of the event. The approach is in saying that ultimately, every Event is actually unattestable and that's why the Event-al form of arch-politics is never attested. In other words, the validation of the statement is fundamentally invisible. Or that its taking place is no stroke of recognition, i.e. that taking place is itself, in one sense, indistinguishable from not taking place. What in Nietzsche, will take the very special, following form: the Event *is par excellence* that which is silent. The silence will be the Nietzschean metaphor of the always unattestable nature of the event. We find it everywhere in "Nietzsche," but we find it concentrated in the song of Zarathustra (2nd part) entitled "The great events." It is in the parable of the hellhound that Zarathustra meets the threshold of hell.

### **The Hellhound and the Silent Event**

Who is the hellhound? The hellhound is the popular revolted event, i.e. the plebeian form of the event, if you would like its revolutionary classic form. The hellhound, says Zarathustra, is the "demon of revolt and the dregs." It's the belch of uprising, before which the bourgeois tremble. Zarathustra will also say that it is "the ventriloquist of the earth", so that it is the land itself speaking of his apparent uprising, the earth as she is sick of man, as Zarathustra spoke. But the sick earth of the man, showing in rage this human disease itself: it is the dog of fire. Here's how Zarathustra's invective against the hellhound goes: "You hear yourself screaming, throwing dust in your eyes. You are the biggest braggarts there are, and you would acknowledge at its deepest the art of being placed in the boiling mire [...] "Freedom! "It is s the word you like to yell between yourselves: but I stopped believing in the great events that are accompanied by yells and smoke. And believe me, I beg of you, dear din of Hell, the larger events do not surprise us in our loudest hours, but in the hour of silence. It's not about the inventors of new uproar, but the inventors of new values that the entire world revolves around, but it gravitates in silence. And you can admit that very well! Once you have cleared your racket and your smoke, you will always see that not much has happened! Whether a city was petrified or a statue lay overturned in the mud! "

### **Two Comments on the First Passage:**

Any opposition on the question of the Event is between noise and silence. The hellhound is the symbol of what Nietzsche calls the big event, as he points out himself with noise and smoke. This is the Event as its arrival is signaled from itself: din and smoke mean that the Event is there in the phenomenon itself. Zarathustra will oppose his own form of the event, which is silent, i.e. is not "the invention of new uproar," but which in the statement of new values is indicated by a world that "gravitates in silence. "The point to be argued for will be that no external or

phenomenal sign attests to the Event itself in the conception made by Zarathustra, and which he expressly opposes, breaking the mimetics, in the revolutionary uproar as a self-proclamation or self-reporting of *Eventness* or the rupture. That's the first remark.

The second has to do with the "inventors of new values." "It's not around the inventors of new noise, but around the inventors of new values the entire world revolves, but it gravitates in silence ..." This means that the inventor of new values, opposed by the revolutionary plebeian, will not be signaled upon his arriving. In other words, nothing in the world that is worldly is going to announce his arrival, strictly speaking, but what will be the "cock" of his own arrival arises from itself. Once again, we find the singular figure of the circle which is antecedent to itself. Zarathustra is strictly one who heralds the coming of Zarathustra. And that is why all around, the world can be silent.

Finally, in light of what we saw in the law against Christianity, the whole fabric of brute will to destroy the symbols and persecute the priest, we find the opposite position. This is the third point, namely that, apparently, it is precisely the characteristic of plebeian revolution: "That it matters that a village was petrified or a statue lying overturned in the mud!" After all, one could say that what matters in this case is that one demolishes the places where Christianity has hatched her eggs. Especially since Zarathustra also continues, "And as for the demolition of statues, this is what I will tell them: there is no greater folly than in throwing salt in the sea, and statues into the mud. The statue lies in the mire of our contempt, but his law only wishes to be reborn from our livelier and more beautiful contempt. It will rise more divine, more attractive, having suffered, and in truth, it will make you grateful for having thrown them to the ground, destroyers of statues! But here is the advice I give to churches and to everything that is weakened by age and poor in virtue: Would you reverse so that you could come back to life and that virtue would be restored to you."

Here we have a very striking paradox, which is that the reversal of all values, Nietzschean *par excellence*, is stated here by Zarathustra to be the deepest wish of the Church itself. We must specifically give old values the guidance of being overturned, because they will be reborn more glorious and more alive than they were before. Zarathustra is perfectly aware that it is useless to enact a law against Christianity. There have been many attempts, from laws against it, but Christianity has always found virtue and regeneration under the order of these laws. Here we find the extraordinary indecision of that Nietzschean act, which is taken or so to speak torn between mimetic revolutionary in its respective declaration, which is the reversal of statues and idols, and the law of persecution, and then on its opposite side, in announcing, but in silence, the Event that has always escaped or been exposed, caught in a side that is quite the contrary, which is that there is no point in enacting the law of execration or in destroying the building or the statue, for that is the reversal - but the reversal is, ultimately, always strengthening. From this point of view, Nietzsche's consciousness is not at all, as in Heidegger, at its deepest; that of Zarathustra, and it is not at all that of a reversal of metaphysics, for Zarathustra knows quite well that what is reversed is always, in fact reborn, i.e. that any reversal is a regeneration. He knows very well that the program of the reversal of metaphysics is, as Heidegger deduced, a fulfillment of metaphysics, that the overthrow of nihilism is nihilism separated from his own essence, and consequently nihilism unleashed. Zarathustra does not say anything else; he says: all reversal is an uplifting, all persecution is a rebirth. But in this case, what is The Act? Because what we read in the statement of the Antichrist is precisely encased in that structure.

So we must necessarily think that the destructive doubling of the negative statement, of the decree of abolition which is the Antichrist by something else, is required. Something must be said, otherwise or elsewhere, the Event itself as not being in essence the imprecating statement, i.e. the overthrow of statues into the



mire. Where it is argued that the Antichrist is not ultimately Christ himself, i.e. the ultimate regeneration of Christ in the form of his modern reversal? In the form that Nietzsche assumes under the signature of "Antichrist"? This problem is really the same one we had met at a different stage of development, when we found that Nietzsche indifferently signed the letters of madness "Dionysus" or "The Crucified," which were the two sides of the break in two of world history. And we have said, how is it that the proper name "Nietzsche" might overlook or rename the two sides at once, Dionysus and the Crucified? And now we discover this question in another form: what is there besides the Antichrist? What is going to double the Antichrist so that it will be Dionysus? Or we can say, and this is the question that will govern our resuming of this seminar, the big question that we should address to "Nietzsche," beyond what we have seen so far, is the question: Where is Dionysus? And we will see that this is really the question of the labyrinth. And then we will remember that Nietzsche has said he is the only one who understood Ariadne because he was predestined to the labyrinth. Here we'll stop!

## Fourth Course: On Creation of Being

Happy New Year's 1993, all students and faculty, if there's any sense in beginning this year under the banner of "good." In Nietzschean terms, this is problematic, in any case, since there is no "good." But even in non-Nietzschean terms, this phenomenon makes such a judgment difficult, and it remains for us to ask what is really a "good year" ... In any case, as far as we are concerned, and what concerns you all, let's say that I hope that the proper modalities of our inscription in this space and time are the ones you'd like. I recall that in this seminar on Nietzsche, we are pursuing a strategy that focuses on three entangled goals:

- **First, determining the very status of speech in Nietzsche**, which opens with the question of philosophy itself. Specifically, this question will lead us to the class of anti-philosophy, a category which in its contemporary form is originally Lacanian, but which I intend to deal with more broadly as an intra-philosophical category itself. We are not able to do it here, but in short, we can conclude on the true status of discourse in Nietzsche, where his statement falls under anti-philosophy, provided that the whole problem, then, is in situating anti-philosophy in terms of what we should call philosophy.

- **Second, we must realize in what sense the century was Nietzschean**, or could claim to be, or in what sense we could claim that it had been so. This more historicizing objective of evaluation will take the form of examining the anti-Platonism of Nietzsche.

- **Third, indeed, chiefly, it will have much to do with determining Nietzsche** as the vector for the contemporary possible relationship between philosophy and art, and through this relation, determining what is the setting of philosophy under the condition of art in terms which are not a suture (stitching together), or an identification. These are our goals.

I recall that we began by examining the anti-Philosophical Act in Nietzsche, not precisely from the discursive Nietzschean configuration, but from the immanent

determination of the philosophical and/or anti-Philosophical Act, such that Nietzsche represents it. And as we have to find names, we said that the philosophical or anti-Philosophical Act for Nietzsche must be conceived as an arch-political act, whose maxim is breaking in two world histories by the favorable resources of thought itself. On this point, we have said enough, and I just want to add something that is both a parenthesis and anticipation on the status of the word "politics" in arch-politics (*Grossepolitik*).

### **Nietzsche and Politics**

Last year, we had studied this question extensively, but I cannot presume to know what was said on the question of what politics enables us to understand in philosophy, for in philosophy, a simply immediate definition, or an empirical one, is insufficient. It has to do with knowing what in philosophy is traced or re-traced, under a condition that is affected by the word "political". I remind you, very fleetingly, of what we had said- namely that the word politics can basically be taken in two senses of what concerns us here.

- *First of all, you can understand from "political" the modes of the thought of sovereignty, and in this case the word is placed under the order of the State. The relation of the political to philosophy is staged by the manner in which the question of the state is retraced from within philosophy. This is the direction that gives wholesale political philosophy, and I have argued, for reasons I cannot recall here, that political philosophy is really an abdication of philosophy concerning the order of the State.*

- *Second, the other meaning of the word "political" which is, in my opinion, something under which philosophy can be authentically under the condition of politics, is in conceiving politics as a process of truth of intrinsic infinity from collective situations. Thus, politics is a faithful, Event-like procedure which produces some truths about collective situations of seizures through their infinity. In this case, we are not*

referring to the structure of the state as a form of the structure of sovereignty, but to an immanent Event in the process of truth, which, on the contrary, is recorded in the collective the distance to the state, i.e. the ability or the possibility of a distance to the state where the thought of intrinsic infinity of collective situations is enabled.

All this is quite brief, but serves to indicate the deep ambivalence of the word "political" between the form of sovereignty, on one hand, and on the other, the singular procedure which produces some truths about the intrinsic infinity of collective situations.

The question, then, is knowing in what sense Nietzsche himself takes up politics or, at least, we ourselves take up politics, when we say that the Nietzschean Philosophical Act is supra-political. With this, what strikes me is an obvious ambivalence in Nietzsche, which in a sense replicates the ambivalence of the word "political" itself.

- There is a very interesting text, a posthumous fragment from Spring 1888, entitled by Nietzsche himself --entitled in the strong sense, because the note gives the title in the middle of the page and the name of the author below, as if it were a reproduction of an extant book, as far obviously nothing like this exists. So we find this page in full: A Tractatus Politicus of Frederick Nietzsche. Where we naturally find the fact that for Nietzsche, "Nietzsche" is a category, not just his name, and it is the name and more than the name. Here we have a political treaty. But what is it? Well, in the program that traces Nietzsche, it is explicitly a genealogy of sovereignty. In this case, this is the genealogy of the sovereignty of virtue, but the title "Tractatus Politicus" makes it clear that in the eyes of Nietzsche, the name of politics deserves a genealogy of forms of sovereignty. So we could say that Nietzsche takes politics in the first sense, i.e. in the sense where politics of the Real is the idea of sovereignty.

- However, this is "balanced out" by another fragment which is also from Spring 1888, and reads of a radical release from the State i.e. the idea that the State cannot precisely be the center of gravity of thought, or of the arch-political act. I

quote: "Whatever a man does in the service of the State is contrary to its nature." [...] Still, everything that they learn for the future service of the State is contrary to its nature." From this point of view, politics seems to switch to its other possible identification, where there is no politics, and *a fortiori*, arch-politics, in an essential untying under the figure of the State, not only in the order of acting, but also that of knowing. All that a man learns, in the target of the State, causes an essential contradiction to nature, and, given the Nietzschean value of the word nature, it equally means that what we do in the service of the State or what we learn for the service of the state is outside any form of authentic thought.

To decide this question of politics in Nietzsche's sense, and from his ambivalence between sovereignty, on one hand, and a radical distance from The Actual form of the sovereignty of the State, on the other--we must set in place the ambiguity of the word "nature" or "life".

### **Ambiguity of the Word "Life"**

We have already spoken of the ambiguity that this requires. We must always remember, and we will often return to this point because it is essential - that life is the foundation of all inevaluable evaluation. The essential attribute of life, but ultimately of nature, and - as we shall see - what takes place of Being, is inevaluable Being. And the inevaluable is what forms the basis of any evaluation. It is this inevaluable dimension of nature which sustains the ambiguity of the word "politics" [Politik]. This inevaluable depth for any evaluation is what suspends the evaluation of the word "politics," because you can say that sovereignty in the sense of Nietzsche, is the thing to which all intensity of vital power tends. Sovereignty is tendentially the phenomenon of the inevaluable depth. Sovereignty will always be assessable, but it is in a sense the phenomenon of the inevaluable depth, because it is that to which all intensity of vital power tends, i.e. all intensity of nature as such.

This is why in Autumn 1887, Nietzsche set in place the following program, which is quite significant for what concerns us here: "Instead of sociology, a doctrine of formations of sovereignty." It is therefore true that politics, in thought, may designate a doctrine of formations of sovereignty, i.e. a doctrine of types of intensification of vital power. But in another sense, and here we pay the price, so to speak, of the invaluable: sovereignty is still reactive. It is both The Activation of vital power (life power), but as such it is reactive. And, in particular, in the modality of the state, it does violence to the vital new assertion, i.e. something in the process of intensification.

So there is a balance or indecision that the word "political" will express word or carry, between the fact that

- On the one hand, sovereignty is to share the phenomenon of an invaluable depth which is life, or nature.
- On the other, sovereignty such that it allows itself to be evaluated, i.e. as far as it is an established sovereignty, i.e. an evaluable one, as a phenomenon, has an undeniably *reactive* essence with regard to everything that is in a view of intensification and where intensification can only constitute power against power, against an established sovereignty.

Arch-politics will always be understood in this ambiguity, which will also be, as we saw already, the ambiguity of The Act itself, i.e. of the arch-political act. Thus, to supplement what we have already said about The Act, one last thing I want to emphasize is that the arch-political act, which is the same thing as the anti-philosophical or Philosophical Act, is not conceived by Nietzsche as destined to establish a new sovereignty. It is certain that the "il y a" of these Nietzschean texts is deeply ambiguous and contradictory as ever in appearance.

However, concerning the essential movement of thought, I believe that we must truly understand that when it speaks of the history of the world being broken in two, unlike the revolutionary scheme, where the "il y a", furthermore an

imitation, it has nothing to do with taking over a sovereignty to another, or replacing a reactive sovereignty through active sovereignty, which would be a simplified version of the Philosophical Act, according to Nietzsche. This Act is not the creator of a new sovereignty, and I would say, despite this, from absolutely contrary statements of Nietzsche himself, that are strongly taken up by Heidegger-- that the essence of The Act is really not the introduction of new values: the reversal of all values doesn't have the essence of establishing new values, just as it has no essence of replacing the sovereignty of Christianity or of the priest, with another form of established sovereignty. In reality, what the arch-political act must create is the capacity to affirm the world.

And the ability to affirm the world doesn't have the phenomenon of a novel sovereignty. Finally, in contrast to the ambiguity of the word politics, between an evaluation of the forms of sovereignty, on one hand, and the other distance with regard to any sovereignty, on the other-- especially in light of the State, the arch-political act is the delivering of an immanent affirmative capacity so any virtual sovereignty. This is what Nietzsche will call, "My new path to the yes." The central problem is the question of the yes. Under what conditions can someone say yes? Yes to what? Saying yes to the world, i.e. saying yes to the "il y a", establishing the "il y a", yes to the "il y a". Or we can say, that in the same passage, what it has to do with establishing, is "the form of stating the Dionysian yes to the world, as such." Finally: arch-politics (*Großpolitik*) as a determination of the Nietzschean Philosophical Act, should not be taken up on the side of sovereignty. What has taken place on the side of sovereignty, is the destructive evaluation of existing sovereignties, which is why it takes the place of sociology: "Instead of sociology, a doctrine of sovereignty." However, sociology is what accounts for the order of things<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Note from the Translator: Here the reader might find or especially appreciate reading Foucault's *Order of Things*, originally translated *Les Mots et les Choses* [literally, Words and Things]

And what Nietzsche wants to say, is that instead of a positivist sociology, we need a sociology of the evaluation of formations of sovereignty; thus, we need an interpretive sociology. Nietzsche thus proposes, in the space of more established sovereignties, that we should replace the analytical description with a protocol of evaluation, which concerns established sovereignties. As for the program of The Act, in my opinion, it is not the substitution of one sovereignty by another, in my opinion. Rather, The Act is a new order of an affirmation of the world, where The Act is at stake. The statement will work over the entire space of the forms of intensification, and thus over the entire space of virtual or potential sovereignty. This is why it is a "Dionysian yes to the world as it is," paradoxically. So you see that The Act does not really change the world, but also in that it is not taken up - except in its mimetic form, where it is in competition with the revolutionary order- in the revolutionary order, because it is the world as it is, and it will not be otherwise, save for its affirmative evaluation being rendered fully possible in the future, where the yes will be possible.

I want to note one thing that suddenly struck my attention. At the bottom of this possibility of the yes, is a question that crosses all time, every scale from the 19th to 20th century. I'll simply note another clue in a non-Nietzschean context. It is at the end of Ulysses, by Joyce: Molly Bloom's monologue in the depth is entirely biased towards the ultimate yes. And if all goes as this gigantic building what Ulysses was in the fate of so, i.e. in the end figure of yes. As if the literary plot, prosodic, was the machination which arises the unlikely possibility of full yes. When you read Molly Bloom's monologue, one sees that it truly has to do with reclaiming the dimension of the yes and it is the totality of the experience, as such. It is not a transformation of this experience, but it is a re-entry of this experience into a full yes. After all, one could say that the peroration of Joyce's Ulysses has a Nietzschean aspect from the site of The Act, i.e. the point that makes it possible- the full yes - the very genesis of The Act.



We can phrase it another way: the destructive aspect of Nietzscheanism, which is a morphology of sovereignty and a setting of the pieces of Christianity through its interpretation, since Christianity is the general name of formations of reactive sovereignty, well this setting in place of destructive parts can only result in the multiple composition of affirmation. It cannot be replaced by another composition, but will deliver a state of effects, i.e. in a multiple state, a world that will be reaffirmed. We can also say, the debris of old values is what forms the assertion, i.e., we will not substitute new values within the meaning of old ones. Consequently, what we will affirm or reaffirm consists of a mundane multiple, or the many, the very thing which is nonetheless the debris of old values. For Nietzsche, there is nothing new in the multiple, or many. The many, i.e. the "il y a" in its multiple Becoming, is identical to itself - it is also one of the meanings of the Eternal Return - and this identity suggests a new Dionysian yes through the form of the debris, reconstructed from itself; not in the dramatized form of another world, or of another sovereignty.

### **Dionysian Dithyrambs**

I believe that this passage from the summer of 1888 will also be re-articulated in *Dionysian Dithyrambs*: "Debris of stars, from this debris I have built a universe." It is the maxim of what is at stake in the affirmative act: "Debris of stars," which reigned so superbly in the sky of men, and which are the old values in the state of debris - one has philosophized enough with a hammer, so that there are no more stars, or debris - but the building or composing of a universe is made of this debris, and it hasn't happened any other way. It is the affirmation of debris as debris. The composition of the new universe is the possibility of saying yes to the debris of the old world, in the sense of the debris of the old world giving us the world itself. And the ruins of the world as far as it is the world, have to do with affirming or reaffirming the Dionysian yes. I believe that this is why Nietzsche tends to find a

metaphor for The Act, in the leap. The image of the leap that goes along with the image of the dance, constitutes the most essential imagery of Nietzsche.

The leap, why a leap? because ultimately, if The Act, through Dionysian "yes," is to affirm or reaffirm the entire world as it is, i.e. such that it is in the debris, since its very Being is legible only in the debris--if The Act is beyond the break and the debris of saying yes to what is already broken, then The Act is merely a bounce or jump over an obstacle that life itself has created. The Act will present itself as bounding on or in the debris so that one is, indeed, beyond, but this beyond is not the beyond, and the universe is not built or rebuilt except from the point of debris. We can say that The Act is the vital power crossing itself. This is indicated by the jump. The old values and their debris are nothing more than an instance of vital power, and it is given as the formation of sovereignty, and includes the formation of reactive sovereignty. This is what was created and invented, because there's nothing else. And the "yes" of the break of this creation, is a sort of bounding of life beyond the obstacle that the vital power itself has created in breaking this barrier. Therefore we can say - and I agree with it quite profoundly - the Philosophical Act as an Event of thought is an immanent excess. That exceeds the form of old values, but this excess is the interior of what it exceeds. It's not negativity, a Hegelian passing, because what is said in the jump signifies that it jumps over itself, over its own shadow. And jumping over the shadow, or debris - it's the same - it gives an irreducibly new instance of affirmation.

I see it everywhere, but another fragment of *Dionysian Dithyrambs* deserves to be fixed, for it is particularly dense and meaningful: "This supreme obstacle, this dispensed thought, which has been created? That's life itself which has created its supreme obstacle. Now, it leaps with both its feet over its thought.

### **Two Brief Notes on the Text**

- "The supreme obstacle": expended thought is obviously the institution of reactive sovereignty, which has several names. Let's view the one we took up so far,

Christianity, as a generic name. And what has created this barrier, and created for the arch-political act an obstacle of this particular policy that is the formation of sovereignty? Well, it is life itself which has created this ultimate obstacle.

- And "now", i.e. in the moment of The Act, life is going to have to jump over its thought. The Act is a thought jumping with both feet beyond its thought. That's what I call immanent excess. The Act is given by figure jumping over itself in the immanence of thought as vital creation. That's what I wanted to say about the configurations of The Act.

### **The Circle**

At last, I recall that the Nietzschean arch-political act is caught in a circle. We have long insisted this, so I will just summarize by saying that for The Act to occur, i.e. for this immanent excess to occur, it must be declared, announced - there is no alternative or evidence of its occurrence except for its announcement - but this announcement is supposed, i.e. it is assumed by the inevitable and necessary character of The Act. We could even say: this proclamation of the radical Event which should break the history of the world in two, is only the anticipatory appointment of this Event as not having taken place. I cannot return to it because it is completely the figure of Zarathustra, who is the form of the antecedent to himself. Zarathustra is the precursor of himself, or, as Nietzsche says in another passage, someone who presents himself as "the shadow of that which is to come."

The figure of Zarathustra is in some sense the very form of the circle, and this is why in other places, his animal is the serpent. But the generic problem which is sustained in this circularity of the Nietzschean act, is a problem that is completely fundamental, which, in my own words, is the problem of the relation between the Event and its appointment.

I would definitely say that this question is properly that of an erasure of Nietzsche's thought, and that this is the true figure that designates Zarathustra.

Because obviously, as an Event, whatever it may be, has no Being except in its disappearance --- and that's what sets it up as the excess of its very being - it is not held by its naming. The possibility that the Event is represented in a situation or in the antecedence of what continues to be beyond the Event-like supplementation, requires the operation of a name. We can say that the future of the Event is suspended in its name. There is always the question of knowing from whence, and how, this naming proceeds, which is extraordinarily problematic, and presupposes both circularity and stopping this circularity. I cannot detail here this problem that I've concerned myself with, so to speak, but I would simply note that in Nietzsche, the fundamental problem is that there is always an antecedence of naming.

In Nietzsche, everything happens as if the naming were to precede the Event, and as if simultaneously, there was a misunderstanding or an essential lack of decidability between the Event and its name. It's not simply the fact that the Event is traced away by its name, but of what becomes the undecidable question of whether we are dealing with the Event or its name. In my opinion it's the heart of the Nietzschean paradox, and in my assumption, as you know, it's what we call the madness of Nietzsche, and it involves arriving to the place of severing the circle: of expending one's person to the point where the circle can open. Nietzsche's madness is indeed a cutting, but a cut that is only divided from itself - "Nietzsche" Nietzsche's break - in a break that is demented and finally muted. But it was really because Nietzsche comes under his proper name and under his own body, to the point where the circle must be broken, and hence the name of the Event, and the Event will depart at the cost of his own madness. I remember how it was said that "Nietzsche" created the world, because, ultimately, the proper mode in which it is possible to announce that we will break world history in two, i.e. the proper mode in which we can announce a restatement of the world, i.e. the proper mode in which we can announce a reaffirmation of the world, ultimately, in the fact that we have already created it, and that the circle is processed into madness as follows: I have a right to

recreate the world, because I have created it. It is here, which is the circle in simultaneous creation and recreation, but also passes the cutting in two, since one who has created the world can reaffirm it. Let's note that from this point of view, Nietzsche's madness is the Eternal Return itself, i.e. its effectiveness- namely the proper mode in which one whose act is to reaffirm the world must be the one who has said. Reaffirmation must eventually return to the first affirmation, which is The Act by which the history of the world is broken into two is to be legitimized under the name "Nietzsche", concerning the "Nietzsche" who has already created the world.

### **The World and Language: Historicized Sophistry, Anti-Theatrical and Poetic**

In fact, under these conditions that we have just mentioned, the Nietzschean arch-political act assumes in its means, methods, arguments, and prose, two core provisions:

-One with respect to the world, the other with respect to language. We cannot engage in this business, i.e. in the nominating speech of this Act, in the possibility of appointing The Act under the name of "Nietzsche" under stringent conditions, which concern both the world and language.

#### **a) The World**

The world should not be the place of truths and opinions, but it should be the place of types. This is the axial thesis concerning the world. The world is a network of types of sayings, or types of what is in the power of uttering, and it is such that "Nietzsche" could be the proper name of a type, an ultimate type where the world will be ultimately broken in two and reaffirmed: "Debris of stars" and "built from the universe." Where an entire doctrine, which is the most famous part of Nietzsche, and what we shall discuss the least, is the Nietzschean typology, Nietzschean genealogy; the doctrine of the composition of sovereignty, the question

of distribution between active forces and reactive forces, so that the entire descriptive Nietzschean protocol on which, however, it is less necessary to expound than the relation, if I may say so--in Deleuze, which is excellent in all respects.

For now, I wish to emphasize a point. The heart of the question is the following, for Nietzsche. **A statement can be evaluated only from the power of utterance.** This central maxim says that if you wish to evaluate a historically existing statement, you can only do so by identifying the kind of power that is exempted from the statement. Consequently, the key statement in Nietzsche's anti-philosophical polemic, is that there is no protocol of an intrinsic evaluation of statements whatsoever. Any evaluation of statements implies the identification of the type of statement that supports it, and therefore the kind of uttering power engaged with therein. A statement is always the summarizing of an investment of power, and the type of investment of power in any multiple in question can be evaluated based on the statement. Or we can even say that the standard of speaking, whatever it is, always returns to its strength against another instance of speaking. From this point of view, the form of evaluation is inherently controversial. The metaphor of war is going to cover this: the problem of war is the very place where philosophy situates the problem of truth. Replacing an intrinsic principle of evaluation of statements under the name of truth or any other equivalent name, is replaced by a principle of an evaluation of the power of utterance, which is itself always given as an antagonistic figure. It cannot let herself be captured in isolation: any power asserts itself or is contraposed by another power, and what it measures is always a relation of power. Thus: the description of a type of utterance will always be the description of a relation, i.e. of a historical figure of a relation of power. It is from this point of view that I would say that Nietzsche's typology is a generalized sophistry. One will understand that by sophistry, any doctrine which considers that it does not exist from the intrinsic evaluation of statements; i.e. any doctrine which refers to any evaluation of a statement of a kind of power that supports it. There we

have it. I do not want to deal right off with the question of Nietzsche's relation to sophistry, which is a complex question, since it is the question regulated by the relation between anti-philosophy and sophistry. I just wanted to say that genealogy, or typology are widespread sophistry. Moreover, we will return to the explicit homage that Nietzsche pays to sophistry, in testifying to it very well. Nietzsche did not hesitate to say that sophistry was the only healthy part of Greek philosophy in Plato's time, because it affirmed that the evaluation of the statements did not specifically hold a shared or shareable place, but it always referred to polemical structures of evaluations of power. Let's say that concerning the law of the world, which is also the law of Becoming or the law of history, Nietzschean genealogy, which is the doctrine of formations of sovereignty or the typology of types of power, is a historicized sophistry.

It is sophistry, in that it argues that the system of evaluating statements should be taken in the relation of power.

It is historicized, because it has to do with the genealogy of these types, i.e., any type is grasped by fate or the history of its relation to types of art.

## **b) Language**

On the side of language, too, it is clear that language cannot be the site where evaluations are shared. It may not be the place of argument or exposition of the statement under the law of the other, precisely because there is no law of the other, so there is no intrinsic evaluation of statements, wherever they are located. Language is basically the resource of the power of affirmation. It is structured in the declaratory act, or in the attestation what language is capable of doing. The question of language is the question of power, and not at all the question of its appropriateness. And where language is capable, we know there's always a poetic investigation in its principle. This is the poem that supports the proper question of the power of language. So, language will be pulled toward its artistic side. And there

we touch upon a very important point in Nietzsche's conception of art as a reserved superabundance, or as gratitude.

What language has in charge when it is the language of assessment, is not the correct or adequate validation of the statement. Rather, it is the delivering of a capacity of language to be overabundant in relation to itself, i.e. to be in overcapacity with regard to what it appeared previously to be capable. The language of assessment will necessarily be a creative language. But it cannot be an available language, because it is a language which invents, and which donates to the space of war from this invention, and donates as one shoots from a weapon. It is in this sense that we must hear the words of Nietzsche, for example in the *Case of Wagner*: "All art that is truly beautiful, all art that is great, has as its essence gratitude." In Nietzsche, what is opposed to the idea of accuracy, is the idea of gratitude. The idea of exact language is replaced by that of generous language, and of language which shows what it is capable of, which generously distributes this capacity. That is why it is also a language that refers to its artistic type because it is art, "really great" art, whose essence is gratitude. Obviously, it would be a pretty good definition of the poem, than of saying: the poem is language as gratitude, or the demonstration of the gratitude of language, not in its accuracy, but merely from its gratitude. In this sense, the essence of the language of assessment, and ultimately of the Philosophical Act, is related to the poem. Let's say that the Nietzschean style, which is an integral part of his thought for all the reasons I just mentioned, is a kind of poetic polemic. It is poetic because its essence must be its overabundance and gratitude. It is polemic, because this Act of power is always misused by another power.

Here's a parenthetical point of considerable importance, which we'll discuss: From this point of view, Nietzsche's style has a conspicuous opponent: theater. In Nietzsche's eyes, language as gratitude is properly what is opposed to language as representation. And, whether it's right or wrong, what forms, for Nietzsche, the language of representation, is theater. One can say that there is a Nietzschean



polarity on the question of language, which is distributed on the side of polemical gratitude, where the last resort is the poem, and on the other side, the captive language of representation and of histrionics, which is entirely given in the form of theater . I quote from the *Case of Wagner*: "But we must not tire of claiming what is theater , in the face of Wagnerians: always a subject of art, always something secondary, swollen and warped." And I quote only one of these statements, of which there are many. Nietzsche (who began with the *Birth of Tragedy* by showing that the origin of tragedy was musical) continued to argue against theatricality and against the theater. But if this polemic against the theater has multiple meanings, here we can take it in the sense that for Nietzsche, theater is the ingratitude of language. It goes as far as the poem is gratitude, and theater is ingratitude-- because it is language, the poem, and finally, also, music; as far as the poem is also music as the resource of language, which remains in the theater of representation captives, captive in a demonstration in exteriority. I leave aside the question of knowing if Nietzsche really captures the essence of theater. I don't think he does, but the fact remains that things are well distributed.

. To summarize, we can say that the speech of Nietzsche, where we are no longer in his act, is the composition of a historicized sophistry and anti-theatrical poetics. The layout of this combination is quite complex: historicized sophistry is the fate of the world, the anti-theatrical poetics, the fate of the language. These are the springs by which Nietzsche comes to dispose of himself after his own creation, the springs through which he tries to leap from thought and life over himself, the jump above himself, which is the essence of the antecedence of The Act. All this will weave our system of questions for what will follow, and I will state it in the form of four questions which will then be ours.

### **Four Questions Addressed to Friedrich Nietzsche**

**The first question: Is everything arch-political necessarily a sophistry in its critical media? There, does it have to do with a Nietzschean singularity?**

Here, is it a Nietzschean singularity, which is the singularity of his genealogy, of his typology, of his device in the structure of power, or can we state more generally that it is the arch-political project, i.e. the project to break world history in two, whatever its origin or legitimacy, which, in its criticisms, i.e. in the protocol of description that he makes from the old world; is necessarily sophistry? In taking sophistry in the sense I just used, it is **the evaluation of a statement in the power structure of the utterance.**

**2nd question: Is all *Arch-Politics* necessarily a poetics with its affirmative resources?**

Second generalization that we will consider: is it all about radical change obtained by means of thought that is necessarily poetic in its affirmative resources? Or, again, is this just a Nietzschean singularity? One can, if you like, pick one or the other of these two questions by saying: Are historicized sophistry and anti-theatrical poetry really a summary of Nietzsche's style, which is also the style of thought itself in its effectiveness, or is what it means, beyond Nietzsche, but through him, a feature of any proposed arch-political nature, i.e. of any structure which would assign to thought the function of a radical break or overriding of an end?

**- 3rd question: Is everything arch-political necessarily a hatred of the theater?**

A more singular question, and even more important, that after all, there is a Platonic hatred of theater. Moreover, as we will see, Nietzsche's anti-Platonism is ambiguous, i.e. there is a latent anti-Platonism in Nietzsche, where theater is one of the parsers. But that's not the only one, and Heidegger grows very far in that direction. There are some Heideggerian statements which explicitly state that no one has ever been as Platonic as Nietzsche. Without going to this slightly aggressive provision from Heidegger, we can address the question quite accurately of knowing whether any

project of thought which he structures with the idea of an overriding or an end, of a radical change, or an absolute closure, is necessarily a medium of the hatred of theater? And what does this tell us about theater - what will it achieve, there, finally- this unfortunate theater? It's still striking to see that the controversy against theater is large enough in the eyes of Nietzsche that he spends much of the year in *The Act* or in madness, which are one and the same. *The Case of Wagner*, and *Nietzsche against Wagner* are written, first and foremost, against theater. This is essential, and not at all derived.

**- 4th question: What does Arch-politics ask of art?**

In a sense, this question summarizes the first three. What features of art found here are charged, or invested in the element of the arch-political? To illustrate this point, what is the meaning of statements like this: "At any time that man rejoices, it is always the same in his joy. He rejoices as an artist, he enjoys himself as far as power, and lies are power [...] Art and nothing but art. It is the great enabler of life." The arch-political asks from art to bring it to the point where "At any moment that man rejoices, it is always the same in his joy, and he rejoices as an artist, he enjoys himself as far as power," but you see that these two statements are equivalent, and synonyms, since "lying is power," but the lie is art itself, because art is another name for lies, and we will return to this point. Finally comes the maxim: "Art and nothing but art," as "the great mother of possibilities in life." What should art be in order to support such a requisition? That is the fourth question, which summarizes all the others. What should art be, so that philosophy or anti-philosophy can state "Art, nothing but art"? Or we can say: when you know what the word "life" means for Nietzsche, imagine what he could mean by "the great enabler of life"--not simply what intensifies it, but what in a sense makes it possible, in consonance with another biographical text where Nietzsche said that without music, life is not worth living. So there is a requisition of emphatic art, because there is such a question of knowing

what there is of art for us to ask him that, which results in our question: What does arch-politics ask from art? Really the question is: what must art be if it can endure or bear such questions? These are the 4 main headings under which we will continue, but I will address them from a distance before covering them again.

### **Question of Being in 6 Propositions**

Because art is given as "the great enabler of life", since the maxim is this general point that says that "art and nothing but art," since ultimately, these 4 questions have to do with knowing what constitute the world and language, nothing less than that--for the investigation of anti-philosophy, we will take the most strictly philosophical basis of the anti-philosophical relation of Nietzsche in the supreme question par excellence, namely the question of being.

Let's devise these four particular questions from a typological philosophical investigation, which is typologically philosophical in the manner of Nietzschean anti-philosophy, namely: What is the relation of anti-philosophy in Nietzsche to the philosophical question par excellence, that he himself claims to be the ultimate question-- in particular, the question of Being. I will set forth some propositions. There is no question of conducting a course on Nietzschean ontology, but there is some sense in posing some propositions assigned to our own strategy.

#### **a) First proposition: in Nietzsche, the "il y a" is the name for Becoming, or of life.**

If I may say so, this first proposition is obviously empirically verbatim: life or Becoming is initially nothing other than the names of the "il y a". They must be taken in the same direction before making them play their roles in their pre-given connotations or meanings. Prior to biological Being, on one hand, and dynamics, on the other, life or Becoming are the Nietzschean names of the "il y a". One thing we have already said, but which is truly important that one must return in a detailed fashion, that these names - life, and Becoming-- are only correlates in meaning: these

are not the names of a meaning, but they are the names of the "il y a", as such. It is not a meaning for it is exempt from the assessment: any sense is an assessment, or the "il y a" as such is inevaluable. From this fact, the "il y a", named as Becoming or life, is, therefore, strictly speaking, meaningless. Finally, with respect to any overly metaphorical interpretations of life or of Becoming, in the nudity of the thing, it returns to the pure "il y a".

Let's mark this decisive point of departure with a fragment from the beginning of 1888, which we will repeatedly utilize, because it is quite central, in my opinion: "It is necessary the Becoming appears to be justified at any time (or inevaluable, which returns to the Same)." Let us remember that the full justification, which is the foundation of the problem of the Dionysian yes, and thus the question of The Act, and what is the "Becoming that is justified any time," is itself suspended from this in that Becoming is inevaluable. At this point, what proves to be a capital point, goes back to what I said earlier, on the yes not being an evaluation. The Dionysian yes is not a form of sovereignty, of meaning, or any evaluation of meaning is a power against another power, because the yes to the world as it is, is the yes to Becoming, i.e. the yes to its justification "at any instant" which, precisely, simply signifies that Becoming is inevaluable. Consequently, the ability to say yes, that it has to do with delivering, is the yes to the inevaluable, i.e. not to the yes of meaning, but the yes of what lacks meaning.

Let us remember that as long as the "il y a" is named under the sign of Becoming or life, and it is what must be "justified at any time" by the Dionysian yes, the Nietzschean affirmation is not a form of sovereignty because it is not a form of meaning, and it is, in reality, a yes to what is exempted from meaning. The inevaluable is thus exempted from meaning, but also a non-meaning, for the inevaluable has no value of meaning, nor value of non-meaning, i.e. it no longer has the value of negativity. Thus inevaluable, the yes to the "il y a" as far as it is under the name of Becoming, or of life, and such that it remains exempted from the

opposition of meaning and of non-meaning, whether it is from the view of the inevaluable or in its own creation that there is meaning, or non-meaning.

I'll quote Nietzsche, because one must truly reinforce this point without which everything else crumbles. The same fragment from early 1888 reads: "Becoming is of equal value at any time. The sum of its value remains equal to itself. In other words, it has no value because it lacks anything according to what it would be evaluable, and in relation to what the word "value" would make sense. "All value in the world" is inevaluable. Consequently, philosophical pessimism is one of several comical things. " It is a passage where the words become intricate: value, sense, nonsense, taken in seemingly complex equations.

This text is taken in metaphors of equality and of summations, etc., but they are only metaphors, which ultimately make this text clear, telling us that: If we accept Becoming, or life, as the name of the "il y a", we must pay the following price that the "il y a" has no value, because any value depends on an assessment and thus there is a localized "il y a" that is singular, particular, and not the "il y a" as such, for the word value has no meaning. We note, moreover, that saying, "The word "value" has no meaning in terms of "il y a", as any meaning is itself an evaluation, also means that there is no value of value. The fact that the "il y a" is inevaluable also returns to say that what the "il y a" has created, specifically, from evaluations, does not fall within itself, so that there is no value of value, and there are only evaluations, and no meaning of "il y a". In particular, there is no destined meaning except what the total evaluation of the world could do according to his destiny, or a destined form related to the historical sense of Being. Nietzsche polemicizes tirelessly against all these intentions or pro-tensions excluded by Nietzsche, from the moment where the "il y a" is inevaluable, and thus meaningless and where finally the meaning itself has no meaning, or the value has no value (which is the same thing). Here we find the statements that have a very important destiny; where we find, *mutatis mutandis*, as in Lacan, in the proposition that "there is no meta-language" or "there is no Other

of the Other, what is in the particular configuration in Nietzsche that will say that "there is no meaning of meaning." In fact, "God is dead" means first of all that there is no meaning of meaning, and also that the total world is inevaluable. All these statements are equivalent.

**2nd emphasis: Why is it "philosophical pessimism [which] is among the comic things"?** Well, because it claims that the nonsense in the world is of value. It evaluates the world as nonsense. But to say that "Philosophical pessimism is a comic thing," signifies something quite important. Saying that the world is nonsense is actually an assessment, and therefore assumes the measurable world, while its inevaluability exempts the world in the opposition of sense and nonsense. So we can say that pessimism is engaged in this particular comedy, which is that coming closer to where the "il y a" is exempted from meaning, this exemption results in a meaning, which is the meaning of nonsense, i.e. the meaning of pessimism. The pessimist is one who makes sense of the fact that there is no meaning. The pessimist is funny, because if we believe that there is meaning, it's not too comical to say: I like, or dislike this meaning, and the pessimism will say that this meaning is unpleasant. On the contrary, when we say that there is no meaning, continuing to wallow in the fact that this nonsense does not make sense, one, like Schopenhauer, becomes a comedic character. Schopenhauer is the scenic exhibition of comic pessimism. Is this comedy theatrical? This is the obvious question we can ask. The question that we may perhaps reconsider, in knowing in what sense Nietzsche takes up "comic," is a very interesting question, since the metaphor of laughter is essential: "The gods are laughing to death" [*Zarathustra*] from what we believe of them.

And in a sense, the ascetic reaction formation is almost defined by hostility to laughter, the condemnation of those who laugh. But at the same time, I must tell you that when one reads Nietzsche at length, one does not have the impression that he really laughs, but that really there's a quite violent irony in Nietzsche, while not a lot of humor about himself or others. The question of knowing what is the comical

when it is assigned in a unilateral fashion to the form of irony, is a very interesting question, and includes in its intersection with the question, of what comical theater, for example, is - humor, irony, laughter, comic repetition, there are affiliations of positions, where we know quite well that these are positions on Being itself. Nietzsche was not wrong to say that the question of laughter is a question that is extremely serious, if I may say. But in Nietzsche, one often has the impression that the seriousness of the question might very well override the importance that it attaches to itself through laughter. In any case, it is appropriate to laugh at philosophical pessimism for all the reasons I've just mentioned.

On the first proposition of Nietzschean ontology, I would like to comment upon my own account. There is an element of this doctrine with which I feel a deep enough agreement, which is at its heart a situation of Being in the world, the pure "il y a", does itself no sense, i.e. that the question of meaning is impertinent to the regard of the "il y a". This Nietzschean statement seems to me quite important and necessary to share. On one hand, we can say that it is the agreement on the fact that "God is dead" or the agreement on the fact that there is **no meaning of meaning, or no Other of the Other**, but it can also be said like this: we don't give meaning to the fact that the "il y a" lacks meaning, and thus we will evade the "il y a" in the opposition of meaning and non-meaning. I believe that the "il y a" has a very significant Nietzschean verdict and it is there that we are contemporaries. On the other hand, the conscience that Nietzsche draws upon and which seems quite sensible to me, is that the Event, the supplement, and not only the "il y a", but the emerging, and fate, should never be thought of as a form of conscience, and the emerging must absolutely be thought as independent from all conscience of emerging. On Becoming, Nietzsche says so, still in this fragment from the beginning of 1888: "We must deny a global awareness of Becoming, a God, in order not to relate to the Event from the point of view of a being who is both sentient and conscious." In my opinion this statement is quite important, for if it says that if one wishes to



grasp the Event as such, i.e. to think of Eventality as the Event, or to refer to emerging as emergence, then we must not refer to it from the perspective of a conscious being, i.e. you should never assume a subject. This also means that if there is a subject of the "il y a", it will be under the condition of the Event, but vice versa will also be true. The subject itself will be Event-like, and not structural. It's never necessary to presuppose a subject. It isn't possible to save the pure Eventality from what arrives, except to evade the preexistence of a subject. Which would be the conscience or sentience of this Event. And what Nietzsche adds, quite justifiably, is that in order not to suppose a subject of the Event in any Event, one must first deny that Becoming belongs to the category of meaning, we must neutralize the "il y a" in terms of the question of meaning or value, i.e. to pose that the "il y a" is inevaluable. You see the connection that is to my eyes very strong, which is established between a position regarding the "il y a" or pure Being, which evades the "il y a" with regard to the question of meaning, and the preservation of Eventality of the Event, i.e. the ability to relate to emerging as it is. There is a connection between the two: we can both originate the subject in the Event, and not the reverse, if previously, and only if we neutralize the question of meaning and Being. This connection that Nietzsche indicates quite clearly, seems ontologically decisive to me. For the idea of a thought of Eventality of the Event is suspended in what Being evades from the question of meaning.

So not only do I demonstrate my profound agreement, but I see in it a very great Nietzschean depth, a great Nietzschean modernity. On the contrary, the question that arises is that of an innocence of names. Assuming that there is such, why is there life, why Becoming? The question returns despite everything. I neutralized it as much as possible, but ultimately, in full settlement, we always end up asking: Why are these words still there, and not others? After all, one could say that the "il y a", the Event, the exemption of sense, are things we are not obliged to name as "life" or "Becoming," for when you say that Becoming has to be justified at

every moment and it is inevaluable, one could say that its dimension of Becoming is henceforth crossed out, because: what does it become, if the assessment is always the same, precisely as far as it evaluates the inevaluable? So why Becoming, if ultimately, every moment is equivalent to any other - because as far as it is the instant of an "il y a", is it inevaluable? However, you can only introduce the difference in the evaluation. If the "il y a" is inevaluable, strictly speaking, it does not become, because whatever is thought from Becoming, requires thinking of the difference. And if any difference is a differential assessment, then the "il y a" as far as it is inevaluable, strictly speaking, does not become. So you may say: yes, it's such that Becoming does not become. But then, how do we stabilize the fact that Nietzsche will still appoint life and Becoming as the inevaluable "il y a"? In other words, name that life and Becoming-- was that not in fact, sly, an evaluation? Even at the point of the inevaluable, saying that one should name this inevaluable "life" is, in reality, an evaluation i.e. evaluated through latent categories, which will finally be living against the inert, creation against the Same, diversity against unity, etc. ... After all, calling the "il y a" "life" and "Becoming" is perhaps a differential assessment that is altogether hidden. This is the process that could be conducted on this point in Nietzsche.

To be fair, I think Nietzsche is well aware of this, and that's what is precisely corrected by the doctrine of Eternal Return. It is precisely this potential evaluation of the words "life" and "Becoming, which are found to switch back in their neutrality, by the doctrine of Eternal Return, which will in effect, tell us that Becoming does not become. The doctrine of Eternal Return will, in fact, tell us that what is affirmed is also reaffirmed, or that the "il y a" can both be said to come, or come back. This superposition of coming and return, of the turn and return, is finally what retains the "il y a" in the inevaluable, because the "il y a" will remain inevaluable, including under the names of life and of Becoming, as soon as under the name of thought of the Eternal Return, one will know that the affirmation of the "il y a" is also a

reaffirmation, and that what has become is also the Same or what will return. We know that the word life, as far as the ontological essential name, which designates both the inevaluable depth of the plurality of evaluations: the world, and also, under the law of the Eternal Return, the principle of the Same. This is the inevaluable depth of moving assessments, but it is also the principle of the Same, or the principle of the identity of the inevaluable. From this point of view, I do not think I will not develop it at length, because it is very complex - that Heidegger is right to say that in Nietzsche, the will to power is the name of a state of being, and that the Eternal Return is the name of Being, for it is indeed the massive interpretative schema of Heidegger, with regard to Nietzsche. The investigation is that, on one hand, there is a tension, often considered an absolute paradox in Nietzsche, where the will to power appears as a system of dynamic intensifications, and on the other hand, an Eternal Return, which seems to be a principle of identity. Heidegger rightly remarks that the problem is not a reconciliation, but that the registrations are different. What is thought as the will to power is a state of being as such, while what the thought or attempts to be under the Eternal Return is to be, in this sense, the Eternal Return as forgotten or erased Being, where a manifested state of Being will be named the will to power. Heidegger's dialectic is more sophisticated, but the investigation is part of it. I myself would not say this. I would say the Eternal Return and will to power, if one refuses this word, which in my view, is not so important that one speaks of it in Nietzsche, finally, whatever it takes. But let's say, concerning the Eternal Return and evaluations, I would prefer the Eternal Return and a multiplicity of evaluations which are names under which an exemption of the meaning of life balances or stands. The Eternal Return and plurality of evaluations, or intensifications, constitute a system of double namings, which ultimately hold that life is exempted from the question of meaning, for to say that, we must, really correct what life possesses from dynamic intensifications or of plurality underlying the Eternal Return, which indicates the inevaluable as a form of the Same. We must therefore

speak at once of the turn, and Eternal Return, or the coming and the return, and is that which constitutes the Nietzschean thought of Being, not in a distribution between thought and Being, but rather having to do with the device of the will to power and of the Eternal Return, which alone can constitute the thought of Being, which for Nietzsche is his removal from the question of meaning, and inevaluable Being.

That is the real question with Heidegger, for with Heidegger, at the last resort, Being is fated to be affected or affectable by meaning: there is a fated meaning of Being, whether it was meaning ruled or governed by the forgetting of this meaning. But for Nietzsche, there is none of it. It is a central point. And, basically, the seemingly paradoxical balance between Eternal Return of the Same, on one hand, and the metaphor of vital intensification, on the other, and the antagonistic or polemical plurality of evaluations, is clarified if we see that it is only the double naming whereby the exemption in the sense of vital origin-icity tries to be maintained in its equilibrium. One could also say that Nietzsche's problem is that "life" is a name for the circularity of the same and the Other, i.e. that the "il y a" is not decidable on the question of knowing this or that. One can say that the Eternal Return on the side of the same, the will to power on the side of the Other, is true because the will to power is embodied in the many types that are always connected to each other. **But in the end, what matters is that the inevaluable, at bottom, is neither the same nor different, and it is indeterminable which one it is.**

So this is the direction toward which the Heraclitean depth leans in Nietzsche, because what is essential in its relation, which is also explicit, in Heraclitus, is precisely that the thought of Being in Heraclitus does some of the same things through the recognition of a exemption of meaningful configurations of the depth itself - which in Heraclitus is represented by the metaphor of fire. However, *mutatis mutandis*, what Heraclitus calls the fire is quite close to what Nietzsche calls

life, if you take his device in its ontological nakedness. For example, Heraclitus, in Fragment 30, states: "This world, all the same, fashioned by no God, no man, but eternally it was, it is, and will always be living fire" (Badiou translation, translated by Kim). This fragment is absolutely Nietzschean, and Nietzsche recognizes that Heraclitus and the Sophists are its essential Greek reference. The "il y a" is in the balance of identity and alterity (Otherness), such that this balance is undecidable, because in the end, in order to decide, we'd need some sense, and there is none of it. It is properly this balance, which Nietzsche calls "life," and Heraclitus "fire." That is the first proposition concerning Nietzschean ontology.

**b) Second proposition: Being is a fictitious designation: We must not name the "il y a".**

We have seen that under very complicated conditions, we must name the "il y a" as "Becoming" or "life", but it is not appropriate to name it thus. One could almost say that Being is a bad name for Being. Or even that the "il y a" does not have to be presented in the form of Being. Here we enter the typology because Nietzsche's thesis is that naming the "il y a" Being or a state of being, is an evaluation. Earlier, I asked the question: to what extent is life not an evaluation? Answer: one only does that by introducing, at the least, the Eternal Return. By contra, it is sure that for Nietzsche, naming the "il y a" a state of being or Being, is a reactive evaluation. It begs the question (if it doesn't beg naming Being the "il y a"), and this is because we know who is interested in naming it as well. Who? Not good people! It begs the question of who, genealogically, has an interest in naming Being or a state of being the pure power of "il y a". Of course, when Nietzsche states: one must not name Being the "il y a", we also understand that it is no longer required to name Non-Being: if Being is a bad name, non-Being is also a bad name for the "il y a". You must very well understand this logic of names. Whenever a name is discredited, the contradictory name that it is also, it is in such a sense that Nietzsche's thought is not

dialectic. It never has to do with greeting a name with contradictory naming. As soon as you say that Being is a bad name, because, ultimately, it is a name that supports the interests of reactive power, you may also say that naming it non-Being is no longer good, either. So we have to name it something other than the coupling of Being and non-Being, which is also quite Heraclitean. Fragment 49a reads: "We are and are not" (translated by Badiou, rendered by Kim). Saying, "We are and we are not" means in any case, that the question is not there. Saying that "We are and we are not," Heraclitus states that Being or non-Being is in no manner the relevant name of the question, since in light of the "il y a", one can say all the better: "We are and we are not," a statement which, in some sense, leaves the question of the "il y a" in nominal suspense. This is exactly the position of Nietzsche.

A fragment from early 1888 reads, "In general, one must admit being nothing, because then Becoming loses its value [which, in light of all that has been said, is an extraordinarily twisted phrase]. Consequently, it remains for us to ask how the illusion of being was born." In other words, if we call the "il y a" state of being, it loses its value to Becoming. There, everyone jumps- you should all jump, of course, in saying that: one will say that Becoming is inevaluable. But this is what Nietzsche means, i.e. that if one names the "il y a", one loses this particular value to Becoming, which is precisely inevaluable, i.e. when we make an assessment. We should understand the sentence as thus: Whoever appoints a state of being to "il y a", who admits the "il y a" of a state of being, there is something here or there that exempts Becoming from the fact that it is inevaluable. He enters the particular form of the evaluation, which is why Nietzsche connects immediately-otherwise we would not understand why he continues thus: "Consequently, it remains to ask how the illusion of being has been born." And the passage is perfectly consistent if understood this way: *"Whoever calls the 'il y a' from the name of Being conducts an evaluation, and one has thus the right to ask who evaluates. So what is the point of the ontological evaluation of the 'il y a'."*

One can also say that in *Twilight of the Idols*: "Being is a drama devoid of sense." While this is true it is also an evaluation-- an assessment about life. And like all drama, we must immediately ask what is the name of the will that drives it. As soon as one enters a fictitious naming, it is an evaluation, where this type should be sought. However, a key point is that the diagnosis of Nietzsche is that the type to want to be invested in calling or being he is there a type of reactive want, i.e. it is to oppose yes to Becoming, i.e. the yes to no meaning, or withdrawal of meaning. You see the trickery: at the start, philosophy which has chosen Parmenides - a name opposed to Heraclitus - calls Being the "il y a", which is in no way engaged in an innocent operation. It has conducted an evaluation, it has engaged the "il y a" in the evaluation. However, the "il y a" is inevaluable, and consequently this evaluation is concerned, and relates to a certain type: the Parmenidean philosopher is originally a guy who assigns the name of Being on the "il y a", and the will which is invested there is a reactive desire, because giving the "il y a" the name of Being, and engaging in the deception of Being and of non-Being is a reactive evaluation, i.e. an evaluation which prohibits the Dionysian yes from being fulfilled, since the "yes" assumes that Becoming is inevaluable.

Thus if we call ontology the /fact of giving the name of Being to "il y a", ontology is a reactive drama, an assumption made originally by philosophy against the Dionysian Yes, i.e. against the yes to the inevaluable, the yes to what does not make sense, or, as Nietzsche says, in a remarkable sentence: "This hypothesis is a source of all the calumnies against the world." This is the form of the second proposition that elucidates the first. If we call the "il y a" "Becoming" or "life," one at least preserves, under complex conditions, the possibility of the Dionysian yes. Whereas if we give the name of Being to "il y a", and consequently engage in dialectical trickery of Being and of non-Being, one has already evaluated one has fictitiously claimed to assess the inevitable. And one has thus authorized-- and philosophy is this authorization-- "all the calumnies with regard to the world."

Calumny is simply taken as the form of reserving the right to evaluate something not as Being from the moment you've assessed the "il y a" in terms of being. Therefore, you are in the matrix "of all the calumnies against the world," which is always to say that this is never so, and really should not be, and it is unfortunate that it is so, etc... And this is the logic of the phenomenon against essence, of appearance against the truth, etc... Thus the matrix of all the slanders to the world, i.e. the impossibility or prohibition placed upon the Dionysian yes to the full world as it is, is ultimately rooted in the philosophical first appointment, which has chosen to annex the "il y a" in the name of Being. So then -I'll leave it there for now - I think we will touch upon a constituent element of what I will later call anti-philosophy, in its generic sense.

Anti-philosophy always has to do with which statement philosophy is responsible for from the depreciation of "il y a". That the "il y a" was evaluated philosophically such that its depreciation is now possible. Anti-philosophy this position on philosophy, which made philosophy responsible for the overall system of depreciation and consequently also the impossibility of affirmative, the affirmative in the radical sense, Nietzsche will speak of the Dionysian yes. Or once again, that philosophy is primarily responsible due to the difficulty of the "yes." You can find this crucial anti-philosophical matrix in all the major anti-philosophers. For example, Lacan states that ontology ought to be called *hauntology*, a haunting of the home.

Yet Nietzsche does not say anything different from Lacan on this particular point, namely that there is a haunting in the fact that philosophy has named Being the "il y a", that this operation originally engaging in philosophy is what, in departing from it, makes it difficult today, for us to say yes to the world. But if I name Pascal as another notorious anti-philosopher to whom Nietzschean never ceases to send friendly greetings, he does not say anything else. Pascal said that ultimately the philosophy obfuscates the yes to God and whom, encumbers a "God



of the philosophers and scholars," forbids us from seeing that the whole problem is in saying yes to "the God of Isaac and Jacob." And that is an anti-philosophical nodal disposition. There we are. Well, we'll leave it here!

## **Fifth Course - The State, The New Idol**

In order to begin tonight's meeting, I would like to return just briefly to a small question I addressed last time, the point regarding the arch-political designation I have adopted to describe the Nietzschean act. About this qualification, you know that the content is the announcement of a radical rupture in the history of the world. I wondered in what sense it has failed, at least in the first approximation, to occupy politics and that this is meant when we say that politics via the Nietzschean gesture is a gesture that is arch-political.

I remember the exact nature of the question: Basically it is the type of conjunction or disjunction posited between politics and the State. Either politics is conceived as structured by the question of the State or authority, or it is ordered by another principle, which requires a distance from the statist principle or from sovereignty. I told you that we can discern a hesitation in Nietzsche on this point, or, in any case, a complexity of Nietzsche, as one side is essential, with him: what he calls a doctrine of the sovereignty of formation and that the question of dominance is a central question in Nietzsche's genealogy, so that from that angle, you would think that Nietzsche inclined towards a connection between political sovereignty and, therefore, to state metaphorically, a statist vision of politics. But, on the other hand, there was a determined distance taken with respect to the State, and the thesis also dealing with the service of the State, that that knowledge without rule or order of the state are reactive dispositions. So you could say that one finds, again, in Nietzsche, the whole complexity of the meaning of the word politics, taken or torn between its assignment to the question of sovereignty, and its assignment to the question of emancipation. On this point, I have, as is my rule here, and I believe I said why, based on the final Nietzschean texts of 1888, and even the so-called notes of madness, since I maintain that this is the place to go in Nietzsche. However, on reflection, I think we cannot let go of what, after all, is the most explicit text on

the question of the State, namely the singing of the first part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: from the New Idol*. I will thus complete what had been told from a review of this song.

The new idol is precisely the State. When Zarathustra began to argue against the new idol, and to set forth the imperative, "Turn away from the new idol" it expressly talks about the State, and this text of the new idol, is a text of a violent anti-statism, which could allow us for a long time to talk about Nietzschean anarchism. In this sense, and despite the doctrine of formations of sovereignty, a Nietzschean anarchism connected to violence and anti-State imprecation. That's where we found the formula has become almost commonplace, as found early in the text: "*The State is the coldest of cold monsters*," a formula that General de Gaulle liked to quote - and many others, a great number of them. Certainly coldness and monstrosity are, in the Nietzschean metaphor, grave imputations. From what we can ask of what are the arguments in the text of Nietzsche on the State, we can come up with this metaphorical imprecation against the coldest of cold monsters, as decisive insights into the relation of Nietzsche to the question of the State, and from there, clarify the meaning of politics in the sense of arch-politics. I would like to take some of them, and thus make this text readable, which, like all the texts of Zarathustra, is in itself partly enigmatic.

#### **a) 1st Thesis: Disjunction Between People and the State**

The first essential thesis is that the State, in Nietzsche's eyes, cannot claim to be a follower of the people. This is a thesis of disjunction between what is designated by the people and of what the State can legitimately avail itself to. Specifically, one could say that there is no possible state representation of a people. The State can't present itself as a figuration of the people, and consequently is, indeed the theme underlying the whole text. The State is still strictly a de-figuration of the people. There is an essential disfiguring element in the State. In this sense, the State is not a figure where the people can be stated. Obviously, this can be taken in many senses,

but it is also, incidentally, a criticism of any representative theory of the State: the State is never justified in being declared representative in the sense that it would be a figuration that is representative of the people. The fundamental reasons that Nietzsche puts forward to support this essential thesis that the state is never a possible representation of a people are the following to Nietzsche's eyes:

- A people is always a *creation*. This is the term he uses. A people is precisely not a state in the basic sense of the word: it is not a state of affairs, but a creation, and therefore, it is a dimension of invention that names the people and which is lost or obliterated in the statist figure. All people, Nietzsche will say, fall under what was proposed to them in the self-invention of oneself as faith and as love. Faith and love. "These are creators who have formed people and who have hung faith and love over the people: this is how they have served life." The two words that designate the people as creation. From this point of view, it is important to signal it, as will be seen by contraposition to the State, which is that a people is always a disinterested creation, i.e. a creation that goes for itself. Therefore: a people must be taken in the dimension of creating and inventing. Energy in which this invention is deployed under faith and love. And it is appropriate for itself or an evaluation of oneself, not structured by anything other than itself.

- By against a State, Nietzsche will say, it's the order of the *trap*. The State is a trap to the crowd. And what will be opposed from the point of view of the maxim of the State in faith and love, is as Nietzsche will state, the sword and interest. "But they are destructive, those who set traps in large numbers and who call this a State. They hang over them a sword and a hundred appetites. "The proposition in creation of a people of a type of faith and love is in affirmation of self, while the State is a "trap to the crowd," thus tense in this creation itself, where propositions are of the structure of the sword, and thus the structure of violence, and the expansion of interest: a capture of interest. If we recapitulate, we can say: a people is a disinterested creation, while a State is a capture of interest; that's for the axial thesis.

### **b) Second thesis: Death of God, Death of the State**

The second thesis is genealogical: it asks why the State exists. Why is this trap set for popular creation in its disinterested form, which submits or filters it into the network of interests? In short, why does the State arrive, however? What is the power that sustains it, even if it is a reactive power?

Nietzsche will respond - and in this sense he makes it a modern sense: it is indeed the modern State - the State that profits from its victory, the victory over the gods, which is why he names it the new idol. The state is the idol of replacement, in the element or the horizon of the death of God. And the energy it captures is this tired energy, already partially divested or residual, compared to what has been committed against the fighting or the theme of God: "You guess the state winners of the God of old. You are tired of the struggle, and now your weariness began serving the new idol. "So: the modern state as a new idol, i.e. as an evaluation, i.e., as subjectivity, it is not simply the construction or state apparatus, because what interests Nietzsche is why would he have a rally or idolatry of the state? Why was there submission to the State? So it's the State as subjectivity or as a wish that interests him. Well, the key to this question is that the defeated will, which the State draws its power from the idol, is that weariness which has won minds beyond or after the victory over the God of old. So it must be understood that the maxim "God is dead", if we take the point of view of the will that sustains it, i.e. the fight which authorized or made it possible, is the very thing which the State takes the opportunity of its trap. The State is built on the fatigue of anti-religious struggle, i.e. on the Event of the death of God or in its form of weariness. Basically, the State is what comes after every victory and fatigue following any victory: "The State you can presume vanquishers of God of the past" and it is you who have built the reactive authority. As a result, the maxim "*God is dead*" will be brought to its affirmative power so that we can indeed also say "the State is dead." The possibility of the

statement "The state is dead" is the only one to complete, other than in a recovered, and rebuilt weariness, the maxim "God is dead." This means that the need for imprecation against the State is closely pegged to the Nietzschean logic of the question of the death of God, where one can say that the State captures residual energy.

**c) Third Thesis: the State is Corruption**

Third thesis - which after all may interest us today (January '93) - the State is inherently corrupt. Corruption must be taken in the sense that the State is intrinsically corrupt, so to speak, and is essentially superfluous. You see how far we are in the Nietzschean device in any functionalist vision of the State. From the point of view of the subjective capturing by the State, there is an essential superfluity, or in my jargon (which on this point intersects with Nietzsche's intuition) that the state is as an outgrowth. Given any situation, the current situation is still in a form of outgrowth. Basically, the Nietzschean idea of the superfluous character of the State is quasi-ontological, designating that the State is, in light of the affirmative position, always in a parasitic situation or is an outgrowth. This is manifested or has its phenomenon in its essentially corrupt character, which simply means that it is corruption from its affirmative force: "[All these extras] want access to the throne: it is their madness - as if happiness was on the throne! Often it's the mud upon the throne - and often it is the throne that is planted in the mud." Given what the Nietzschean imperative will be, I quote, "Avoid falling into idolatry of the superfluous." The muddy nature of State authority is the phenomenon of its excess or superfluity. All this returns, ultimately, in the first line, in the fact that the modern State is building on the capture of residual energy involved in the death of God, and ultimately, that in any case, the State has no legitimacy to stand as a representation of the will of a people.

**d) Fourth thesis: the State changes art, science and philosophy into a**

**cultural magma.**

"Thus you see what is superfluous! They steal the works of the inventors and the treasures of the wise: they call their spoils civilization - and everything becomes their illness and setbacks!" There is in Nietzsche a general critique of culture in a definition, after all implied, extremely interesting from culture, which is that culture is the art (let's take it as paradigm, but it is also science, philosophy, wisdom) seized by the State. But beware: culture is art seized by the state, understand the "always" in subjectivity. This does not mean the art of the State, which also exists, but it is secondary. It means the art practiced or apprehended in subjectivity from the point of the New Idol, i.e. in subjective relation and tired desire of the new idol, i.e. the State.

From this point of view, the cultural - it is a mathematical proportion - is opposed to the artistic, but, in truth, to the scientific, philosophical. The culture is opposed to the artistic, just as, *mutatis mutandis*, the State is opposed to the people. There is an equal proportion. Disjunction, the "non-relation which is presented however as a relation between people and the State, in its analogue in its non-relation which is presented as relation between art and culture: "Culture" is *Bildung*, i.e. in the sense of cultivating cultural formation. I quote: "I see the superfluous! They steal the works from inventors and the treasures of the wise: this robbery is what they call their culture." This superfluity is the name Nietzsche attaches to the States or to the statesmen. If we try to understand these things in the dimension of the will or subjectivity, we say that culture refers, again, to the tired form of the state. Every culture is fatigued, because fatigue only makes State appropriation subjectively possible. Let us always remember that point. Originally, it is the general state appropriation of residual energy invested in the death of God, but there is affirmative will in art, this is its point of fatigue that it lets fly, steal, expose, where it can have a robbery that is precisely and properly what constitutes the cultural element. Note that, from this point of view, every State in the eyes of Nietzsche, is

cultural, and conversely, every culture is statist. There is an essential correlation between the figure of the State as a form of the new idol for a tired wanting, and culture.

**e) Fifth thesis: Humanity is always beyond the State.** Finally, the fifth thesis, which is the summation of all the others: Humanity is always beyond the State. I give you the essential text, which also ends the song of the new idol: "Where in the end of the State begins the man who is not superfluous. Where does the State end, that song of necessity, the unique melody, which is irreplaceable, begins? Where does the State end - don't you notice the rainbow and the bridges leading to the Superhuman (Übermensch)?" What we must remember in this central passage is a grand density that must be connected to the theme of Superhuman. Basically, the text says: What is Superhuman? This theme, permit me to say, of Nietzsche's opinion, eh well Superhuman is a person, of course, but as an irreplaceable affirmation. Superhuman is the human fit to be an invaluable affirmation. There again, we have a logic that we have often deployed. No more than when one breaks in two world histories, one will not succeed a good sovereignty with a bad one, and no less the passage of the man to the Superhuman is the transition from one type to another in the sense of a substitution. In reality, the Superhuman is the affirmation of the human as "a unique melody, irreplaceable." And it is true that Nietzsche's arch-political gesture announces the Superhuman, but precisely this should be taken in the general logic of the arch-political gesture, which is the possibility of the yes. The Superhuman is the man in capacity of the irreplaceable yes to himself. Good. But what the text tells us is that the Superhuman is where the State ultimately ends. "Where does the state end- don't you see the rainbow and the bridges leading to the Superhuman?"

*1st remark: the idea of a State of the Superman is an absurd idea for Nietzsche.* There is especially no possible statist configuration of the Superhuman. The text is absolutely clear: the condition of the Superhuman is to be where the State



ends. The figure of the Superhuman is precisely what cannot exist anywhere else, except under the State. It stands irreconcilably where the state ends and cannot be held elsewhere, particularly in some figures whether the state. This first remark is essential without going into the quibbles of the genealogical relation between Nietzsche and Nazism, taken in their extensions, in any case, where there is an absolutely certain point that it is really absurd, unthinkable in the eyes Nietzsche, that there is a statist figure of the Superhuman. From what we can perhaps decide, and that's where I was coming from, slicing or elucidating a little differently the oscillation where I left off today, the oscillation between politics as genealogy of sovereignty on one hand, and politics as irreducibly anti-statist, on the other, how the political in Nietzsche can happen to hold two sets, i.e. to keep a rule configurations of sovereignty as well as a distance, which you see is absolutely radical in the very figure of the State.

One could say that what is at stake in the arch-political gesture, i.e. what Nietzsche as a proper name offers to the century, is the idea of the human as the formation of non-statist sovereignty. Formation of sovereignty because it is an order of affirmation, so it is the height of The Active force, and thus is man himself as a formation of sovereignty. Not a formation of sovereignty over man and over life, and thus a formation of sovereignty over man and life, and thus a reactive formation of sovereignty, but man himself as formation of a reactive sovereignty; man himself as formation of non-statist sovereignty with the idea that man cannot be a formation of sovereignty under the rule of the state - it's where the State ends, that this is possible.

The name of the human as formation of non-State sovereignty is the Superhuman, which intersects with the man in the capacity to say yes, but more specifically the ability of man to say yes to himself, implying what is fully terminated as the new idol, namely the State. Without dwelling upon this, I would just say that man as formation of non-state sovereignty in the 19th century bears another name,

which was the name of communism. In its generic sense - not in its contemporary political sense - communism was originally designated by the man as the formation of collective non-state sovereignty. Formation of sovereignty over nature, over needs, and thus regulation of sovereignty from non-statist necessity. So we would say that the Superhuman in Nietzsche names something- which in a completely different device, a fully heterogeneous device -was named communism in its generic sense. And the test of this century under a double naming, in truth, was to ask the question: can there be a depth of non-state sovereignty? Can the human being be defined as the ability to himself be a formation of non-statist sovereignty? Can the human perhaps be someone who de-statizes his own sovereignty? and this question has had the name of communism, and also the name of the Superhuman. And on one hand, the 20th century was the test of these two names through a question, which is ultimately more important than any empirical question, and that is the following question: can we order the essence of human reality in the theme of a formation of non-statist sovereignty? I just wanted to recall that this was undoubtedly the purpose of Nietzsche. From this point of view it is also a central purpose of the entire 19th century, which is: "Can there be a generic human essence that can be designated as a formation of sovereignty exempted from the figure the state?" That's to re-elucidate the point of arch-politics, where one could perhaps say that in general - we will revisit this point- that any arch-politics (which was called revolution) is a gesture that puts into play the possibility of the human as the formation of a non-statist sovereignty. I now return to the main course of events.

### **Nietzsche's Ontology in Six Propositions**

We were questioning the anti-philosophical determination of Nietzsche and the 4 main questions that we addressed to him:

- Are all arch-politics necessarily sophistry in its media of criticism?
- Does any arch-political project necessarily be poetic in its affirmative

resources?

- Is everything arch-political necessarily a hatred of the theater?
- What does the arch-political ask of art?

We begin at the manner where he himself poses what is traditionally the organic question of philosophy, i.e. the question of Being. We will interrogate ourselves with all the required quotation marks about Nietzschean "ontology." Finally, what is the doctrine of the depth, or the absence of depth, or of a presentation in general, which is in the work of the Nietzschean text? I have mentioned that I will utter them under six propositions, and we will have examined the first two. I repeat them quite briefly.

**a) The first proposition is that for Nietzsche, the "il y a", what there is- let's call it Being in its absolute indeterminacy- the "il y a" has as its name, Becoming or life.** Becoming, life – it is, I repeat, a question of method - must be taken as nothing other than the names of the "il y a", whatever their nature or context, otherwise. They must be taken first in immanence in Nietzsche, as the names Nietzsche chooses to designate the "il y a". We had fully developed the fact that these names do not immediately correlate in meaning, i.e. that they are not defined donors of meaning to the "il y a", since all meaning is an evaluation, and life as far as it is a name of the "il y a" is explicitly posed as inevaluable. If we built it in Heideggerian terms, it looks exactly like this: a state of being in totality is meaningless. A state of being in totality is properly what Nietzsche names the total life. Therefore, a state of being in totality has no meaning where in the Nietzschean lexicon, life is inevaluable. You see that the first proposition begins to build in a relatively complex way on the "il y a" which remains completely undetermined: the names of the "il y a": Becoming or life, and the question of meaning.

**b) Second proposition, negative, is: Being is a bad designation for the "il y a".** Again, Nietzsche will build the legitimacy of the naming of the "il y a" by life or Becoming, among other things, by the process of legitimacy for other namings. He

would instruct the process in illegitimacy of the naming of the "il y a" in the form of Being or beings. The couple itself is fired here: the "il y a" does not have to be presented in the form of Being or beings. Being is a dramatic description: "Being is a drama devoid of meaning," is mentioned in *Twilight of the Idols*, but what is important is that once you identify a dramatic or inadequate designation, one has to wonder - such is the great Nietzschean procedure - who has an interest in this naming? Who has an interest in naming Being or a being the power of the "il y a"? This point is made in its historical singularity. It turns out that since Parmenides, a number of people have appointed Being or a state of being the power of the "il y a" and not Becoming or life. We then ask what purpose they pursued, and what was their interest in this affair. Nietzsche will conclude with a reactive interest, i.e. that any designation of the "il y a" under the name of Being is a ban on the yes in the "il y a" itself, i.e. in Nietzsche's terms, a ban on Becoming and life. But basically, it is a ban on the yes to the "il y a". Thus: naming Being or a state of being has no innocence, but consists in engaging in philosophical machinery, machinery that will dominate the philosophical space, which is a machine of prohibition, of obliteration or the incapacity concerning the yes to the "il y a", which is actually a yes to Becoming, yes to life. And I remind you of the formula among others by Nietzsche: "This hypothesis of a state of being is the source of all the calumnies against the world." I noticed, in passing, that there we entered more accurate characterizations of anti-philosophy, as anti-philosophy is going to be a category that we will submit to in the test of our survey on Nietzsche. One can say that what declares anti-philosophy is that philosophy ensures its control by its ontological depreciation of the phenomenon of the "il y a", and this is initially already contained in the selection of words Being and a state of being. So there is a Parmenidean depreciation of the power of the "il y a" in its nominal assignment in Being. Here, we have a process intrinsic to the ontological program as such. The difference from Heidegger is that this critical depreciation there was involved from Parmenides, and therefore there

is, properly speaking, no innocent form of pre-Socratics in Nietzsche. It's not true that in the pre-Socratics taken together, there was an authentic thought of Being that would have been forgotten or obliterated. From Parmenides, the battle between philosophy and anti-philosophy is engaged: there is knowledge, so to speak, from philosophy and anti-philosophy: the philosopher is Parmenides, anti-philosopher is Heraclitus. The coupling of Parmenides and Heraclitus is for Nietzsche the original coupling of philosophy and anti-philosophy, which is given in its inaugural form in the choice of names, in the very act of its naming. Name the "il y a" under the sign of being committed since Parmenides philosophy as derogatory control of power of the "il y a". On the contrary, naming the "il y a" in its form of Becoming, as Heraclitus does, is preserving the possibility of the yes, preserving the possibility of the Dionysian affirmation.

**c) Third proposition: Logic is dependent on the reactive doctrine of Being.**

We are entering the area of what might be called Nietzschean anti-epistemology. In the eyes of Nietzsche, logic, properly speaking, is dependent on the naming of the "il y a" under the sign of Being. From this point of view, logic is a philosophical creation: the option which consists of originally mutilating the power of the "il y a" in naming it Being or a being is what founds the space of possibility of logic. The logic is created by the first reactive option of philosophical control that enslaves the power of the "il y a" to ontological naming. I quote a fragment from Fall 1887. "Logic (such as geometry and arithmetic) is valid only for dramatic truths that we have created. Logic is the attempt to understand the real world according to an order of Being posed by us." The text is very explicit.

***Two Remarks:***

**- 1st remark: Logic is dependent on the order of Being.** There is no logic except under the onto-logical option itself. In short, one could say that all logic is Parmenidean, i.e. it assumes or supports the naming of the "il y a" as Being. The

logic simply seeks to capture in the real world this order of Being that we have posed in the essentially reactive gesture. A consequence that we can take from this point, is that obviously it is not possible to use logic, in such a sense that one takes it, for The Act or the arch-political Nietzschean gesture. Logic is originally corrupted by the ontological option. It is therefore disqualified as a remedy for the anti-philosophical Nietzschean act. I say this because the recurring theme of Nietzschean irrationalism is a very complex question. In fact, we have many opportunities to see the position of Nietzsche that is not situated between reason and irrationalism. There are also texts that exalt, for example, the classical rationalist coldness in Nietzsche. The question is not there. The central question is: Is logic such that we inherit it in its historical device, appropriable to the philosophical or anti-Philosophical Act, in the Nietzschean act? What Nietzsche will say is that there is an essential inappropriateness, which has nothing to do with the debate on rationality or non-rationality, but is tied to the condition of the possibility of logic, i.e. its genealogy: What is at stake is the ontological option underlying all logic. Ontological option which may be summarized under the species of the naming of the "il y a" in the form of Being. From the view where logic is a calculation of this order, logic is an ontological calculation. Logic is never an ontological calculation. So if the goal is to reclaim the affirmative, i.e. the possibility of man as formation of non-state sovereignty, it cannot be done, and this is not even a question of evaluation, but of necessity, making it in the element of logic. One will thus treat logic as what it is, i.e. not at all a medium or instrument of the arch-political act, which it cannot be, but as a pure and simple theory of signs or calculation, adequate for the dramatic thesis of Being or a state of being. Thus we will both define, circumscribe and demonstrate the rationale. After all, we will say yes to everything that there is, and we will also say yes to logic. So irrationality should not be taken in the sense of a name qualifying logic itself, because one will say yes from another point than itself, naturally. One will say this yes that is not allowed, i.e. that one will say to him the yes as it is a

theory adequate to calculate the order of Being. In *Twilight of the Idols*, it says very clearly: "A theory of signs as logic and this applied logic which is mathematics: in reality it is never present, not even as a problem." This is the logic that makes the reality, i.e. the "il y a" is out of the state that is presented there, even as a problem, for it is in reality a calculation of a preformed ontology already decided at the level of the primary names that are Being and a state of being, names distributed to the "il y a". Finally, Nietzsche position on the question of logic is that logic has no reason of Being than the theory of adequate signs in the dramatic theory of a state of being, than in this register where one must understand that in reality, i.e. the "il y a" itself is never present in the title of a problem, and that consequently, logic and be anything but an adequate means of the arch-political act, which does not mean that it is nothing, or even that it is not useful, recognizable, even essential, in the field or in its own domain, namely the theory of signs under the prescription of the ontological original choice in favor of Being. That's the first point.

**2nd remark:** the second point I want to make, apparently more technical, but very important in my opinion, is that **Nietzsche consistently identifies logic and mathematics.**

The quoted texts say this: "Logic (such as geometry and arithmetic)" i.e. the example of what is here called logic is directly mathematics: geometry and arithmetic. And "a theory of signs as logic and this applied logic, which are mathematics ..." marks a difference between the two, but ultimately, this is all in the same bag: there is an essential identification of logic and mathematics. Consequently, for Nietzsche, mathematics itself is actually an ontological calculation. By this we mean a calculation of the ontological option of a Parmenidean type, i.e. obliteration of the "il y a" under the name of Being. I think it is there in this constraint of identification, so to speak, of logic and mathematics, a whole chain of inferences that characterizes the anti-philosophical subjectivity in general, and thus beyond Nietzsche. I unfold it as follows:

***1st- The Anti-philosophical subjectivity always envelopes a depreciation of logic.***

I stress the point that this depreciation is relative. This is not the rationalism / irrationalism debate. This depreciation is that logic is inappropriate to act. I remember there was in anti-philosophy or in arch-politics a focus on The Act. The depreciation will gladly take the shape of the view that logic is just that, a theory of signs without primordial ontological option.

***2<sup>nd</sup>- The anti-philosophical position identifies logics and mathematics***

This second point connects to the first from within the first depreciation and according to reasons, which if they unfolded, would lead us very far. This means that anti-philosophical subjectivity will have a tendency to treat mathematics itself as a pure theory of signs, and not just, say, logical formalism. From this point of view, I would say that there is an organic bond between anti-philosophy and theory commonly known as logicism. Any anti-philosophy surrounds a logicism, i.e. what has been heard in the debates at the turn of the century: namely a thesis which is to argue that the essence of mathematics is logic. Logicism argues that there is continuity and a foundational possibility transitive, between logic and mathematics. So that mathematics is reducible to the logical form or mathematics is logic. That's logicism, in that it recognizes no real discontinuity at any point, between what is discussed in logical grammar and discussed in mathematics. From inside the depreciation of logic, in the name of The Act, where there is in any anti-philosophy, there is the ingestion of a thesis or complicity of a logicist thesis that is quite striking in Nietzsche, which will identify mathematics and logic.

**3rd: The ultimate goal of the anti-philosophical position is to state that mathematics doesn't think, i.e. that it is not a thought.**

This is explicitly stated by Nietzsche: "... In them [logic and mathematics], reality is never present, even as a problem," which means that we are not dealing



with a system of thought, but merely a theory of signs. All this leads to the thesis that mathematics should not be regarded as a thought, but as a formal grammar. And you see that this requires the logicist identification between logic itself considered as an ontological sub-option, and mathematics.

*4th: Thus there is a complicity of logicism (i.e. of the thesis that mathematics thinks nothing) with sophistry (i.e. the thesis that language, in its way, is not prescriptive truths).*

However, in the fourth chain of this inference, there is, in my opinion, a recurrent complicity of logicism with sophistry. I would argue that we will take here - what will become a crucial point in this investigation - a point of complicity or indirect homogeneity between anti-philosophy and sophistry. This point goes through a logicist conception of mathematics, i.e. a view that mathematics is not a thought. Why does this indirect complicity between anti-philosophy and sophistry occupy a strategic position? Answer: because the question of whether or not mathematics is a thought or not is originally a fundamental question debated between philosophy and sophistry. It's a question that is, almost factually, but also originally, is paradigmatic and ultimately the question of whether there is thinking or not, of truth or not, and it is so, of course, at least due to the controversy between Plato and the Sophists. The question of whether mathematics thinks, or if it is nothing but grammar, or a rhetoric of formal signs, but signs anyway, this is from the beginning a question that draws a line in front, and at the same time, a line of relation as a mirror between philosophical disposition established by Platonism and sophist resistance, and sophist dispute, on the same point. And this case passes up until today, when the debate is completely reconstituted from a manner that is completely active throughout the history of successive philosophical options. I would just say this, since we will find this problematic, that there is in anti-philosophical subjectivity- that we will gradually appoint, construct, edify (this is the purpose of this survey on Nietzsche, then Wittgenstein) - there is in this anti-

philosophical subjectivity an element, which for any other reason, takes the sophist party on this question, i.e. upon the question of knowing whether or not mathematics thinks. This is a point to be absolutely noticed. This, again, does not transform the anti-philosophical opposition into sophistry, not at all. Why? Because in the anti-philosophical position, the key is the question of The Act, and the thesis that there can be a radical act is absolutely non-sophist by itself. It is even in a certain sense the very opposite of all that sophistry plans because the Nietzschean thesis of a radical rupture is in the order of thought, of the advent of a Dionysian yes, which has nothing to do with sophistry. And yet, and yet, in this essential disjunction, there is this point of recurrent complicity of an inevitable depreciation of mathematics as thought, and its grammarian relegation, so one sees there is a grammarian relegation of mathematics considered non-thought. It will be a task to understand this point: is mathematics a thought or not? I think it's a good question to ask. And finding a good question is not bad. This concludes the third proposition on the relation of Nietzschean "ontology" and logic.

#### **d) Fourth proposition: There are nothing but relations**

The fourth proposition concerning Nietzschean ontology is some sense a consequence of the first two statements, but we must give them their autonomy - I will introduce in the following manner before announcing them: how to avoid from falling back into the ontological naming [substance ontology, Aristotle]? This is the great danger that will regulate the extraordinarily complex relationship of anti-philosophy to philosophy beyond the fact that, as you know, the anti-philosopher Nietzsche declared that the philosopher is the biggest criminal. But this one is, so to speak, warned. Beyond this warning, regulating the relationship is complex such that Nietzsche did not have the means to shoot all philosophers. The point is how anti-philosophy, which states that the name of the "il y a" is life or Becoming, will withstand the original pressure exerted by the ontological option? Let's call the

ontological option the naming of the “il y a” under the name of Being. The only line of tenacious resistance in the ontological option is holding absolutely that the “il y a” is without Being. It must be taken faithfully, and it's very difficult, that a state of being, Being, are mere dramas. Or even that nothing is, not in the sense of nihilism, but the meaning of subtraction of the “il y a” in the designation of Being. So how is one to argue that there is nothing, which is not in the form of the presentation? Well we will have to engage in the idea that there are only relations. Since there is no Being, under the generic name of life or Becoming, there is no entity involved in these relations. There is strictly nothing but relations, relations or relations of power. The fourth proposition will say this: there are only relations of power. The “il y a” is nothing but the fact that there are only relations without related entities, i.e. there are only relations of relations, otherwise it would introduce an atomistic base between which there would be relations. But no, there are only relations of relations, and the investigation of the “il y a” can only be done as an investigation of types of relations, provided that a relation is always a relation of relations.

There are a number of texts on this question, and most of all, this question is very well investigated by Deleuze, but I'll quote you a fragment from 1888: "The world is essentially a world of relationships. It may have occasionally seen a different aspect from each point. "Its being" is essentially different at each point, it weighs on every point, every point resists it, and in any case, all this does not align perfectly. The amount of power determines what has to be the other amount of power, in what form and with what violence and necessity it resists."

The first sentence gives the bulk formula. The following formulas are very intricate because this central text is complicated like all nodal texts of Nietzsche. This text tries to keep the thread of a thought that would be faithful to the fact that the “il y a” is not named as Being. Nietzsche does not conceal the extreme difficulty of this point, because in accordance with its analysis, there has been a long hegemony of the ontological option, we have been trained, so we see Being everywhere, even

when the "il y a" is precisely incapable of receiving this name. In other words if you wish to change the names - calling life what it was called to be, and then, step by step, calling relations of what has been called an entity, and then determining the same and the other from the point of power relations – one must engage with a resistance of thought that is extraordinarily difficult. Changing names is an operation, which is also an act of resistance of thought to the ontological option. This resistance is always difficult, threatening, conflicted, etc. ... "The world is essentially a world of relationships" is what he is saying. But if uttering it abstractly is a thing, keeping this statement, considering this statement is another very difficult thing. Finally, Nietzsche will spread it in two main points:

- First, this forbidden utterance will determine a totality, so there will be no Being of the world. If we take seriously the fact that "the world is essentially a world of relationships," we must conclude that there is no being in the world. Or even that the world is its presentation, but is not presented, i.e. that "all that is not absolutely consistent" because there is no presentation in Being of the world. So the first axiom: There is no Being of the world.

- Second maxim: Any relation is a relation of relation, which is stated as: "The amount of power determines what Being in another quantity of power," and of course, the other amount of power will also determine what has to be the first amount of power. This is specified in a relation that does not let itself be measured as a relation of relations. You would not enter an entity engaged in the relation. The only Being which is attested is what the relation determines as its relation or what it relates. The two great maxims are:

- There is no Being of the world: there are only aspects, but aspects taken in a more "ontological" sense than phenomenal, i.e. there are only weighed ones (a preferable image to that of the aspect), different and situated where there is no connection, so there is no Being presented in the world, and it is so necessarily.

- The relation is the relation of relations in the form of weighed thoughts

which are always localized. This will certainly recall something in those that follow, elsewhere, which I do in my seminar on Saturday, because in fact you could say that, for Nietzsche, provided there is a thought of Being, but of Being not taken in the sense of the ontological option, let's say as long as there was a thought of the "il y a", that this thought has two essential characteristics: the thought of the "il y a" in Nietzsche does not give anything. It is originally de-totalized. The point that is most difficult to see is that this is not a weakness: there is no impotence in grasping the form in totality of the "il y a". It is the "il y a" itself which has the being of never being given other than in a de-totalized manner. This is a very good example of what is in the power of the option of thought. If you think that Being is not given in totality as you think we do not have access to totality – that it is refused, eludes us, that it is hidden – you are in reality in the ontological option. You would not escape the ontological option than if you asked that the de-totalized character of the presentation is organic to the presentation itself, and has nothing to do with an inability of the subject, forgetting the subject, or a historical destiny of the subject, or from the human reality, or of thought, of Dasein, whatever. In Nietzsche, we are dealing with a de-totalization which is given on the side of the donation, i.e. that nothing is presented in the form of the whole. Or we can say: there are wholes of data in the instance of de-totalization. And, again, this is not a limit, in the critical sense of thought. It is not that we have no access or that the constitution of our reason makes us unable, as if we could not decide. No. It is the essence of the "il y a" of not fitting: "All that is added does not absolutely match." The absolute is precisely the mismatch. It follows that any evaluations of relations are local. The text says so: "the amount of power determines what has to be the other amount of power," but an amount of power that is here is always a particular amount of power. So any evaluation is local, since the essence of the "il y a" is given without alignment. What will also be said is that there is only local truth, i.e. we have a localizing topology of truth. We will return to this axial question of truth for Nietzsche. But if you look at

his writings on the subject, extraordinarily bushy texts, which give the immediate impression that all is said and otherwise, but that actually a common thread, namely what Nietzsche polemicizes against, is against a concept of truth subordinate to the primary ontological option, i.e. subjected to the idea that the name of the “il y a” is Being. If the name of the “il y a” is Being, then there follows a class of truth against what Nietzsche will polemicize relentlessly, because it is necessarily matched to the idea of a total donation or all even when it is presented as particular or fragmentary truth. By against, Nietzsche will support the idea that there is a possible local protocol of something that he can also call truth, in another ontological option, i.e. a truth exempt from the requirement of Being, which names the “il y a” as life, Becoming, or in other words a truth that admits that it's not absolutely consistent, but yet maintains that there is no truth at all. Simply, it is the essence of truth to be locatable. It will always be genealogical and historicized, and concern types. All truth will be located in a typology. So we can say, although this is not at all Nietzsche's words, that we are dealing with a typological conception of truth: the point is finding its place. There is no truth outside the place. You see that this is in part a polemic against transcendence, rear-worlds, God, etc ... but all this is the machine in Nietzschean vapor, the elementary. In depth, it means that even when this statement is given as a localized truth, if you are under the ontological requirement, in reality there is a conception outside truth, outside the place of transcendence, religion etc ... It is only a possible form, perhaps the dominant one, but the decisive point is: does one have or not have a topology which filters and situates the question of truths? And in Nietzsche, this topology is also a typology, i.e. every place is also a type. There will only be truths with regard to these places and these types.

I revisit what I mentioned at the start: at the part most faithful to my seminar on Saturday, the remark that I will make will be esoteric for some of you, but no matter- this signifies that the Nietzschean device on the question of truth is more

categorical than holistic. The requirement of the universe is most under the sign of a particular doctrine which is called the theory of categories, but it is not under the registration of the device with which you are most familiar, which is that of the theory of wholes. There you will find the two ideas that there are of the mismatched universe, on one hand, and on the other, the real question of the truth is always local, or typological (this is the problem of its place).

That was the 4<sup>th</sup> proposition, in its simple form: **there is nothing but relations.**

#### **e) Fifth proposition: Lack of an Adequate Language**

I state it: the media of thinking cannot be sought on the side of an adequate language.

This is obviously a generalization of statement 3 that said: Logic is under an ontological option, and thus cannot be used to act. More generally, we will say to The Act and thought cannot serve the ideal of appropriate language, i.e. the idea that there would be an adequate language for The Act. It is also critical to any theory of adequacy, including the meaning of the Aristotelian definition of truth. The purpose of thought cannot be the adequacy, in particular it cannot be the attempt of determining an adequate language. A fragment from 1888 reads: "Asking for an adequate mode of expression is absurd. It is inherent in the nature of a language, a way of expression, to not express a simple relationship [Nietzsche continues with this kind of bounding of thought in which we will begin to be broken.] The notion of "truth" is devoid of any meaning."

This begins to form a little knot [node] of all previous statements, converging towards the question of means, including language, of the anti-Philosophical Act. In any case, they will not be of the order of suitability. "Seeking an appropriate mode of expression is absurd." Nothing is adequate for The Act, and even the demand for an adequacy of The Act in language, has no sense. Why? Because it is "inherent in

the nature of a language [...] by only expressing a simple relationship." This must be understood in two senses:

- First, because there are only relations, language is itself always a relation of relations, and it makes the relation of a relation by taking the relation in its equivocation: it brings a report.

- Second: because a language is also delocalized, i.e. it is also in a topological and typological prescription, and it will thus express a unique relationship, which will be taken in a specific relationship. Language does not overlook the network of relations.

Let's also understand that we cannot hope that language will align what does not match. Language itself is inconsistent, and there is no linguistic alignment. Language itself is taken in its localizations of relation, from relations which held it, and it is in no way unifying, overlooking what is given as mismatched or unrelated. That's why we must understand that it is inherent to the nature of a language [...] to not express a simple relationship. "The notion of 'truth' is devoid of any meaning." "Truth" in quotes always refers to truth in the global prescription of a tenable assumption of totality. And it is devoid of any meaning precisely because there is no mode of adequate expression. So there isn't even a possible place for truth, in this Language is not such a place. One says: if there is truth, yes, let's say it, language is consistent with the thing, or the relation, yes, but the problem is that there is no language--the language itself is inconsistent. There will be mismatched languages or heterogeneous modes of expression taken from relations of relations. What is eliminated here is the idea of a linguistic pact on the theme of truth. There is no possible linguistic pact: language is not permitted to set a consensus. It is not a consensual possible recourse. If you want, it is not what is in front of the heterogeneity of experience as a possible consensual horizon. Nietzsche's view of language is as equally mismatched or inadequate as the rest. That's why "demanding an adequate mode of expression is absurd" and thus the Philosophical



Act is not under the rule of adequacy or under the rule of the mode of the matching or contractual expression. The linguistic operation is itself an operation of power, and thus it is itself a relation of relations in the determinations of power. Which brings us to the sixth proposition.

#### **6) Sixth Proposition: Intense Drama as a Resource for Thought**

If the media of thought are not on the side of an adequate language, where are they? Well, the media of thinking will be that of an intense drama, or dramatic intensification. They will be presented as the dramatic intensifications which are themselves typed, i.e. taken in the mismatched network of sites or of types. Again, later, we will ask the question, as we did earlier about the history of mathematics or logic, which eventually led us to the complicity of anti-philosophy and sophistry - we ask the following question: is this thesis anti-philosophical in the broad sense, i.e. is any anti-philosophy opposed to the doctrine of adequate language and enters the logic of the medium of thought as always in the order of intense drama?

I am tempted to say yes, is it not so? Any anti-philosophy determines the theme of appropriate language as if taken under an ontological option. The ultimate use of the naming of the "il y a" as Being, when this naming was badly shaken or overturned by history, id language, which is, in its misaligned or virtual form, the last shelter of the ontological option. Such is already the Nietzschean construction. Arguably, the centrality of the question of language in contemporary philosophy since the beginning of the century would be interpreted in a Nietzschean fashion, as a final burst of the ontological option, i.e. as the determination of the place where perhaps Being finds its shelter, i.e. the place where the name of Being as far as it's a dramatic name of the "il y a" ultimately finds its shelter: this would be language. And that is why language would be the transcendental of our time. After the destitution of forms of divine transcendence, of the constituent subject, etc.... Language would be the point where one finds shelter in its final form, and that Nietzsche would say "nihilist," the primordial Parmenidean ontological option.

After all, as the dead come to life, they need to have their revenge! Nietzsche was interpreted by Heidegger.

*One can only imagine or dream what would be the Nietzschean interpretation of Heidegger.* That would be without doubt what I would suggest is Nietzsche's interpretation of Heidegger.

I think Nietzsche would say that Heidegger was the one who saw that this original naming of the "il y a" under the form of Being was ill for a long time - perhaps always - and it gives him a virtual shelter, or a shelter in a promise in the resource of language itself taken ambiguously with the poem. And he would say that it is not a coincidence that he, Heidegger, puts Parmenides and Heraclitus in the same bag, which is an original error. Heidegger did not see that in fact, originally, Heraclitus is the adverse ontological option, which gives and proposes other names. So there would be a Nietzschean diagnosis in Heidegger, who would oscillate between the subtleties of character slyly mismatched from the Heideggerian view of language under the standard of the poem, to the inevitable insults such as: "I shot Heidegger yesterday!" It would be deployed there in the gap. But I think it would be of this structure. And the profound idea that I illustrate from this fable is that, in fact, anti-philosophical option cannot enter, albeit in an extraordinarily sophisticated form, in any hypothesis of appropriate language, i.e. the language that is supposed to be adequate for the uncovering, a language that would be of *aletheia*, a language that would be held in the open in the impossible poem. It would be the last refuge of adequate language that Nietzsche would uncover as still holding onto the first ontological option and putting away this linguistic proposition.

However, this proposed anti-philosophy is a localized theory of intense drama where it assumes that it is particular, i.e. that language is nothing but the relation itself of relations, that it gives no shelter to any first adequacy - it is a mismatched aggravation. It is what Nietzsche will often say in the metaphors of war,

when he says, for example, to leave 'his heavy artillery,' but that's the metaphor of the discordant nature of language itself, which from this point of view, does not bring peace, but war. There is a linguistic anti-pacifism in the Nietzschean option. So I think it's a case for anti-philosophy, at the least for negative reasons. In my opinion, any anti-philosophy rejects the hypothesis of adequate language in whatever form it is given, ranging from the long chains of Cartesian reasons to Heideggerian cryptopoetics. There may be a turning of tables, but it's always in the eyes of Nietzsche, the insidious assumption of appropriate language, of linguistic composition. So if we break from the linguistic composition, it will necessarily be the order of intense localized drama, which could show that this is already the subject, for example, of a Pascal: Pascal's relation to the question of the relation of language, to the non-relation that it tries to relate. But if the means of thought are those of intense drama, there is a point--it is true, they will in turn become indistinguishable from those of art. We will have extreme ambiguity with what I just said about Heidegger, precisely because art is also presented as the discipline of the power of language and art itself is the internal demonstration in the language of the power of language. However, in the decisions contrary to those of Heidegger, there is in Nietzsche a promotion of the form of art as far as art is indistinguishable from the intense order of drama in which anyone who refuses an adequate language for the Philosophical Act is necessarily led, in such a sort to take adequate language. Obviously, there is a certain thing, which is that it is necessary, otherwise we fall back into the ontological option, that this art, which convenes there, analogically, is not that of a representation. If it claimed to be that of a representation, one would inevitably fall into the ontological figure, i.e. in the option of Being and imitation of Being. The problematic consequently, of the means of thought, will be the means of intense drama as long as it is in no sense theatrical, in taking theater as the paradigm of representative intensification, where they will be the media of art non-compromised with representation, i.e. as a radically non-theatrical art. And this is

where the Nietzschean polemic against the theater will be disposed of, not as an accessory or second element, but as a central element. In fact, in this case, the possibility of the media of thought are put at stake: can there exist an absolutely non-theatrical intense drama? This is the problem. This is where the question of the debate lies with Wagner, and Wagner's apparently exorbitant importance. I say "exorbitant" because from one end to the other in Nietzsche's work, the question of Wagner circulates as a true obsession, an emphatic obsession that is admirable at first, but a destructive and hateful obsession at the end. Wagner is truly an essential proper name of the Nietzschean device. But what is Wagner, the name Wagner? As always, the real question in Nietzsche is the question of naming. What gives Wagner his name? Why was Wagner the name for Nietzsche? It is merely a self, which is a matter of philosophical, or anti-philosophical complication, which is extraordinary. I'm not sure of coming to grips with the problem: for what was Wagner the name, because it is the ambiguous name of the clear possibility of a non-intense theatrical drama, while it is also the name of the corruption of this possibility. Wagner was the name of a non-intense theatrical drama in the sense that we will take up theater, again, as the essence of the performance. Wagner was the name of the possibility - contemporary for Nietzsche - of a non-intense theatrical drama, while it was the name of the theatrical corruption of this possibility. And thus it was the name of the contrast of representation. That's terrible! It's terrible! If the inaugural paradigm of the possibility of a non-theatrical intense drama proves itself to be a last resort where there is further theatrical corruption, then the question of the means of thought is at stake. We must understand these well, because this is why it's not a matter of a paranoiac like a Schreber who found Flechsig. It is a question of a completely different order. If there is only Wagner, it indicates that indeed, intense drama is not freed from theatricality, so we are still in the hand of the representation, and thus still in the Parmenidean epoch, because the contrast of the representation is the ontological option itself. That is why Nietzsche is struggling with the question: is

there only Wagner, or is there something else, because Wagner was found to be both the name of the possibility of a non-intense theatrical drama, and the name of its corruption. Obviously, when he tells us: there is Bizet, one feels insecure! And when he told us, there is also Offenbach, so here we are overwhelmed! Because ultimately the price to pay so that there would be a medium of thought is to find that Offenbach is really great - "This is an asceticism" ... We will resume next time from the point of this question as follows: we shall return a little later on the question of: What does he mean by intense drama? We will specify this through the style of Zarathustra. What does Nietzsche attempt in Zarathustra from the point of language? Which will lead us to the question of the type of artist, because the question: he has other things that Wagner is the question: what is the artist type? What is the artist, since it appears that he can be at once the possibility of intense non-theatrical drama, and also the possibility, indeed the necessity, of histrionics, namely the revenge of representation - the theatrical in art. And through this question, what is the artist as a type? We will deal with the media at the margins of the true story of his dispute with Wagner: Nietzsche and Wagner. We will conclude there!

## 6th Course: Dialectics: On Creation and Void

Let's take a look at what we might call the six main statements of Nietzschean anti-philosophy, which all hinge on the essential conviction that at the heart of things, there is The Act, i.e. an irreducible pause of the discursive device.

I make a *parenthetical statement*, perhaps concerning this belief that at the heart of the apparatus of thought, there is a gesture or a radically irreducible or heteronomous act of the discursive device that proves to be a characterization of any anti-philosophical device, or any device that in philosophy inscribes this singular form that we choose to call Anti-philosophy.

To give two other examples, we know that for **Pascal**, who is an exemplary anti-philosopher, this Act is called the Wager, and is surrounded by the discursive device, although it remains fully heterogeneous for him. And as for **Kierkegaard**, another exemplary figure of anti-philosophy, we can say that The Act is called the Alternative, or what is called "either ... or." For Nietzsche, as we have seen, The Act has to be designated as a gesture even to break into two world histories, and is more restrained in its transmutation, reversal, or transvaluation of all important values. The six propositions of Nietzschean anti-philosophy must always be heard with the fact in mind, the fact that they cluster around this kind of central source which is The Act as such. Finally, before recalling them - I will only mention them- it is clear that what we're here to ask is whether these statements of Nietzschean anti-philosophy are statements of any anti-philosophy. This is what ultimately interests us in this investigation.

### Reminders: 6 Ontological, and Anti-philosophical Propositions of Nietzsche

I recapitulate on the six statements of Nietzschean anti-philosophy, which are also statements on "Being":

**1st statement:** The name of "il y a" is life, this name is inevaluable, and, consequently, one can also say that the pure "il y a" is chaos, since sense and/or

nonsense arises from assessments of inevaluable life, and therefore the evaluation of meaning refers to the inevaluable, i.e. to chaos.

**2nd statement:** Naming Being as "il y a" is a reactive naming. Otherwise said: the ontological option, i.e. the choice of naming Being as "il y a", challenges chaos, and originally imposes a sense of being, which obliterates affirmation of "il y a". Note that anti-philosophy is first and foremost an anti-ontology.

**3rd statement:** Logic is the same as mathematics and two subsumed under this identity are nothing but a consequence of ontological language.

**4th statement:** Since the "il y a" lacks Being, a thought, whatever it may be, finds only the relations of power, without a specific depth or individuated entities engaged in these relations. There is nothing but relations of power.

**5th statement:** The means of anti-philosophical thought cannot be under the normative ideal of adequate language.

**6th statement:** The media of anti-philosophical thought are that of an intense drama: they are thus the media of art as far as art is delivered from representation, or art is not under theater as will to power, or under the will to power of the theater. Everything is a power relation, and by virtue of being submitted to representation, art is in fact what sustains or endures the will to power of the theater. I make note of the well-known consequence that in the eyes of Nietzsche, who continues to be a faithful disciple of Schopenhauer concerning this point, art that is most delivered from representation is music, from which, of course, we have the absolutely central question of Wagner.

This is the organic body of Nietzschean anti-philosophy at the stage where we are, above all, under the jurisdiction of The Act. I would like to make a subjective parenthesis by contra-posing six statements of Nietzschean anti-philosophy, which could also be six statements of philosophy – for example, those of mine, if you will – but in truth, it would probably be 6 contrapositionable statements as statements of Nietzschean anti-philosophy that could take on any philosophical system not in the

form of anti-philosophy. Again, I'm just quoting my contrapositionable statements, and my intention is not to utilize them.

### **Alain Badiou's 6 Ontological Philosophical Statements**

**1st statement: The name of "il y a" is multiplicity, or a Pure Multiple.**

*Parenthesis* within a parenthesis: One problem with Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche, and ultimately, one of the tensions of Deleuze's philosophy, is that everything about it is to be equivalent to or make itself coincide with the designation of Being in multiple and the designation of Being under the name of life. This is the ontological option of Deleuze, which is Nietzschean, but original at the same time. The point of creation is to ultimately keep the name of "il y a" in multiplicity while arresting, so to speak, this designation by means of Nietzschean designation, which leads Deleuze to a doctrine of the living character of the multiplicity as such. Arguably the conceptual categories of Deleuze--such as, perhaps, the central concept of folding, is probably his densest --covering this arrest of multiplicity by the vital Nietzschean designation, and structuring thought into account, in any situation, in multiplicity as a living fold upon itself. End of this account.

The name of "il y a" is a multiplicity, which I would also complete with a Lacanian expression: the concluding point that "il y a" as such is a void (*le vide*). And the effectuation of the thought of the pure multiple, is mathematics itself as a doctrine of historicized doctrine of multiples and the void. It would be contra-posed to the 1<sup>st</sup> anti-philosophical statement. I should add, of course, that the latent process would be done in the Nietzschean thesis, which is that naming the "il y a" "life" instead of naming it just pure multiplicity, is already of the order of an interpretation, i.e. it does not sufficiently balance out the designation of "il y a". "Multiple" is taken here as the most radically offset designation with regard to the interpretive field.

**2nd statement: Naming the multiplicity of Being as "il y a" could be**



**harmless if such a designation were split, i.e., if we were to separate Being and truth from all continuity with meaning.**

“You know that for Nietzsche, the designation of “il y a” with the name of Being, is blasphemy against the world. One would not say that the designation of “il y a” under the form of Being is the inevitable imposition of a meaning that distorts or mutilates life. Rather we’ll say that the whole issue is the question of what is the latent or explicit correlation between Being and meaning. The decisive point is whether this nominal imposition invests the “il y a” from the presupposition of meaning. If in its primary pairing, Being and Truth are taken under a major or uninterpretable discontinuity with the form of sense, we’ll say that this designation could be innocuous. This is accomplished when one names Being as pure multiplicity, for the pure multiple does not prejudice against or presuppose any direction, provided that this multiple is woven from the void; otherwise the imposition of a meaning, if it is woven from anything but the void, cannot be avoided. I would speak of this in other terms to argue that it is not the ontological option that is reactive, but rather the hermeneutical one. It is not the ontological option as such which is reactive, for example, as such, in its Parmenidian form, let alone in its Democritean one, but it is rather the hermeneutical option where the requirement of the name Being is, in truth, the harbinger of meaning. And we agree with Nietzsche that, one way or another, the hermeneutical option is organically linked to the religious, if we take the definition that I always suggest for religion: religion may be called any presupposition of a continuity between truth and meaning. Or any notion that the truth must also be meaningful. This is what constitutes religion. So we can say that this is not the ontological option that is reactive, but the religious option, i.e. the ontological option under a latent or explicit spiritual precondition which invests from meaning the ontological designation.

**3rd statement: The logic is that philosophy itself traces the effect of mathematics.**

Under the “il y a” of mathematics, philosophy is, in fact, forced to re-trace the logical layout in itself that it otherwise invents. One can even say that the invention of logic is the intra-philosophical trace of the “il y a” of mathematics. This of course assumes that mathematics and logic are originally unidentifiable, and thus poses a non-logician thesis.

**4th statement: Since the “il y a” is of a pure multiplicity, there is no relation.**

The opposition is growing: nothing is related or can be related. The “il y a” is not in the element of relation. It is thus an explicit contraposition, but for reasons that are quite clear: it is the point where the significantly divergent effects of the primordial designation of the “il y a” consequently turn out into terms of life or its primary neutralized (offset) designation in terms of the pure multiple. These divergents are consequently given in the fact that, strictly speaking, there is no relation, and truly there is no relation, or the real is non-related. We can say that: the relation is always a constitutive drama of knowledge. We will order the question of knowledge in the drama of relations, and correspondingly argue that the truths cover themselves due to pure multiplicity. They are not in any way apprehensions of relations. Any truth makes a hole or tear in the relations of knowing.

I form another bracket, which is also an anticipation. You can say that for Nietzsche, there are only power relations, so that truth rather does not mean anything (and thus constitutes a whole section of Nietzsche's polemic), or always means that what is established from the point of power relation, i.e. an injection of meaning determined by a power relation. If we re-examine it from the vantage point of what I am saying, it means that in reality, the Nietzschean doctrine of meaning is itself held in the drama of relations of knowledge, i.e. that it is of the order of knowledge and not the order of the truth. It could thus be argued that Nietzsche lacks the element of the rift, of tearing or of discovery in the relations of knowledge,

that the non-relation of “il y a” establishes in the element of truth.

The unrelated character of “il y a” is precisely what is always given in truth in the form of the cut, tear or hole of a relation of knowledge. Yes, you could say that, but as we shall see, Nietzsche's probity is a twist of its own device, for the whole question of The Act in Nietzsche is still in the vicinity of such apprehension, i.e. The Act itself is, ultimately, something other than a power relation and shows –this is the extreme tension in which it is left to Nietzsche himself, since this Act is named in his name –that which is here called truth, namely that which is only a tear or hole in what is related or relatable, and which remains by itself unrelated.

**5th statement: the Media of Philosophical Thought will superimpose, combine, or articulate the ideal of appropriate language and that of intense drama.**

It is a question that I will not attempt again here, but you can get an idea of it from what has been said. Suppose that a truth is what makes it happen in tearing from a relation of knowing the pure multiplicity of the “il y a”. Let's give it this definition. Truth always proceeds in a particular genetic order, and it leaves the non-critical relation of “il y a” to arrive, i.e. its multiplicity without relation or its essential unbinding in a gash, a tearing of relations of knowledge. Let's say this is it, a truth, so that if philosophy is thought of truth, i.e. if it is related to this category as its central category, it will always be in the description of the edge of a hole that it will try to think of. Or: it is the rift, but the rift can be given without the edges. Thus: it will always be both a linguistic apprehension that takes knowledge, i.e. from the relation by a certain bias: on the face or its torn edges of the relations, and at the same time, it will attempt to restore the gap as such, so that the language of philosophy is necessarily ambiguous, because it is a side effect or rather because it is trying to think of an edge. It is this ambiguity that I describe by saying that philosophy takes part in the standard of adequate language, a standard that falls under the drama of relations of knowledge; to share in intense drama, i.e. from the

language of The Act, or the gap, or speech without relations, i.e. of language that does not befall the relation, but to non-relation. In my lexicon, one can say that philosophy is the standard, combined with the matheme and the poem. That is, if one summarizes the matheme as the ideal of appropriate language, i.e. the ideal of integral transmission, which is also the ideal of formalization, and if the poem is meant by the language that is precisely in resource of its own power, i.e. the language that is given not from the relation or from knowledge but from an unrelated intensity, which is, in my opinion, the obvious function of the poem, whatever it may be, and moreover, its architecture. Ultimately, it will have to deliver something which is exempt from the drama of the relation. That's why it seems to me that the media of philosophical thought will superimpose and entangle themselves in combinations, in alchemies which are each time singular, the norm of proper language and the standard of intense drama.

**6th statement. The element of drama in each intense philosophy is, in truth, what is retraced in philosophy from its artistic status.** One can speak, in a sense, as if logic is what is retraced in philosophy from its mathematical condition. We will say: indeed, the philosophy is still in the process of intense drama. This does not mean that philosophy is an art, which is why I sometimes say that art is a drama, because this operation only traces the inevitable orderly artistic status *immanently* as a treatment of the truth as a limit or a hole. Which, of course, will not return philosophy to artistic subjectivity, as is necessarily the case against the reference to such artists in the Nietzschean device.

There you have it, now you have the 6 statements of anti-philosophy and 6 possible statements of philosophy. This being said, we will move backwards - on towards Nietzsche.

**The Act and Nihilism** The element that will pivot our investigation of Nietzsche will focus on the 6th statement, i.e. to the requisition by anti-philosophy by means of intense drama, and will consequently guide us towards the question of

art and the relation between art and philosophy.

**A) Introduction** The starting point is fundamentally very simple, and again articulated in Nietzsche. Finally, only what I call intense drama, i.e. the language grasped in its power and not in its appropriation, can capture the relationship or the power relation. I recall that everything thinkable is about power relation. In a sense, we can say that apprehending a power relation requires language as power. One could even say that language as power is in turn a taxation of power or establishes a relation of power with the relation that it apprehends. That is why the language of control, whatever it is, is of the order of power, i.e. the order of order, the order of command, but the command must be attested as linguistic power. It only allows itself to be linguistic power. The question of knowledge is, what constitutes the fundamental relationship that Nietzsche begins to grasp, and in which he will structure the maximum concentration of the media or linguistic resources that are his.

Good, everything is a power relation, and you know perfectly well that Nietzsche describes quite a number of them. He genealogically and typologically grasped a complete series of correlations of power relation: master discourse, the discourse of the slave, the discourse of the artist, the discourse of the last men, Zarathustra himself revealed as a typology of the power relation. But again, in this descriptive articulation of the types of power relation, which constitute the Nietzschean genealogy and typology, we have only one exemplary descriptive relationship in the book of Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, but it is not immediately what will concern us. What concerns us immediately is this: of all these relations of power, which is most difficult to grasp? Consequently, which requires the imposition of maximum power? Where in the Nietzschean linguistic device is proof of his essential requisition? Where will it be that the artistic style will be in its purity and intensity? There are times when the ironist style or the style of great German prose are adequate.

But there may be *a* relationship or *a* power relation, which so well summarizes all the others, if engaged in the Nietzschean act, that we will truly ask for a concentration of totally particular media. I think the fundamental relation to grasp, for Nietzsche, is *the relation between Nietzschean nihilism and The Act itself*. This is the point where, in my opinion, the general system of Nietzschean difficulty is filtered and concentrated, and I hear it there, not an extrinsic difficulty or question addressed to it from outside, but an intrinsic difficulty: the most difficult one, which requires imposing maximum power. What is the correlation, what is the relationship, and is it ultimately a power relation? Is it really the whole question between nihilism, nihilism that is the form of power that is both dominant and obsolete, and which is summarized by the name of Christendom and Nietzschean act, which aims even at this point to break into two world histories? In my view, this point is crucial in any interpretation of Nietzsche. I would even say that it is the answer to the question of how Nietzsche grasps or apprehends the relation (which is perhaps a non-relation) between nihilism, on one hand, and his act on the other, in the center of the disposition of thought? The relation that controls even the system of interpretation of Nietzsche.

By the way, I argue that this is the real substance of the relationship between the will to power and Eternal Return. I say this because, as I had the opportunity to recall that the relationship between will to power and Eternal Return is the *arche*, the entry into Nietzsche that is chosen or established by Heidegger, and which determined a large part of the subsequent exegesis. Let's note the fact that the statement was made, that the word or expression of Eternal Return disappeared from Nietzsche's vocabulary in winter 1886-87. These issues of dating are both scholarly and critical, since you know that my attempt is to rename Nietzsche from the year 1888. However, the fact is that the term "Eternal Return" disappeared in winter 1886-87, and the term will to power disappeared at the end of '87., i.e. that all of what has been written by Nietzsche in 1888 divides the economy in two. This has

quite often resulted in the judgment that at the end of his account, what had taken place in 1889 did not actually take place, i.e. that the Nietzschean book had not been written, which is indisputable, and which has been the subject of innumerable commentaries. In any case, the Eternal Return and will to power are terms which are self-erased at the start of the decisive year 1888, which will be both a preliminary year in what was called the “collapse” or Nietzsche's madness, and also the year that Nietzsche wrote and published the most. At the beginning of this year, the Eternal Return and will to power categories appear, in the eyes of even Nietzsche, not to be decisive any longer. Note, too, that because this is the third concept often invoked, that the Nietzschean Superman (Übermensch) disappears from his lexicon much earlier, soon after *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, and thus from 1884 to 1885.

So, indeed, to take Nietzsche from the view of 1888, we no longer have:

- Eternal Return
- Will to power
- Superman

This is an important detail to remember!

On the contrary, what one knows for certain is the question of the relationship between nihilism and decadence, firstly, and secondly, the project of breaking into two world histories. And I think that is the real substance of what has previously been articulated under the names of the will to power and the Eternal Return. Ultimately, the whole point is how a radical act is even possible, when the device of established sovereignty is nihilist. Nihilists wish to say that it is both commanded by the will to nothingness, and at the same time, in a state of weakness relative to itself.

**Nihilism has two meanings with which we must be very careful:**

-Primarily, this device is nihilistic because it is controlled organically by a **will to nothingness**. Such is the thought that one can have of it. And I remember

that will to nothingness is absolutely different from the will to power. These are the vital contents of nihilism: the essence of desiring to be involved is to will nothing.

**Secondly**, and in a 2nd sense, **desiring nothing is weak with regard to itself**. It is not in the strength of its own will, and it shall rather be called decadence. "Willing nothing, which characterizes nihilism, is furthermore a mitigated will which weakens itself, so that its power relation is weakened, which is simply another way to say that it is a willing of nothing. That said, it is far from being an absence of will. It is still a will that in the Nietzschean lexicon, one will call an established will, i.e. still a formation of sovereignty."

The whole question, then, is how to know how it is possibly articulated and how one conceives of the relation between this particular form of sovereignty which is contemporary nihilism, on one hand, and on the other, the termination of The Act with what happens or seems likely to bring about the Dionysian affirmation. The system of affirmation, where Zarathustra is a prophet, but where, gradually, Nietzsche announces more and more impatiently the imminent arrival in the form of breaking into two world histories, how this is thought of in relation or in non-relation, but in any case, how does an act of such a nature begin? Does it allow itself to be described or name from the interior of the form of sovereignty, which is that of nihilism in the two senses in which I will recall them?

Thus: everything relies on the determination of The Act, the name that one will give it, being understood that The Act must necessarily be considered in a joint articulation or disarticulation of nihilism. Such is the extreme concentration concerning Nietzsche, and it is not surprising that the direct expression of this connection was replaced with the thematic expression, and probably once again in the eyes of Nietzsche, philosophizing, which was given in the will to power or Eternal Return. I say this because, in my view, to go back to the will to power or Eternal Return as constituting the relation in thinking about Nietzsche, is to renew the Nietzschean anti-philosophy to something that can be better appropriated by the



philosophical. I see it as this: what is given in the tension of 1888 as extreme anti-philosophy, i.e. as arch-political radical will, when taken in the dimension of will to power/Eternal Return, is already returned to the categorical - tamed by the philosophical. But of course, here I attempt to be in the most difficult and painful test of taming the least possible, i.e. of capturing anti-philosophy in its wild state. However in its wild state, the relation will be said to be primarily between nihilistic configuration on one hand, and the possibility of The Act of the other, which under the categorical structure of relation that is eventually contradictory or non-contradictory, is between will to power and Eternal Return. And I think that is why Nietzsche abandoned these categories after having created, invented and deployed them. Nietzsche's order of interpretations will focus on this problem: how can we capture the essential relationship - and perhaps the essential unbinding - between nihilistic configuration as diagnosis of modernity (modernity being this very strange figure of nihilism) and The Act that announces the Dionysian affirmation, i.e. the possibility of saying yes? To put it simply: the whole question is in knowing from the bias through which act nihilism can deliver a yes while its predominant and hegemonic nature is precisely the will of nothing. Obviously, it's going to have various orientations which control the system of interpretation of the Nietzschean device.

### **B) Rejecting Three Orientations (Hegel, Heidegger and Deleuze)**

What we will exclude and call the form of zero would be the immediate demonstration of a **dialectical** structure, namely the extreme negativity of nihilism that is reversed to full affirmation in its immanent movement. We will thus discard the massive Hegelianization of Nietzsche where in the site where one wills nothing, the will of everything arises, for everything is the essence of nothing as Being is the reversal of nothingness. We will leave to one side this temptation, which governs things pretty well, but it does not lead to thinking what Nietzsche seeks to think,

that is for sure. It will be in accord with Heidegger that especially with Deleuze to say that we need to disperse the structure of a dialectical reversal by which The Act would only give way to an intimate hidden Being of nihilism itself in the form of absolute affirmation. Or we could say: we will discard the interpretation in terms of negativity. It is clear that in Nietzsche there is none of it, although the question of negation and destruction is quite complex in his work, whether it is anything analogous to the work of the negative. The negative does not work, where if it is working, it would be for hammers, and not without the cunning of reason. From there, if we go back to the great exegetical framework we are familiar with, we are dealing with two major interpretations of The Act, and consequently, as concerning the thought of this paradoxical and decisive relationship between nihilism and The Act.

**First Interpretation: The Act's Essence of Creating is that of Creating New  
Values Over Against Reactive Nihilistic Ones**

Nietzsche seems to bide time for quite a bit, until very late in the first interpretation. The Act would have the essence of creating new values. It would have to be taken in the form of creation, which is, in fact, not a form of reversal or achievement, but a figure of the invention, and The Act would be by itself the creation of new values in contraposition to reactive values that triumphed in nihilism. Strictly speaking, this means, and we have already discussed this point, that The Act would bring about another formation of sovereignty, for speaking of new values, regardless of the evaluation of these values, necessarily means the formation of sovereignty, and thus we would specifically be in revolutionary camouflage. As always, the first interpretation is authorized by many Nietzschean aphorisms. I will create new values, creating new values and ultimately the transvaluation or reversal of all values would balance out the advent of new values that are affirmative and non-nihilistic, affirmative, active and non-reactive, but they

would define another form of sovereignty.

With regard to this possible interpretation, we have already declared that the relation between The Act and nihilism is a revolutionary sort of relation in the classic sense: The Act at once destroys the forms of exhausted sovereignty and establishes the form of affirmative sovereignty. We have already said that this was not said most deeply in Nietzsche himself and, in a certain sense, this is what is said less and less the more that we approach it—what? Well, The Act, The Act being ultimately Nietzsche's madness: one must take things in a pinch, as that. Gradually, as we approach The Act, it has nothing really to do with one form of sovereignty succeeding to another. We already spoke upon this point concerning Nietzsche's doctrine of the State. But we should add that this thesis faces a decisive objection to Heidegger. I want to say that *if* Nietzsche has his essence of *this* relationship with nihilism, which is the will to create new values, *then* Heidegger's objection to Nietzsche is based, namely, as Heidegger said, on Nietzsche merely separating nihilism from his own essence, because the essence of nihilism is precisely the unleashing of the will without novelty. It is thus the unleashing of all will to will. The deep thinking of nihilism is to detect the outbreak of the will as an obliteration or irreversible oblivion, so that the height of nihilism is claiming that the unleashing of this will can be structured in the establishment or creation of new values. This is because nihilism is blind to its own power, or separated from its own essence in its blindness.

I believe that if the nature of the Nietzschean Act really comes down to what concerns introducing new values, it thus boils down to a camouflaged speculative revolutionary. Heidegger has quite reasonably objected to what is below the diagnosis of nihilism: The Act would be below what carries the diagnosis of nihilism, namely that nihilism is itself unable to establish anything, not because it is not a power but precisely because it is the unleashing of power as such, which is given for Heidegger in the technical arrest of Being but in Nietzschean terms, given

in the perception that the nihilistic will is ordained to the willing of nothing and that such is precisely the essence of modernity. We can also say: Not willing nothing, but willing something, is obviously below the apprehension of the will of nothing as such – this is what Heidegger says essentially, and on this point he is right.

This wraps up the first elementary interpretation of The Act, which would be The Act as the creation of new values.

### **Second Interpretation: The Act is Asserting What is of Maximal Intensity**

The second interpretation is actually that of Deleuze. I summarize it to the extreme, but Deleuze says this: The Act, or, in any case, what is at stake in Nietzsche's proposition, is to assert all that is the highest form, i.e. the maximum intensity. Even where there is nihilism, there is and there will always additionally be a corresponding creation. So we distinguish what is established, i.e. the will to power as an establishment, which is always the triumph of the reactive dimension of the will, and The Active will, which also includes active nihilism. Indeed, Nietzsche distinguishes between active nihilism and passive nihilism - as might be willed, i.e. likely to be reaffirmed. There is always the affirmative that can be invested with a will and which can be reaffirmed. We will thus not see it, due to the question at hand: nihilism and The Act, the difficulty of saying that nihilism itself is affirmed in what it conceals from local creation or from contrarian novelty. Consequently, by the correlation of The Act and of nihilism, what is furthest from being a dialectical relationship is actually an intrinsic affirmative correlation which senses and detects The Active reagent. It is able to identify and affirm or reaffirm, or most of the time, to reaffirm The Active dimension at work in The Active one itself, for example to state that the element of will, including the will of nothing, because in the will of nothing there remains the affirmative which is the element of will. And if you want this will, i.e. if you want this willing, then one reacts against reactivity. And this itself is The Actual correlation of nihilism and The Act.

I would like to read a very beautiful text by Deleuze on this subject, which allows for me a biographical parenthesis. In 1964 he held a major conference on Nietzsche, whose proceedings are published by Editions de Minuit as *Cahier de Royaumont*, Philosophy No. 6, Nietzsche. I wanted to tell you that this conference is quite good. That's great, because it is truly the cards placed on the table on the question we are occupied with here, namely the system of Nietzschean interpretations. In this conference, there was Foucault, Deleuze, Jean Wahl, Gianni Vattimo, Jean Beaufret (thus there was Heidegger!). There was Karl Löwith, there was Henri Birault (hence Heidegger again!) And it was really quite great, because it is in the 1964 system of texts of a density and exceptional clarity on the types of contemporary appropriations of Nietzsche. This is completely remarkable. Thus Deleuze concluded the conference. It is an exercise in style that is absolutely amazing, for the way that he manages to serve all of the disparate interventions in his own conversation is absolutely extraordinary. How Heidegger's interpretation, the humanist interpretation, the skeptical interpretation, etc. converge and find their completely natural place in Deleuze's interpretation, in which all of them contribute, as ultimately life contributes kinks to its effects. I will read a passage from Deleuze's conclusion, which I think states what I'm trying to tell you much more effectively. It starts with: "Mr. Birault was right" (everyone is right, and it is very Nietzschean!).

Arguably, it was Deleuze who stated at the symposium at Royaumont, as Nietzsche asks, that one affirm the world in all its parts, without neglecting anything! *"Mr. Birault was right to recall that between the extreme and moderate forms, there is in Nietzsche a difference of nature. And the same is true of Nietzsche's distinction between the creation of new values and the recognition of established values."* We are at the heart of our question, are we not? *"Such a distinction would be meaningless if interpreted in the perspectives of historical relativism: the recognized established values have been new values in their day, and the new ones would be expected to become established in turn. This interpretation would neglect the basics."*

This interpretation is quite strong except that **it undoubtedly dissolves The Act**. The singularity of The Act is, as such, dissolved, or more precisely, The Act is radically disseminated. It is obvious that the formula of breaking into 2 world histories must be placed aside with this system of interpretation. In fact, it is called the assertion by a possible feedback system linked to any complex formation of latent sovereignty, which is able to be reactivated by affirmation.

In my view, Deleuze's interpretation is structural - I say that, oddly enough - i.e. because it determines the correlation of nihilism and acts as a structural order of the configuration itself. Albeit nihilistic, i.e. under the formation of a reactive sovereignty, there is always something to say, even in immanence, and in the disposition of sovereignty. So there is an eternal and structural order of affirmation, which rules, in immanence, the problem of the correlation between The Act and nihilism. However, in my opinion, the rule is canceling The Act, particularly by disseminating it over the entire surface of the nihilistic configuration. This is Deleuze's doctrine of the omnipresence of the event. The Event is never a singularity, which is given in the rarity of a break or a fracture, but it is combinable anywhere, given that elsewhere one is struggling with the forms of the reactive and passive. But the interpretive loosening of novelty is always possible, as is always possible the welcoming of the Event, and Eventality is finally the law of Being.

Now if Eventality is the law of Being, there is, in a sense, no Event. There is therefore an absolute reversibility between dissemination of the Nietzschean act and dissolution of the form of The Act. But there is no doubt, at least in the terminal form, which is what we use as a gateway to Nietzsche, which he argues quite differently: Nietzsche explicitly states that The Act is a radical singularity. It is as he himself says, "An explosive located at the junction of two millennia," and as a result, even assuming that something has to be reaffirmed, this reaffirmation is not immediately able to be disseminated again in eternal availability. The new — Nietzsche repeatedly utilizes the expression — is an unprecedented occurrence. The

question of how the "unprecedented" can be under the law of Eternal Return is a very complex issue, but perhaps there is more here from the law of Eternal Return, perhaps the "unprecedented" has been rightly beaten out of the form of Eternal Return in the final Nietzsche. You can also say that there was in Deleuze's interpretation an erasure of the arch-political dimension of The Act or, in any case, the arch-political determination of The Act is crossed out by an immanent understanding, extensive or disseminating from its singularity. That's what I would object to, on my part, in this system of interpretation, which however, as you can see, deals with extraordinary strength and skill concerning the objection we can make to Heidegger's type, the idea of creation of new values, since it is completely laid out in an element where there is no contradiction or contraposition between novelty and establishment.

*"We have already seen that at the level of the will to power, there is a fundamental difference between "being assigned current values" and "creating new values." This difference is the same one of the Eternal Return, and which constitutes the essence of the Eternal Return: namely that the "new" values are exactly the higher forms of all there is. So there are values which have only begun to be established, which appear only in seeking a structure of recognition, even if they have to wait for favorable historical conditions to be effectively recognized. Instead, there are values that are eternally novel, eternally untimely, and always contemporary with their creation, and which, even when they seem recognized similarly in appearance by a society, are actually addressed in other forces and seek, in this same society, the anarchic powers of another nature. Only these new values are trans-historical and supra-historical, and demonstrate a wonderful chaos, a creative disorder that is irreducible to any order. It is this chaos which Nietzsche had said was not the opposite of the Eternal Return, but rather the Eternal Return in person. From this supra-historical depth, this untimely chaos, leaving the great creations, at the limit of what is bearable. "*

The text has an exemplary strength and clarity. In fact, the affirmation is

radically immanent. One finds the necessary appearance of Deleuzian logic of immanence is appropriate to Nietzsche here. The entire problem is precisely such that we need to think of creation of new values as an immanent element that thwarts the establishment in a power relation which is always already there. Consequently, the new values are intrinsically novel, i.e. that the novelty of a value, i.e. The Activity of the force that sustains it, is not intended to die or to be devalued in the form of the establishment. It is eternally new, at the same time that reactive and established values are so to speak, eternally ancient. And all this is co-owned in the system of immanence, which performs The Act, provided also that The Act consists in detecting and in reaffirming the novelty of the new. But the novelty of the new is an immanent stigma in the creation or the created, which is eternally attached even in what is created. In the depth, of course, you have the paradigm of the artwork. This grants some intelligence, namely that the work of art as creation, still always leaves itself to be requisitioned as novel. It does not sink into the establishment or in the reactive, and it can always and forever be reconvened as creation and a new value. The novelty of a value is thus an intrinsic or organic attribute of this value. Consequently, she argues, for example, in nihilism, that there is a relation of immanence, which is simply the relation of distribution between The Active and the reactive in any formation of complex sovereignty. The new is returned to the immanent eternity of its innovation. The essence of this new thing is innovation, but innovation is eternally immanent in its system of evaluation.

### **c) Third Interpretation**

**I would suggest a third interpretation: The Act creates the possibility of a yes composed from the debris of nihilism.** The third interpretation is present in a sparse or singular manner in many of Nietzsche's predecessors. I would say this: The Act creates the possibility of a yes, which is composed from the debris of nihilism. I have already suggested this formula in commenting upon the small fragment of Dithyrambs in Dionysus, who said: "Debris of stars, from this debris I



created a universe." I would say that *The Act* is structured in nihilism from a manner such that it neither overcomes nihilism, nor does it affirm itself, or create another form of sovereignty. He disposes the possibility of one or all, but the yes is itself composed with all the debris of nihilism. Consequently, you need an explosion, a destructive curse. And we must take more seriously the metaphor of recurrent dynamite in terminal Nietzsche. Also, as I said, the title chosen by Sarah Kofman for his analysis of *Ecce Homo*, namely *Explosion I*, is absolutely relevant.

It takes a blast, because the yes consists only of a nihilism in debris, i.e. a nihilism that has exploded. This is not at all a form of negative work, nor the advent of the essence in the negative afterlife of configuration. It is truly an affirmative composition of debris. Why? Because we need the formation of nihilistic sovereignty to be returned to chaos, i.e. to attest the inevaluable depths. The debris, that's it. The debris is not nihilism maintained in the formation of sovereignty, i.e. retained as the will of nothing. As long as we remain in this form, we do not understand how *The Act* can be linked to nihilism, or how the yes can arise from nothing. The yes can come out of nothing when the configuration of nihilistic sovereignty has exploded, i.e. only attests to chaos, which is another name for life itself as inevaluable depth. And the yes will be composed as the yes regarding that. So it is very important to understand ultimately that the yes is the yes to the inevaluable. And that is why this is not a new assessment or new formation of sovereignty, because it is nothing other than a yes to inevaluable, and thus a yes to chaos. But for one to say yes to it, this inevaluable should be prepared, and what does so is the explosion of nihilism, i.e. its exposure in the form of debris.

Let's call this explosion of nihilism something that exposes within it the pure multiplicity. I'm not saying this does not pose huge problems, which we will try to consider, but the composition of the link between the diagnosis of nihilism as a characterization of modernity, and *The Act*, and Dionysian affirmation, at the heart of the anti-philosophical proposition of Nietzsche, is that the Dionysian yes cannot

be a partial yes, which would thus be an assessment, a power relation, and thus a new formation of sovereignty.

The Dionysian *yes* should not be taken in a certain perspective, at one point, but it requires the Dionysian yes to be a *yes* to the inevaluable depth (*fond*). The metaphor of totality is both apt and misleading. Nietzsche is often said to be saying yes to the world as it is, fully, without leaving out anything, etc. ...But this world is above all, something that is not a formation of sovereignty, and thus not a power relation, if you are still in a perspective. He also said that you're always at a point, but at one point, you are actually in a power relation which defines a formation of active and reactive sovereignty, whatever it may be, with regard to another will to power, etc. ... The Dionysian yes is only possible if it is not what we are dealing with, but rather in the inevaluable, which cannot be itself the object of an evaluation. Therefore the totality signifies the inevaluable, i.e. life as such, and the naming of the "il y a".

The name of the "il y a" is what we're going to affirm, provided that it is exposed to us, because we cannot constitute the yes if we are caught in the network of formations of sovereignty. Something must expose to us the pure depths so that we can assent to the inevaluable granting of the yes. And what can expose to us the pure depth? That's the whole problem. What *can* happen is that nihilism, which is the formation of existing sovereignty, explodes, i.e. that this occurs in debris in the radical destruction of its composition. This rupture of nihilism – in making a break in the sense of the explosion, of being reduced to chaos -- is what ultimately exposes the ingredients of nihilism itself, i.e. the pure "il y a", in the possibility of full affirmation. In other words, one cannot really say yes only to what is radically exposed as the inevaluable, because if it is evaluable, it's not yes that we'll say - we will deliver an evaluation, i.e. we will build a formation of sovereignty or we will institute new values, but the introduction of new values and the institution of the Dionysian yes are not identifiable, in my view, as shown in the Nietzschean text in

an increasingly tight manner as he rushes headlong into The Act.

## Nietzsche and Foucault: The Question of Interpretation

### a) Exposition of Foucault's thesis

Another way of putting it is that what strikes me as the rereading from this excellent *Conference of Royaumont*, is the notion of interpretation found at the book's heart. For the modern non-Heideggerians, i.e. finally, in the attempts of Foucault, Deleuze, Klossowski and even, in part, Henri Birault, let's say that, well, what they credit to Nietzsche - which is especially true for the extraordinary attempt of Foucault - is having proposed **a new system of interpretation**, to have reordered philosophy to the question of meaning, of using an innovative new system of interpretation. And this is where Foucault has his own triptych: Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud, in saying that what they have in common is having had proposed in the 19th century, and finally within their entire thought, inflicting upon themselves as well, a kind of injury; a system of interpretation whose great strength is that there is nothing to interpret, i.e. that any interpretation is ultimately an interpretation of interpretation. We recognize that in the language of Deleuze, there is only the relation of will to power, and not of the last entity that would serve as the number, or measurement for this relation. With Foucault, it is stated directly in these terms: there is an infinite order of interpretations where any interpretation decodes the system of another interpretation, and where the world is constituted as networks of interpretations without anyone ever touching upon what there is to interpret. In this conference, it is this that is experienced as the radical modernity of Nietzsche, but also of Freud and Marx. The conclusion drawn by Foucault is that this work is in a system of endless work. Obviously if any interpretation is an interpretation of interpretation, i.e. if there is no foundation, the interpretation remains under the imperative of an endless task. And all this is referred to in Nietzsche carefully. Enough of Nietzsche's texts completely validate this hypothesis as a Nietzschean

modernity. In light of the discussion of the age of 60 years, which portrays Nietzsche in a sort of generalized intertextuality, or of a discursivity which always returns horizontally to itself without there ever being a basis of layers of successive interpretations, what strikes me is that one can object, in any case, to the following: that the yes is not an interpretation. The affirmation of the Dionysian yes is not an interpretation. I think this is a key point, because if it is conceived as an interpretation, an interpretation is for Nietzsche an evaluation, i.e. a granting of meaning, and ultimately, an evaluation is a relation of power. It will necessarily be extended to the thesis in which the yes is a new formation of sovereignty, namely the introduction of new values, and we will make Nietzsche the prophet of the new values. We will fall back on Heidegger's objections which are, in my opinion, decisive regarding this point. What he holds is that the yes is not an interpretation, regarding which Nietzsche had an increasingly keen conscience. It is also why everything is centered more and more pressingly upon the question of The Act, which is not an interpretation. The "yes" is not an interpretation, because, once again, we cannot say yes except to the inevaluable but the inevaluable is also uninterpretable. The "il y a" of life is uninterpretable. There is no interpretation of it. Once you are in interpretation, you're in a system of power relation, and consequently the yes cannot fully result from an interpretation. Foucault is perfectly right in saying that if one is in the system of interpretation, it is a task without end. There is no resulting yes. There is no resulting affirmation. Certainly, any interpretation is its own affirmation, but it is situated there in a system that is quite transferable in terms of there being only relations of power.

### **A) Critique of Foucault's Thesis**

Now I shall maintain, and I think it quite arguable, that the Nietzschean yes proposes to bring about something other than interpretation, and I would even say that the Dionysian yes is the cessation of the interpretive system of thought.

This is The Act! The Act is such that we do not have to interpret anything. The assent to the whole world, without subtracting anything, is obviously impossible when you're evaluating i.e. in power relations, since a power relation always consists of subtracting something, and in affirming one feature against another. However, if you are in the Dionysian yes, you are in the termination of any interpretation, i.e. in the possibility of no longer having to interpret. And that's normal because the yes is a yes to the inevaluable. That's why I would assimilate Marx and Nietzsche as well, but absolutely in reverse of Foucault. Foucault brings Marx and Nietzsche together under the category of interpretation. He admirably shows that finally, the interpretive system of formations of sovereignty in Nietzsche is quite comparable to the system of interpretation; for example the status of money in Marx. And it is absolutely convincing. In addition, I would say that it's true. It is true that the system of Nietzschean interpretation concerning the formations of sovereignty and the system of Marxist interpretation concerning the monetary principle can be combined under a modern category of interpretation, which is entirely consistent. Finally, we will adjoin the system of interpretation of symptoms by Freud, and we will find our triptych, which works perfectly well. But I believe that it hinders the Nietzschean form of affirmation.

I would assimilate Nietzsche into the same category as Marx who said: "Philosophers have thus far interpreted the world, and now is the time to change it." **That itself is not an interpretation.** This last thesis on Feuerbach suggests a very different assimilation, which is the anti-philosophical assimilation and not the hermeneutic one. This is an assimilation that is not done under the banner of the category of hermeneutic interpretation, but is instead under the sign of the will of a termination of this system. One has so far interpreted the world, and basically Nietzsche would certainly agree that philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world. He would say, in addition, that they have always played *reactively*. As part of the ontological option, they have always slandered the world. And their

interpretations, those were their calumnies. But whether it's now the time to transform it, I think it is also deeply a conviction that is terminally Nietzschean. Transform, not in the sense of substituting a formation of sovereignty with another, but in the sense of making possible the yes to the inevaluable, i.e. not being able to interpret, because the last thesis on Feuerbach Marx means above all this: It has to do with no longer interpreting the world, in no longer having to interpret it. This is another way of naming the *Übermensch*. The last time we said the *Übermensch* - if this is something - is the formation of non-state sovereignty, i.e. the formation of sovereignty without sovereignty. I would add two points.

First of all, if the *Übermensch* disappeared after *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, it is because the *Übermensch* remains once again, in Nietzsche's eyes, too tied to the political formations of sovereignty. Of this I am convinced. The *Übermensch* lets it be understood too well that he is bringing about another formation of sovereignty, or as Nietzsche stated, that of overcoming the human: "*Man is what must be overcome*" - but what is this imperative? Too much dialectic there! Insufficiently affirmative! Insufficiently radical! Still interpretive! Stating: "*Man is what must be overcome*" is still an interpretation of man. Thus: as far as we would retain the *Übermensch* - if you keep it, which Nietzsche did not - one will say: the *Übermensch* is the man who no longer interprets. This is the man not interpreting. We will return there, and we will see why the real metaphor of *Übermensch* is the child, i.e. the one that is still under the system of interpretation, and thus still has a relation to the inevaluable. However, to further examine the question of The Act and nihilism, one will say: Nihilism is the unleashed reign of interpretation under the ontological option. In my view, the confusion arises from nihilism being the reign of interpretation under the ontological option. It is true that the Nietzschean critique of nihilism is an interpretation of interpretation, which fits well into Foucault's matrix, namely that there are only interpretations, and we're always trying to interpret an interpretation.

It is true that as far as the formation of nihilism as sovereignty is the system of interpretation under an ontological option, everything from Nietzsche's critique of nihilism or its description will be presented as an interpretation of interpretations. But this is the critical Nietzschean form of Nietzsche critique. When Nietzsche is critiqued, he gives himself a number of names. This is Nietzsche called the immoralist, the psychologist, or the free spirit. We are the other immoralists, other psychologists, other free spirits. When Nietzsche also speaks, he speaks, in fact, in the system of interpretation, i.e. that he is an interpreter of interpretation which is nihilism or the nihilistic reactive formation. But this is not that of the *Übermensch*, much less that of Dionysus. When he signed the letters of Dionysus's madness or the Crucified, so we will later come back, one might say that something else besides the Nietzsche who signaled the immoralist, the psychologist, or the free spirit, occurred. That one, I see that in fact it was he who proposes an order of interpretation as an interpretation of interpretations. But whoever signs Dionysus or the Crucified, even looking at someone who announces the *Übermensch*, is anything but an immoralist. From this point of view, I would even say that Zarathustra is an equivocal figure between the immoralist and Dionysus, or between the psychologist and Dionysus. In part, this is a figure taken into interpretation, and which on the other hand, has announced the possibility of its separation.

Let's say that Zarathustra is a free spirit who announces the *Übermensch*, or Zarathustra is a psychologist in charge of Dionysus. That is why, as we said at the outset, that Zarathustra is the precursor of himself. This essential ambivalence of the character of Zarathustra to be the precursor of himself must be finally thought of as a clear link between the system and the reign of interpretation, and the reign of affirmation. But the affirmation is the cessation of interpretive constraint. So to resume, the link to capture, to state, for Nietzsche, is thus: What is the relationship between the interpretation of nihilism, which is the interpretation of the interpretation, and the Dionysian yes? **How should one conceive of the correlation**

**between interpretation and the interruption of interpretation?** The real question is: How does an interpretive system of thought issue an affirmation, where the entire contents do not have to be interpreted –and no longer have to be? How does infinite interpretation stop? For Foucault is right to say that interpretation is an infinite system, but how does its infinity interrupt itself? This is Freud's publication on *Infinite Analysis*, by the way. How can a treatment itself be interrupted? I.e. who and to what they will say yes in this case at any time, so we do not rest on the couch for 45 years interpreting and interpreting interpretation, and interpreting the interpretation of interpretation!

It's infinite, principally infinite. This must be said! So when it ends, it's not that we have an ultimate or final interpretation. Foucault is right to argue that in the modern system of interpretation, there is not what one has to interpret, so we're still very much in the interpretation of interpretation. A Freudian or Nietzschean problem, but also a Marxist one, to take the triptych of Foucault, is that at the end of ends there must be a yes. A yes to what?

That is the whole problem. There must be an affirmation or "yes". Nietzsche calls this yes Dionysus, and he is fully aware that yes can only be a yes to the inevaluable, otherwise the interpretation continues. And there, Nietzsche is in a very strong and dramatic impasse, and the mediation thereof is the idea of debris. The idea that interpretive formations may in certain circumstances be given in the face of their debris. This is the only solution he finds, i.e. to return to pure multiplicity that they constitute. There, in fact, the interpretation stops, and the assertion is possible, because it is affirmation of the pure multiple as inevaluable. So between the interruption of the interpretation and the possibility of affirmation, there is the explosion at the point of The Act, i.e. the yes to inevaluable depths.

*I always feel that the rupture of the interpretive system is what Lacan calls the Real, or possibly the object a. It is what is being done at any given time, in the system of interpretation as debris. And that's what will be said... So? Yes ... that I do not know.*



*Anyway, it lacks the Dionysian appearance - it does not look Dionysian! But it says something that is not of the order of interpretation, and it seems to be in the figure of dustiness, the Real. The Real seems to be what is unsymbolizable as such, and therefore uninterpretable, nonetheless, as such. And when that happens, when you put your nose on it, well it's over. That's it. We say yes to anything but interpretation, i.e. which in practice one says yes to something besides the couch.*

It is true that there is an analogy for this point. Thus we can also say that the question of yes is the matter, if you sail from one language to another, from the key of the Real, with this extreme depth in Nietzsche that the Real does not allow itself to touch as the inevaluable, than in the destruction of interpretation. One might wonder whether Nietzsche did not think at any one time that in the force of interpretation, one would use interpretations until they would be ruined. There is a whole part of the work of Nietzsche that consists in rubbing interpretations in interpreting them, and we feel that it's like a pumice stone: that there was this idea that at the end of ends, it would spread out under the interpretive screening, that the interpretation would spread itself in the powerful action of an unrelenting and courageous over-interpretation in the situation of control.

I believed that for quite a while, **Nietzsche thought that he could have done away with interpretation, as the true master of interpretation.** There are texts in which Nietzsche is saluted as the most eminent psychologist. But the psychologist in Nietzsche's sense is not someone who knows people, but rather, one who is the master of interpretation, and Nietzsche believed that in the position of the control of interpretation, one could bring about the ruined exposition of interpretation itself, or at least, the collapse of nihilistic configuration. And thus I think that he understood it as no; as for the position of the analyst he was not in the position of control, if we continue our analogy. The definition of the analyst is not the master of interpretation. In Freud it is still ambiguous, and it must be said. Many texts of Freud might suggest that the analyst is the master of interpretation. But what is said

plainly, beyond Freud, especially by Lacan, is precisely that the analyst is not the master of interpretation. So if he is not the master of interpretation, there is an act. And Nietzsche, in categories, for you can see that it is all analogical, came to the same point as Lacan. He came to say that if in being the master of interpretation, we as psychologists, we as immoralists, do not allow ourselves to expose the inevaluable, there must be something else – the principle of the Real is not there, so it is in an act. And The Act is life as an interpreted multiplicity, not subject to a system of interpretation that is basically uninterpretable just as the Real cannot be symbolized. Yes, but that the Real is unsymbolizable does not mean it's easy to feel like this or to meet him as such. The whole affair – is it possible? Impossible? We just don't know ...

And so as to the yes, it is made possible by it, i.e. by the fact that the inevaluable as the disseminated and inevaluable and uninterpretable Real is given. And that's why the yes is innocent. The Nietzschean innocence is: do not interpret. We must sufficiently understand that everything of the theme of innocence and child in Nietzsche has the essence: do not interpret. The child is the contrary of the master of interpretation. It is he who is not only *not* the master of interpretation, but it is he who does not need to interpret.

The child is a metaphor for this point, which is why he is the essential metaphor of the Dionysian yes in its attribute of innocence. So the line to think about is the one between the second and third metamorphosis early in Zarathustra, i.e. between the lion and the child. How do we move from the lion to the child? The lion is the one who says no, who has the courage to say no, because he is the master of interpretation, of course. And the child is the one who says yes precisely because he is outside the register of interpretation.

### Three Metamorphoses

Let's read the fragment entitled *The Three Metamorphoses*, which open

*Zarathustra*, and which are quite well-known, while listening to the extraordinarily difficult question of The Act as it is, in Zarathustra, implicitly held between the lion and the child, i.e. the site of The Act for the boundaries of the lion and child. Zarathustra calls it a metamorphosis, but the question concerns how it is transformed, and what is The Act of metamorphosis. Here's the passage: "*To create new values- the lion himself is not yet capable: but to overcome in order to become capable of creating new values, is what is called the strength of the lion. To win his own freedom and the sacred right to say no, even the duty to do so – for this, my brethren, you must be a lion. To win the right to new values, it is the most formidable undertaking for a patient and laborious mind, and certainly one sees in it an act of plunder and preying. What he once loved as his most sacred good, is "You must," and he must now find illusion and arbitrariness even in the depths of what is most sacred in the world, and conquer also the noble fight of the right to be free of this attachment. To exercise such violence, one must be a lion.*"

The lion is in the midst of a non-interpretive speech. This is the figure of the master of interpretation, and it is he who finds the "*illusion and arbitrariness even in the depths of what is most sacred in the world,*" so that it is he who interprets the reactive values of religion and of Christendom, i.e. he is the interpreter of nihilism who has the courage to escape the nihilistic strain itself. For this, we must be a strong lion.

*"But tell me, my brothers, what can be done by a mere child where the lion himself was incapable? Why should the kidnapper lion still become a child? Is it because the child is innocent and forgetting, a new beginning, a game; a wheel that moves by itself, the first mobile – a holy affirmation [we could comment on each of these terms, but all refer to the yes as something other than interpretation]. In truth, my brothers, to play the game of the creators, one must be a holy affirmation. The mind presently wills its own will; having lost the world, it conquers its own world. I told you of the three metamorphoses of the mind: how the mind has changed to a camel, the camel to a lion, and the lion, finally, to a child."*

The transformation from the camel to the lion is not a huge problem, but a

transformation which, after all, if you do not see every day, is interpretively detectable. On the contrary, the metamorphosis of the lion to the child is the central problem in Nietzsche. We can say that the question of Nietzsche's main rush toward his act, i.e. to his madness, is fully implicated by the question: **how does the lion morph into a child? i.e. a violent interpreter of nihilism, the violent master of the interpretation of reactive values? Does he become someone who forgets all interpretation?** It is this exact point that the intense Nietzschean drama must attempt to present without representing, i.e. that it must try to demonstrate without making a mere representation. That is obviously the focus, the ultimate call of art, which enables the presence of the metamorphosis of the lion to the child –a metamorphosis that must undergo the full release from all formations of sovereignty.

That's truly it for tonight!

APPENDIX of Nietzsche I-  
*Anti-Philosophy, 1992-1993*

Wagner's Anti-Philosophy

Translated and Edited by Wanyoung Kim

## New Course One: Poetry, Theater & Nietzschean Act

Some information missing from the reading which struck me as important, and isn't included in the current daily reviews. I begin with an element of advertisement : *Briser en Deux Histoires du Monde (Breaking World History in Two*, a small pamphlet in my name.

Elsewhere in Berlin, a collection entitled *Rimbaud Millennium* was published. This is the title given to the review of a conference on Rimbaud organized by the College of Philosophy, and by Rancière Borreil and myself. Basically, it is a collection that takes Rimbaud in the form of a thought, i.e. which stands at an equal distance from the consideration of Rimbaud as an allegorical figure, character, and existential symbol, but also Rimbaud considered in strictly literary form, i.e. taken up in the limited vision of the function of the poem. Rimbaud taken up in the element of thought, despite various interventions, and Rimbaud as a poet whose singular scansion is declarative. The declarative scheme of thought in the poem has in truth demanded almost the totality of those involved, a declaration in the poem that is otherwise very busy in the letter, not distanced from textuality, but seeking to decipher the declarative operations of Rimbaud in this literal proximity.

Still on the subject of the poem, the last book by Michel Deguy, published by Seuil, is titled *Aux heures d'affluence* (At peak times). My opinion is that as a book, I find it a little insufficient and unnecessary, as far as it groups texts that were all published except for one, in connections that are sometimes difficult to grasp. There seems to be nothing that might establish

it as a book. But the opening text has captivated my attention. In a few pages, he has collected and ordered his conception of the poem, and more than that, the vocation he attributes to the poem. This is one of his most synthetic and collected texts. I would like to identify some maxims of this opening.

**1st statement:** "I owe you the truth in a poem." This tiny bit orders everything else. The poem is under an order of truth that is both imperative and addressed. I owe you. The formula is simple and dense: this requirement is of the order of truth, that this requirement is under the rule of an address (I owe you), and then this truth is in a poem, i.e. a strictly immanent order. The poem is not the instrument of the truth that is owed, but it is the truth itself in the poem, and that's what the poem owes us.

**2nd statement:** The poem is composed of propositions. A proposition is made clear between the verb "propose" and its grammatical meaning. But this maxim refers to the declarative function: the poem contains or holds something that is fully proposed. It is something besides a dimension of expression in some sense that we take it. What the poem makes is not in the order of expression, but the proposition.

**3rd statement:** The role of the comparative function will be brought up: the poem moves in what may be called the semblance of things, which is precisely what opposes their seeming. Things are not in the order of the seeming even though the poem captures them in their semblance, i.e. in their reference to other things as evidence of their presence. And at last, there is what Deguy calls the propensity of the near. The vision is that the contemporary world is its distant abstraction, i.e. a distant primate that is not at some distant horizon, but in an abstract dissemination glued to the image,

or simulacrum. The poem is destined for a sort of hole that restores as much as possible of the near and its propensity, i.e. which introduces a commensurability. So it is for these reasons as well as others that I find this opening interesting.

I'd like to point out a book by Esther Kellerman, *Distance de fuite* (Distance of flight), published by Flammarion. Some words about this collection. I would say this: you might think that these poems, with their brevity, density, and sense of soft brokenness, i.e. something broken in a dull and rough tenderness, could evoke Paul Celan. For example, in one of the poems, which is interesting because it is like a figure in multiples of 1, 2, and 4 and this poetic numericity, this function of 1, 2, 3, and 4 and the order in which the poem has this form, the question of the address, of alterity, is something that bears a remote analogy to Celan. I read the poem "... Summer snow, not two realities, a white hole, 4 plants."

But in reality this poem differs a lot from Celan, with a type of reflexive entanglement, their order and function in the poem. I, you, they, i.e. the reflexive provision of the poetic address. We know that in the Celan, the "tu" address is essential. There is an symbolic feature of the 2nd person, who commands the order of the address. Here it is entangled: a singular "*nous*", where listening is unique. I give an example of this: "what necklaces adorned our nights, what smooth acacia ..". And of course there is a she, and what strikes me here is that it is a mild inducer of light subtraction, which is decentered. For example this: "she falls beyond a shadow of signs, and if the sky has not shared it, columns or off-center," and this 'she' in light subtraction, decentered, is distinct from a 'he' who is often clearly the



separator. I will end on this question of he: "... he slices it up, justly and unjustly. This ... ". There it is, and to conclude, at the other end of the language, I want to emphasize to you Paradoxes of the Infinite by Bolzano, translated and introduced by Sinaceur. I remind you that Bolzano is a critical thinker because he paves the way for Cantor in the mathematization of actual infinity. He assumes for the 1st time the possibility of actual infinity inscribed in an actual matheme. Bolzano, in the modern genealogy of the thought of the infinite, plays a vital role, even if he does not follow his position to the conclusion.

Now we shall return to Nietzsche, our Nietzschean suspense, and I would like first of all, of course in formulas, or in a non-definitive way, to retrace or reconfigure some of the things that were said.

1) What was our starting point? Our starting point was in trying to grasp Nietzsche's thought from the bridge of his ace, i.e. the point of his madness, and not the reverse, i.e. viewing madness from thought, or considering that madness simply interrupts thought, but grasping the edge in which the Nietzsche act is decided, or perishes to determine the edges, the points of forces, guiding lines, essential desire. This resonates a lot elsewhere with Nietzschean signifiers. Especially if one proceeds in such a way, it cannot be held that will to power and Eternal Return are the essential organizing categories of Nietzsche's thought. It's not, what is seen from this point, appears to be destined regarding the Nietzschean Philosophical Act. You could say it in these terms: there is a Nietzscheanism and there is even more of a Nietzscheanism than there was a common Nietzscheanism during the entire beginning of the century, and perhaps until today. And one could

say that grasping Nietzsche from the point of view of the Act, is in a sense to separate him from his own Nietzscheanism. Nietzscheanism was not through and through some deception. It was for some time, but not apart from that. The method we adopt is to separate Nietzsche from his immanent Nietzscheanism, which otherwise reorders and accentuates with regard to their importance and central organizing function. I should mention that there is a text by Nancy where we find a somewhat comparable project. It is published in *Pensée Finie Deus paralysis progressiva*. I would say this: What Nancy sees fully, with which I fully agree, is that what is called Nietzsche's madness is in some way the taking upon oneself of what was formerly only an announcement, only news. The moment there is a rush toward The Act that Nietzsche must take on his own body because he does not stand any more of the state of news. He must pay from his person and go from where the announcement remained indefinitely open. Nancy will say this, which is quite strong: "God is dead, but this time (Nietzsche = someone who is paralyzed and mute), it is not new, it is the presentation of death." i.e. that Nietzsche will turn himself into the corpse of God. You know he states that he is God, and we commented on these texts. And that God is immediately paralyzed and mute, it is a form in anticipation of the corpse of God. Nancy's thesis is that Nietzsche made death of God's present, i.e. in truth, his statement that God died must be taken literally. God is nothing but dead. Or that God is dead, hear the verb "to be" in its ontological resonance. Death is not the adjective that suits God, God is death itself and this is what makes the very body of Nietzsche present, in the form of progressive paralysis. He cannot say anything because no one can speak of his own death; no one can say "I'm dead." One could say God is dead, but it is news, an announcement.

Who says it? A witness, is he someone who states it? Is it good news heard somewhere? Nietzsche shows that God is dead, he is himself the dead God when he founders. We find that obviously what we have tried to state about art, which is that Nietzsche, under the name of Nietzsche, becomes the name of all possible names, of all the names of history, and under this name, what occurs is the death of God. Nietzsche is more than a proof, but the presentation of what God is dead. And so we find this fatal idea that the thought of Nietzsche can be satisfied by the announcement of the news or testimony. It is not enough to testify that God is dead.

This needs to be presented and it is under the anonymous name of Nietzsche that it will be done. The point of this discussion is to assign it strictly to the formula God is dead. We have assigned it to the other, which was the necessity of breaking in two histories of the world, and of affirmation as such. His madness arrives when one breaks the announcement, one breaks it, but in assuming the two words of the rupture. Nietzsche says that he has created the world, not one that will come, but one that was there. Nancy takes it in a more narrow sense, in the formula God is dead, which gives a decisive function to the formula God is dead. What is at stake in madness is the presentation of mortality as such, of the death of God, which Nietzsche will interpret as the death of the subject, or as he said, the ultimate fatal jolt of metaphysics. What makes Nietzsche philosophically present, is the corpse of the Cartesian form of philosophy, the God who is no longer even able to state his being because his being is none other than death being ultimately the last gasp of the cogito, or the self-positing of the subject. This is the fundamental thesis of Nancy: what Nietzsche tells us is that the essence of self-positing is

death, and that thus the subject itself is made present by Nietzsche, the category of the subject in its mortal essence. A subject is ultimately only his own death or the owning of his death, and the owning of his death is obviously unspeakable. That there will be material to challenge it, to challenge that the Nietzschean form of paralysis of The Act is the presentation of the mortal essence of the subject. What I believe is that here Nietzsche gives up an assumption of finitude, to a finite arrangement of thought, it is what eventually accomplishes it but in the double sense of completing something [*achever*], i.e. achieving the form of the cogito but also in the establishment of a finite order of thought, i.e. of establishing thought in its elementary consideration, in the sense of its element, in finitude. I wish to point out this other attempt, this other way of grasping Nietzsche's thought from the point of what has been called his madness.

2. We have mentioned grasping Nietzsche's thought from the point of view of madness and not the opposite, i.e. of capturing it from the viewpoint of his act. How is the Philosophical Act determined?

3. We have said, thirdly, that this Act is that of breaking into two world histories. It is in this sense that we have declared it arch-politics. In this sense, Nietzsche's thought is probably the most contemporary radical thought of the revolution, although it is in competition with it. Breaking in 2 world histories, which has led us to say:

4. What about the old history of the world, that was broken? The old history of the world is the history of the will to nothingness. More precisely, it is the history of the domination of the types of the will to nothingness. And the generic name of the domination of the types of the will to nothingness, is

Christianity. You could equally say that the old world history is the history of nihilism, and that it is this history that will be broken in two by the Nietzschean uttering.

5. A new history, which is at stake in *The Act*, is that of a yes. We have tried to demonstrate a complex issue, so it is composed from the debris of nihilism itself. Essential thesis: the yes is a yes to the inevaluable, i.e. a yes to the very bottom of life as life that does not let itself be evaluated. And only the rupture of nihilism exposes in a broken form the pure and egalitarian multiplicity. The inevaluable is exposed as such to the yes in the element of the rupture of nihilism that produces from it the egalitarian multiplicity. It takes an explosion, which is not metaphorical, but is the real of *The Act*. It is necessary for the egalitarian multiplicity to result from the explosion of nihilism as only this egalitarian multiple is disposed of to produce the affirmative yes.

6. The *yes* or affirmation, the new history is not a new value: any interpretation of Nietzsche in terms of the creation of new values is restrictive and ultimately inaccurate. It has to do with creating new values, but to create or blow up possibilities of affirming the inevaluable life. Precisely as it's inevaluable, it is not as such pronounced under a value. We can also say it is a variant, that the yes is not an interpretation or a new interpretation, but it is the end of the interpretation. The yes is precisely what does not interpret. It can even be argued that the superman is the man of the uninterpretable, the man, whom if I may say, has no need to interpret, where the Dionysian power is non-interpretive.

7. We have noticed that The Act, which is this explosion that disposes of the egalitarian multiple to expose the pure affirmation, is actually prepared by the genealogical interpretation of nihilism. The Act is, so to speak infinitely or indefinitely prepared by the genealogical interpretation of nihilism with it being widely known that since we are in interpretation we are in nihilism itself. The Nietzschean interpretation of Nietzsche is indeed extracted from nihilism itself, as is any regime of interpretation. So you could say that The Act will be prepared from within nihilism by its genealogical interpretation that is an extreme form of nihilism. But The Act does not reside in interpretation. At most, we will find its pedagogy, or see it as propaganda. Not its arch-politics, but its politics. This is where the resources of sophistry will be mobilized, available since the Greeks, and consequently they can be reaffirmed. In the question "Who is Zarathustra," also asked by Heidegger, we have said: it is an equivocal figure, an equivocal figure between the interpretation of nihilism and the Dionysian yes. Between the one who has the capacity to interpret, pushed toward the possibility of saying no, of saying a radical no, and one who would be able to say yes. This ambiguity is represented by Nietzsche in the form of someone who is his own precursor, the very definition of Zarathustra. He is his own precursor as far as he is a master of interpretation, and interpretation itself remains intrinsic to the interpreted, i.e. to nihilism.

And what ultimately brings meaning is the very act in which the Dionysian yes is possible. Zarathustra moves from side to side in this essential equivocation. This is the entire issue of the 2nd metamorphosis. The first metamorphosis is the camel into the lion, i.e. the one which bears

hardship, to the one who has the power to interpret, that of a certain manner is nothing but an internal enigma of nihilism itself. To be the lion of nihilism is to be in nihilism's most violent form. It is a relative enigma, for it is an immanent enigma. One can imagine or depict the figure of the lion as an extreme figure, or a form of extremism. You could even call it nihilism as far as nihilism of prey. The 2nd metamorphosis involves the tipping of the master of interpretation into a figure of affirmative innocence. It is the transformation of the lion into the child. It is not an interpretive enigma. It is the very enigma of The Act. Alternatively there is a hermeneutic intelligibility in the metamorphosis of the camel to the lion, but there is no possible hermeneutic intelligibility of the lion into the child. It is uninterpretable. We had said: the whole problem indeed lies there, and this is the true heart of the Nietzschean question. It can be formulated abstractly in this way: how do we name, simply name the rupture with the order of no, which brings the advent of yes, without it being a double negation? without the advent of yes not merely being the negation of the order of no. Deleuze is right: Nietzsche's thought is not dialectics, but dialectics as an adversary: how do we arrive from there to the yes other than in the form of the negation of the negation?

How do we bring about affirmation of the inevaluable other than by breaking with a first scheme of critique? Critique does not bring about affirmation. The paroxysmal interpretation does not have affirmative innocence. The child is not the negation of the lion, while the lion is (not) the negation of the camel. The camel is the one that supports it, and the lion the one who cannot stand all of it. Between the one who finds it unbearable, and the one in the mastery of the furious interpretation of Christian nihilism, and

then holy affirmation, innocence and forgetting, there is no negation. Thus the last focus on the question of Nietzsche is that of knowing how the Dionysian yes occurs like another world, a world I insist is without value. This is not the world of other values, but the world of the inevaluable. How does that happen? Other than by negation, than by dialectical negation, i.e. of sophisticated genealogy of the old world, which we know is itself extreme nihilism. This is where the question of art enters the scene, and it is where it should be placed a radical question. Art should at least be able to present this metamorphosis, to capture its own power, other than be just the element of negation. You could say this here: the function of art is to affirm the affirmation. Art is summoned here as far as there is power to affirm the affirmation. It is not an affirmation itself.

Nietzsche never gave up stating that *The Act* is arch-political, and it is not a new aesthetics or a new art. *The Act* is not aesthetic. It is not fair to make Nietzsche responsible for an aesthetic vision of politics, including the Nazi usage of Nietzsche. He does not have a directly aesthetic representation in *The Act*. There is a problem of presenting the affirmation other than as the negation of negation, and it is a problem that requires art in its didactic form. Only art is able to say what it has to do with asking for affirmation. That does not mean it is he who is or makes effective affirmation. This is not an artistic revolution. But art can at least let it be understood how the statement can be anything but the negation of the negation. It is in this sense that I said that art can affirm the affirmation.

We might also say this: art is par excellence, what is not dialectical. Art is not dialecticism, i.e. the ability to connect to the affirmation other than in



the modality of the negation of negation. Thus, the question of art is central to a boundary that must be captured well. It is central as far as it has to do with capturing, giving to thought; it is the possibility of affirmation, not its real (this falls within the effectivity of arch-politics, breaking into two histories of the world), but in the least, art may suggest the possibility of affirmation, otherwise, once more than resulting from critical extremism, i.e. in a scheme evading interpretation. One could say that art is non-interpretive, or that there is something non-interpretive in art. Thereupon the texts are labyrinthine. But we can follow Ariadne's thread in the labyrinth: there is interpretation in art, but there is also non-interpretive element, something that connects us to the presentation of the affirmation. This is art as far as it is non-dialectical art. Here is the dispute with Wagner. Why does it become an obsession? It becomes an obsession to the point that he devotes it to his last strength.

The register of psychoanalytic explanation is fully open, and so I will not continue further. It is absolutely true and absolutely useless. If we try not to go into too much interpretation, that Wagner is the name for, what is the name, while trying to avoid answering right away that it was his father's name. I would say: Wagner was without doubt first of all to Nietzsche, the name of the return of high art, i.e. the name of high art, i.e. in fact the name resulting from the possible affirmative dimension of art. We should not be mistaken about it: high art needs to be considered in a rigorous manner. It is art that can affirm the affirmation. It is art that is not embarrassed in its own dialectic. It is certain that Wagner at one time was Nietzsche's name for this. And then finally, Wagner has been the name for the responsibility of a

dialectization of high art itself. The background of the trial is there. In a sense, Nietzsche never completely abandoned the first thesis that Wagner was the name of high art of the century.

He has constantly maintained that he had it in a greater fashion. He never said that Bizet was greater, that Carmen was greater than *Tétralogie*. He had criticized him for dialecticized high art itself, of being soaked left to his knees or his head in dialectics. This dialectization of high art has a name for him: the theatralization. Wagner is the one who dramatized high art. Now the theater, to Nietzsche, is dialectic art par excellence. It is *par excellence* the paradigm of non-affirmative art, or the one furthest from affirming the affirmation. Hence Nietzsche's relentless diatribes against theater. Theater is literally, through and through the negation of the negation. It is even in this proper order, artistically extremist. It is through and through typological, and it is art dedicated to the presentation of the naming of types. And Wagner himself has submitted to this rule of high art. He has immersed himself in dialectic theatralization. So the question that arises from there is to know this: since high art, where Wagner remained the symbol, by his own genius, has been thrown into non-affirmative dialectic, or in infinite interpretation, what can be the artistic supports of art? That's why there was a terrible crisis around Wagner.

There is a history which challenges the very possibility of The Act. The alliance with Wagner was decisive in Nietzsche's strategy during an entire period, because it testified that there was an affirmative resource of the return of high art, within the naming... But the compromise in theatralization, i.e. ultimately with Christianity itself, is a terrible blow on the plausibility of The

Act. This is what is expressed with a terrible acuity in the passage in Zarathustra on the magician. Let's look at some passages of dialogue between Zarathustra and casting spells. The magician or sorcerer is Wagner. He is constantly portrayed as the sorcerer, magician, as cunning ... he has enchanted high art, cursed it, he was high art and has enchanted it in an immanent manner. He was the magician himself, he threw a curse on what was otherwise the symbol. It is the magician who ends up turning against himself in his mind, the man, who having transformed internally, freezes in contact with his bad science, his bad conscience, he who was high art. Zarathustra encounters him, and wonders if he is not going to meet a great man.

Zarathustra sings a song and gives him the staff. Wagner says the following in Zarathustra: "O Zarathustra I've had it with all of this, I am disgusted with my artifices. I'm not good at pretending, but you know I seek greatness. I have wanted to be with a great man, and I have seduced many men, but it was a lie beyond my powers. I am broken from it. O Zarathustra, everything is a lie in me but I am broken from it. It is the only truth that remains in me. That brings you honor, Zarathustra says gloomily, lowering his eyes and looking away. Seeking greatness, that brings you honor but it also betrays you, you're not that great. Sinister old magician, what you have best, what I respect in you, is that you're tired of yourself and that you have declared I'm not great. In this I honor you, in that you are indeed the penitent of the spirit, and it was only the time for a breath or a wink. For a moment you were real."

What should we say on this complicated text? Wagner attested to the return of high art, and he was in search of greatness, authentically. Then he injected into it lies and artifice. The thesis is that high art, if it is dialecticized, theatricized, histrionized, and actually becomes the simulacrum of itself. So Wagner, by dramatizing high music, has established artifice and lies in art itself, and in doing so he has corrupted and lose greatness of which he was the name and symbol, and Zarathustra gives him The Act by saying, "I'm not great." I doubt whether Wagner said it, but it's nice for Nietzsche to have him say it in Zarathustra! This drama of the discussion with the old magician, notice how it is treated here: Zarathustra is dark, lowers his eyes, he is himself defeated in part. The discussion is very strange, and it is not a proud affirmation of Zarathustra faced with an enchanter defeated by artifice. There is something achieve and undone in even Zarathustra. The Nietzschean conscience that ultimately Wagnerian art is the dialectization of high art, its renunciation, its nihilistic extremism carried out, has left him helpless on the following question: how do we present the affirmation, how will the affirmation be affirmed, if it is not in the manner of high art?

There are trails of research on this point.

There is the matter of the poem, in German, i.e. the idea of an unprecedented breakdown in language, a language evading dialecticity. Nietzsche contrasts his German in his native dialect, a German that is made once more capable of affirmation. This is no small task. It is the first track, the track of the poem as a native form of the presentation of The Act.

And then, and this is an important 2nd theme, he has gone looking towards dance as a symbolic form of art that is non-theatrical or non-dialectic.

On this question of Nietzsche and dance, which is a track that is both conjoined with, and alternative to the poem, I have composed a text, which I give to you here.

The question was: why is dance obligated by Nietzsche to be a metaphor of thought, of his thought? This is our question: What power of art can be summoned which at least affirms the affirmation? Dance is opposed to the great enemy of Zarathustra-Nietzsche, an enemy he calls the spirit of gravity. Dance is above all the image of a thought without any spirit of gravity. We must understand when Nietzsche speaks of the spirit of gravity, that it is what prohibits affirmation, essentially. It's not only what is clumsy, German. It is what paralyzes the aerial possibility of affirmation. Arguably, if one attaches to it ontological considerations, that the spirit of heaviness is the opposite of the debris of stars, as we had seen

(Again, the aerial metaphor). This is what sticks to the type, to the typology, so that you one is generally obliged to the reactive type to which one is assigned. I said that it is important to identify other images of subtraction, as they put it in part or place it in a dense metaphorical network.

There is the bird. Zarathustra says, "It's because I hate the spirit of heaviness that I keep the bird." There is an essential metaphorical connection between dance and the bird. The dance is what brings the bird to the interior of the body.

There is more generally the image of the flight. Zarathustra says; "He who learns how to fly will give the earth a new name. He will name it light".

One could say that the Nietzschean definition of dance would be this: dance is a new name given to the land.

There is also of course the child. This is also why the dance will be the presentation of the 2nd metamorphosis, our essential enigma. The 2nd metamorphosis of dance is not negation of the negation, but it is represented in the leaping of dance. The child, as we know, is innocent and forgetting, a new beginning, the 3rd metamorphosis after the camel and the lion. Dance, bird and flight are all that refer to the child.

Dance is innocence because it is the body before the body, the body before the weight of the body. As the child, dance is forgotten for it is a body that forgets its restraint or weight; it is a body forgetful of itself. Dance is also a new beginning: the dancing gesture should always be as if it brought about its own beginning.

And play: it frees the body from any social mimicry, from any seriousness, any propriety. Nietzsche says of the child: a wheel that moves by itself. It is also a possible definition of dance. It is like a circle in space, but like a circle that is its own principle, a circle that is not drawn from the outside, but which is drawn. And the child is a first mobile, but the child as well: each gesture or layout of the dance should be presented not as a consequence or mechanical effect, but as a source of mobility; and then dance is also simple affirmation because the dance can be said to be what radiantly places the negative body, i.e. the shameful body, in absence. The dance is what places the shameful body in absence.

Nietzsche also mentioned fountains, in the same line as images: "My soul is like a gushing fountain." The dancing body is gushing outside the ground but also outside of itself. I believe that finally Bachelard saw it clearly in the interpretation of Nietzsche's poetics, this question of the formation of the affirmation raises a metaphorical element of air. In the arrangement of the elements, it is air that will name the mystery of the last metamorphosis. Dance is what permits the aerial name of the earth itself, and it is what aerates the soil or allows the earth to be thought of as provided with constant aeration. Or it even assumes the sigh or breath of the earth.

That is because the central question of the dance is the relation between verticality and attraction. It is basically the same problem as the presentation of The Act. That's why dance is a relevant metaphor. This is the moment when verticality dissolves an attraction. Not in the sense that it denies it in a visible manner, but in the sense where it was time for a flash, but it is as if the attraction were dissolved. The dancing body is a vertical body from this point of view, but in the dissolution of an attraction which transits after it. Basically, dance manifests the possibility which is the possibility of the affirmation that land and air exchange their position, and earth and air pass into another. Under the question of the transformation of the child into a lion, there is the question of a permutation of the position between air and land. It is for these reasons that Nietzschean thought will find its metaphor in dance, which will recapitulate the series of the bird, the flight, the fountain, the child, and the impalpable air.

One could say: this series is a bit too innocent, and finally slightly vapid. It gives Nietzsche an image where innocence is guaranteed by an

overabundance of metaphors. But it is necessary to understand that Nietzsche gives this series as traversed by dance in its connection to power and rage. This is the point. We can say that The Act is the traversal in a powerful metaphorical series of innocence. The dance is at once one of the terms of the series and at the same time the violent traversal of this series. Zarathustra says that "there are enraged feet of the dancer." In dance, we have something like the traversal in the power of innocence. It is the lion who affirms the child, for it is he who in some way traverses it in power, so that metamorphosis is not exactly the right word. It would be necessary to imagine a kind of jump of the dancer in the trajectory in which the force of good is the lion, but the suspended aerial grace is the same thing as innocence, which is the child. But this is not representable other than in an artistic recording, where dance is the symbol.

All that is related to Nietzsche's belief that thought is an intensification. We must understand how dance is called upon as spectacle if I may say so, or a visibility of thought as intensification. It is also necessary to be able to understand that the child is an intensification of the lion, much rather than its negation, the dancing intensification of the lion. For Nietzsche, let's remember this is the key, the thought does not occur somewhere other than where it is given, it is effective there, it is what is intensified in yourself, it is the movement of its own intensity, we could say. And it is at this point where thought should be purely given as a movement of its own intensity, or it is what should be affirmed, contrary to reactive types, and it is where the image of dance is natural. Basically you could say that dance visibly conveys thought as an immanent form, in the figure of the body. It is the body as



visibility of an immanent intensification. Of course, this imposes a certain vision of dance, particularly Nietzsche is opposed to any vision of dance as an external constraint, i.e. as a gymnastics with rules, i.e. as a flexible body obeying a prescribed configuration, and that includes a configuration prescribed by music. The dance is not at all an obedient and muscular body, i.e. a body that is both capable and submissive. It is the opposite of the dancing body. The dancing body is the body that inside it exchanges air and the earth. Besides, this contrary to dance is a capable and submissive body, and it has a name, the German, the bad German. The definition of the German is said to be: obedience and good legs. But after all, it is a possible definition of the dancer. There may be a vision of dance, a tyrannical vision of dance that requires obedience and good legs from the dancer. He is able, with the necessary good legs, of music or choreograph that is imposed, or inflicted upon him. Obviously such an image of dance does not correspond to what it was intended for here, i.e. I recall giving visibility towards the thought as pure intensification, and beyond that consequently and fleetingly giving us a pedagogy of the yes, i.e. the pedagogy of the reign of pure affirmation. Obedience and good legs are not everything in dance, but everything in the military parade. To understand the thought of dance, one must understand that it has the exact opposite of the relation to the body manifested in the military parade. This is interesting because it's the 2 cases where we have bodies performing something under the horizon of a musical or military rhythm. German is the military. The parade is the body that is aligned and hammering, not a vertical body, and in spite of its appearance it is a horizontal body, horizontal and noisy, the strike rate. While dance is the aerial and broken body, it is the vertical body. It is not the hammering body,

but the body on tiptoe, i.e. which pokes the ground as if it were a cloud. This is the silent body, not the struck cadence. The parade is the body commanded by the thunder of its own strikes. Finally, dance indicates a vertical thinking for Nietzsche, thought stretched toward its own height. One knows all too well that in the extreme of its stretching toward its own height, there is the noon of the Dionysian yes, where dance is a kind of earthly allegory. Basically, dance communicates with noon, too. Noon is when the sun is at its zenith. One could give a definition of dance: dance is the body dedicated to the zenith, its own zenith. If we go deeply into the reasons for this emphasis on dance, in the failure of high art whose corrupt symbol is Wagner, Nietzsche sees in dance the theme of mobility that would be attached to itself, i.e. which moves without detaching from its own center. A mobility that unfolds itself, as if it were the expansion of its center. There is an elementary interpretation, which is that dance as an art form corresponds to Nietzsche's idea of thought as Becoming...

### **New Course Two (Badiou, Nietzsche, & Art)**

We had in some manner left Nietzsche on this following quibble concerning art. One could summarize it in the following ways:

**1. Art has the power required for arch-political cut-off**, the fatal gesture, for The Act, only if it is what Nietzsche called high art or the art of high style, with the understanding being, long story short, that high art or high style designates art that is commensurate with its Greek origins.

**2. Wagner is the contemporary of Nietzsche**, who in Nietzsche's eyes is the sole possessor of a project of high art. It is he who, in this century, proposes or re-proposes the theme of high art.

**3. Nietzsche is gradually convinced**, and at the end of his life furiously so, that Wagner is not representative of greatness, and that the Wagnerian project, the Wagnerian opera, are not realized by high art, but rather by its theatrical imitation. So ultimately there is a Wagnerian imposture in the question of art which presents an imposture under the theme of high art.

From this, it results that the destiny and function of art are obscured. Or more specifically that the connection between the Philosophical Act and the form of the power of high art should be re-examined precisely in the light of the Wagnerian imposture that is at last uncovered. This is what constitutes the importance of the Case of Wagner. This is the reason why he uses this expression: there is a Case of Wagner, who is at once a symptom and a problem, in the light of which one must review the foundational correlation between art and the Philosophical Act. Moreover, The Case of Wagner is subtitled: a problem for musicians. This should be understood in the sense where it is not simply a problem for musicians, but it is a problem, period. The Case of Wagner is indeed a problem, and reformulates the relationship between art and the Philosophical Act.

This tension or problem may be taken up in the light of two statements of Nietzsche, both seen in the Case of Wagner:

1st statement: *"Wagner summarizes modernity, and nothing else will do; one must begin by being Wagnerian."*

2nd statement: *"Wagner is but one of my sicknesses."*

So on one hand Wagner sums up modernity, and on the other, Wagner is simply one of my sicknesses. As a consequence modernity, as Nietzsche thinks of it here, is itself presented as a sickness. The essence of modernity is in being a sickness of thought. Or even in modernity being where one must fight. One has often seen in Nietzsche a prophet of modernity, but we understand very well that modernity is a significant definiteness here. In a certain sense, what Nietzsche states, is what he wants, a cut where he is the

instigator of a cut with modernity, a healing of modernity, an exit from modernity. One will also say on the proper question of art that modernity is defined as “the general transformation of art in the sense of histrionics”. One can also say that modernity is the impossibility of high art. It is in this sense that the case of Wagner is exemplary: it attests to the form of impossibility of high art. As for high art, consequently, in a contrapositive way, what is it? High art is well a non-histrionic art, i.e. non-theatrical art.

Compared to Nietzsche contra Wagner: “I have for the theater, massive art par excellence, the outrageous contempt that he owes today from the depth of the artist’s heart...”

Modernity is the process of a theatrical dialectization of art. That indicates a related point: for the arch-political act, which must break into two histories of the world, it is essential for it not to be a theatrical act. There is in political revolution something of the order of histrionics. The revolution is about the scene of history in a theatrical posture. Against that, Nietzsche proposes a non-theatrical explosion (explosive in a non-Christian manner). It is necessary to conceive of the break of the world in a form distinct from theatricality. This is what he means by emphasizing the silent character of the true Event: that he must not owe anything to the theater, contrary to the Revolution. He must abolish theatricality, break from it. The arch-political gesture is the gesture through which thought leaves the scene, and it no longer inhabits the site of its power, but it is in departure from the scene, in the silence of its break. In the final Nietzsche, the negative slope of the question of art is that of the departure of the scene, of the putting to death of the submission of art to theatricality or histrionics.

The problem that falls upon us is this: the original matrix of high art is tragedy. It refers to the permanent manner in which Greek tragedy is a matrix or a primary form of high art. But isn't tragedy the founder of theater? This point is essential.

The demand of the rupture with modernity is to finish it in a certain manner with theatricality, but the paradigm of high art is found in Greek tragedy where one can suspect that it is what founded theatricality. How can theater be at once the stigmata of modernity and the matrix of high art? How can it be what forbids high art in the Case of Wagner and what has in other places given a form to the theme of high art?

An apparent contradiction, a great difficulty from this point. This leads us to examine the 1st theses by Nietzsche on tragedy and the tragic in *Birth of Tragedy*. There is an ambiguity of theater: a form through which high art has become impossible, and its primary model. On this question of theater, one has the most powerful continuity in the thought of Nietzsche. This is one of the points where Nietzsche has not varied, despite a specified paradox. The fundamental thesis of *Birth of Tragedy* is the following: tragedy does not succeed theater, and is not theater, and its essence is in exception to all theatricality. The paradox will be raised when theater will be absolved from its ambiguity, theatricality will be what corrupts high art, tragedy remains high art, but at the price of the non-theatricality of tragedy. This point is essential in penetrating the theme of high art. There is a disjunction between tragedy and theater. As long as its thought is tragic, tragedy will not relieve tragedy from its theatrical sense. One can thus state that the arch-political act has a tragic connotation at the same time that one will argue that

it has left the scene, i.e. that there is a subtraction in theatricality. One can even go as far as to say that Greek tragedy is high art, for it is not theater. Theater has been created by Euripedes, and not through high tragics, which are Aeschylus, essentially, and subsequently Sophocles.

Euripedes invents it, and it is the corruption of tragedy, an obliteration of its essence.

To understand that, one must wonder what is tragedy, high art and the tragic being a determination of thought, and the arch-political act.

In an orderly manner:

-Aesthetically, tragedy is the pairing of music and myth. There is tragedy when there is a regulated and rigorous conjunction of music and myth. This is why Nietzsche will voluntarily call tragedy the “musical drama”, an expression that is typically Wagnerian. Nietzsche identifies tragedy as a pairing of music and myth, and it is legible in the expression “musical drama”. What is key (determinant) is the aesthetic of tragedy as a conjunction of music and myth, under the jurisdiction of music as a shelter of the creation of myth. “In tragedy, we possess a tragic myth newly re-emerged from the genius of music.” Myth, as long as it emerges from music: thus pairing myth and music under the jurisdiction of music.

Figurally, in terms of figures (great proper names), tragedy is the pairing of Apollo and Dionysus under the jurisdiction of Dionysus. “The two protective divinities of art, Apollo and Dionysus, suggest to us that in the Greek world there exists a contrast between the origins and ends of the art of sculpture and the art of Dionysus. These two instincts stand side by side,

being mutually awakened to perpetuate this conflict of contraries that recover this name of art, until, finally, they appear united." Art is distributed under 2 names and not one: there are 2 tutelary divinities of artistic power, and in the normal order there is a disjunction. What characterizes tragedy is the conjunction of the two. This is not a dialectic resolution, a unity of contraries, but it is a placing of immanent tension. The principle which is under the name of Dionysus and the one who is under the name of Apollo, in tragedy, are placed in immanent tension, and this tension constitutes tragedy as such. It is a creation of will, what has been willed, and this conjunction is what Nietzsche calls a metaphysical miracle: there is something falling short of what this explanation does not demonstrate again, i.e. miraculous conjunction. The miraculous existence of this miracle is a tragedy as such.

Vitally, from an ontological point of view, i.e. how the invaluable power of life is exercised there. Tragedy is the pairing of dreams and drunkenness. The dream and drunkenness are pre-artistic or trans-artistic qualities, and are qualities of nature herself, of vitality as such. "It has to do with energies of art that stem directly from nature without the intermediary of the human artist." As far as the simultaneity of the dream and drunkenness, tragedy is the conjunction of the energies of art produced by nature. The dream is what delivers appearance as appearance, and it is the form or vision of appearance, and the happy necessity of the image which is known as image, and which is not self-discrediting as an image but on the contrary is serenely produced as image. It is appearance as appearance, not as far as degraded from the false which appears, or subordinated to the



veiling of essence. It is its solar brilliance, its self-sufficiency, appearance resting in itself in the calm of its vision. A “vision contemplated and compromised” that is in the sculpture: it is the dimension of the dream conceived in this way, the self-sufficient glory of the appearance. It is vital energy, conceived not in the form of philosophy of the awareness or appearance that has returned to what it is not, and arises from appearance. It is what is as far as it is, what blooms in the solar glory and its appearance, in an exposed, hidden depth. Sculpture produces in its force the possibility of the solar appearance as self-sufficient; it is the dream such that, given in the work, the sculpture is the work-dream where the dream is invested in its form of work which does not discover anything other than its appearance.

Drunkenness is the manifestation of the artistic energy of nature. Is it the offering of the earth in its creative movement? It is what is not individuated (the dream proposes the individuation of appearance, something that is serenely detached). In drunkenness, the abolition of individuation in the immediate totalization of life (the vital) as such, is earth “offering itself its gifts,” and it is thus the pure movement of the offering of what “there is” (il y a). The dream, in a certain manner, is what is offered, the manner in which the earth produces its gifts in an immanent fashion. Tragedy will be the conjunction of drunkenness and dreams, of dreams invested with drunkenness. Tragedy is what is offered as an offering, in the movement of an offering? It is the moment of miraculous equilibrium, a metaphysical miracle, where the capacity is to deliver what is offered as an offering.

Generally, tragedy is the pairing of sculpture and rhapsody (the dream) on one hand, and the musician (drunkenness) on the other, i.e. from the Apollonian and Dionysian. "The plastic artist and the epic poet close to him plunge into pure contemplation of images and the Dionysian musician, without calling forth images, identified with pain itself...". Tragedy is the contemplation of the image under the rule of absence of any image. The image is under the law of the non-image. There is nothing but the image but as far as the image is offered as the offering, the profound rule of the image (sculpture) is in being under the jurisdiction of what does not use any images (music). What does not use any images = music, and image = sculpture. Tragedy is the moment where in the flux of images, the movement without image passes, or even where image is nothing but the transit of the non-image. One can say that tragedy is this art where the representation is in fact under the law of the irrerepresentable, the mode where what cannot be represented is in transit in the representation. This gives the definition of high art. Let's say this is the myth of gods, the imagery of the gods, but given or transited by musical intensification, traveled, transited, de-imaged in music. High art is the de-imagination of the image. The dream is traveled by intense de-imagination. Nothing in that is theater, and does not invoke, revoke, or convoke it. There is no scene, actor, representation which touches the essence of tragedy. It is not representation except by accident, it is the obliteration of the image in the movement of its own intensity. Theater is a creation by Euripedes in the eyes of Nietzsche, "the criminal Euripedes," and he has sacrificed tragedy, has accomplished his "suicide." He has sacrificed herself to something besides herself, and The Actor of this sacrifice in every sense of the word, was Euripedes.

Who is Euripedes? The trial of Euripedes is an anticipation of the subsequent trial of Wagner. The system of arguments which dispose of Wagner are what identify Euripedes as doing away with high art. Euripedes is a Socratic dislocation of tragedy. Nietzsche calls philosophy the criminal of criminals. Here, Euripedes is a criminal, i.e. he subordinates art to philosophy (such is the essence of his crime). From the point of view of the essence of tragedy, what do Euripedes do?

Aesthetically, it is the criminal birth of theater which is the crossing out or obliteration of tragedy. It pretends to no longer submit myths to music but to discourse. Consequently, and ultimately, it is Euripedes who is homogeneous in the destruction of myth by science. An essential thesis by Nietzsche: science has destroyed myth from Socrates and Plato, and Euripedes is the one who dramatizes this destruction from the proper angle through which he submits allusion to myth or myth itself to discursive logic in place of capturing it in the 'intensification and drunkenness of music'. "Science has destroyed myth and this destruction has expelled poetry from its ideal homeland to turn it henceforth into an exile." An allusion to Plato's banishment of the poet from his ideal city. The essence of exile where Euripedes is the instrument and artist, and this is the destruction of poetry "Euripedes as thinker and non-poet."

***Parenthesis:*** the destruction of myth, the mythical rooting of thought, is constitutive of philosophy. There could not have been philosophy except in the cost of the end of the pregnancy of myth. Philosophy originates at the end of the power of myth, under the condition or regard of the paradigm of science. If Euripedes is the theatricalization of this gesture, he is the tragic

contemporary of philosophy. This is what Nietzsche says: “philosophical thought dominates art and obliges it to cling to the trunk of dialectic.” One can thus say that in effect Euripedes will create theater in the form of an obliteration of tragedy by philosophy. The creation of theater is fallaciously inscribed in tragic genealogy (3rd tragedy), but executes its obliteration in the dominant element of philosophy. Myth is simulated and effaced. What is put into place in this obliteration, is a simulacrum of myth, and effaced, it is no longer there. These grievances are taken up against Wagner, as a result. Nietzsche is aware of this primordial mutual belonging of theater and philosophy. Not tragedy and philosophy, but theater. There is a responsibility of philosophy in the theatricalization of tragedy, i.e. in its end. What this indicates to us is in reality that there is a constitutive element of theatricality in philosophy. Philosophy is co-present in theater, and theater is co-present in philosophy. There is a primordial node between the two. Theater is forgotten from tragedy (the forgetting of Being!). Euripedes is the patron of this obliteration, and this is connected to the proper mode in which philosophy is submitted to art. Theater is exemplarily art which attests to the form of submission of art to philosophy. An interesting point of view on philosophy and theater. A primordial co-belonging. This is aesthetically why Euripedes no longer names tragedy, the pairing of music and myth, but the submission of myth to discourse, and through which that, a passage to a simulated or masked myth under the jurisdiction of philosophy.

Formally, the project of Euripedes is to reverse the relation between Dionysus and Apollo, to place their conjunction under the law of Apollo, and indeed eradicate through this very submission the form of Dionysus, to fully

re-appropriate tragedy to Apollo. "Euripedes' intention is to eliminate its primitive tension from tragedy." Wanting to reverse the coupling in the domination of Apollo, he eliminates the two, and he cannot be Apollonian ...in the sense of the conjunction of the dream and drunkenness, i.e. in the sense where an ontological operation is returned as little as possible. And if The Act is the execution of this novel possibility, it is absolutely central in the Nietzschean device, grasped in a way other than from the genealogical and critical angle, but grasped from the angle of affirmation.

As for Wagner: how has Nietzsche perceived him? He had proposed to recreate myths under the jurisdiction of music. This was his explicit purpose, for his purpose was to create myth under the shelter of music, under the shelter of musical drunkenness. He was immediately perceived by Nietzsche as someone who was the equivalent of what tragedy had been for Greeks. The 1st perception is that of the hero of the arch-political act itself. Or, if you will, Wagner is perceived by Nietzsche at the start as the attestation of the return of high art, but also, according to an old theme that goes back to Holderlin, who attests that Germany will be at the height of Greece. It is Holderlin, for he will provide the Germany people with a form of high art as far as the reconciliation of myth and music, of dreams and drunkenness, and he will be for Germany what Aeschylus and tragedy have been for the Greeks. Wagner is the one who announces Germany as the new Greece, in the categories of Nietzsche.

Compare to *Birth of Tragedy*: "and thus to do justice to the Dionysian gift of a people, myth and music, and given their close kinship, the decline (decadence) of one leading to the decline of the other. In Germany today:

nature is hostile to art and life and Socratic optimism." The situation of Germany is Euripedian: an interruption of the conjunction between founding myth and Dionysian music. "But there are some consoling symptoms... let us keep believing that the German soul... one day she will awaken, kill the dragon...she will destroy the sword of Brunhilda. In tragedy, we possess a tragic myth, and it must make us expect... the worst pain, in the service of treacherous dwarves."

I make 5 emphatic points:

1st point: the determination of the Wagnerian opera as Dionysian myth. It is not characterized as theater. What holds Nietzsche in the Wagnerian resurrection does not concern theatrical representation, but the conjunction of music and myth under the jurisdiction of music, with what myth carries over from the Dionysian.

2nd point: to suppose that there was such an art, that the Dionysian myth is realized, deployed, fulfilled, is the arch-political gesture itself, not its instrument or support. It will re-appropriate Germany to itself, and awaken its sleepy soul. The invaluable depth is abolished, crossed out, and missing, and so long as this high art reappears, it is arch-politics itself.

3rd point: the possible site of arch-politics itself, is Germany. But not universally; this is not breaking into two world histories of the world, but breaking into two histories of Germany.

4th point: Nietzsche does not speak of high art as something that has indeed returned. He declares that there are one or more symptoms. The Dionysian myth is in the order of the consoling symptom. In *Birth of Tragedy*,

Nietzsche does not exactly argue that the musical creation of Wagner fulfills the re-appropriation. He only declares that there is a promise, but finally, high art is once again to come. Wagner is at the edge of possibility, and not at the fulfillment of this possibility.

5th point: Wagner may be punctually identified as the Aeschylus of Germany, but under certain conditions. This is not even the case. It is necessary for him to be helped by Nietzsche, for him to be penetrated by the proper essence of his act. It would be necessary to form a history of their relations: Nietzsche is presented as someone who could have stated his fate (he was about to be the Aeschylus of Germany), and Wagner thought that where he was capable, he had been the standard of this without Nietzsche! Whether high art is actual or promised, it has given rise to quarrels: Nietzsche does not conceive that the return could be made without his support. The return is not repetition, there will not be the same innocence. Wagner cannot pretend to be the return of Aeschylus to Germany. One must in some sense be aware of this return. It is necessary for this return to be captured in the element of the doctrine of the return. If it returns, tragedy will not truly return except in the logic of the power of its return: Wagner needs Nietzsche, for the return of high art demands the philosophy of this return. The return is not accomplished except in the element of the thought of the return; Nietzsche is thought of as someone who thought of the return, and he needed innocence to be named in order to arrive at its return. But Wagner let it be understood that he is sufficient unto himself. In reality Nietzsche shows that there is nothing but a promise, and this is thinking of the essence of the promise which will allow his accomplishment in the return of tragedy.

Therefore the complex question of the return of high art, for it includes Nietzsche not as an artist in the sense of Wagner but as someone who brings the essence of the return as return.

From this rupture, the device collapses. From *Birth of Tragedy* and *Case of Wagner*, it is only an individual rupture, but a collapse of the device of thought.

Here is a run-through of the series of events:

Nietzsche will discover that Wagner's music is not established by myth. It is not a shelter, a dream or myth. It is rather the simulacrum of a myth where its essence is psychological. It could be said like this: music is the dissociation and non-conjunction. Its music is dissociating. The greatness of Wagner is in its detail, for the essence of this music is only the establishment of myth

Nietzsche will discover that Wagner's art is short of a full rupture, and is merely an accomplishment. His greatness is in accomplishing, not in breaking. The essence of music is not in the order of a pause. What one would believe to be healing is an illness, and the illness in its health, in its thriving. Wagner is illness at its height.

Nietzsche will discover that the site of arch-politics cannot be Germany. He substitutes it with the maxim "breaking the history of the world into two." Germany becomes a target.

Recapitulating upon this, Wagner, whom one imagined could have been Aeschylus, is in reality Euripides. Such is the Euripides of modernity. What is at stake is the following: if Wagner is Euripides, there is no



Aeschylus! He was the only person who could perhaps have existed. This is a radical diagnosis on the question of art, and it only makes Wagner a case. Modernity only knows Euripides. Euripides is a model – he states in *Birth of Tragedy* – modernity is Euripides, if modernity is in default of high art, the arch political Event cannot be artistic in nature. The stakes are high: if Wagner is actually Euripides, then there is no arch-political gesture of the artistic or aesthetic type (high art or pure artist would be needed). And so, by an extraordinary reversal, the arch-political act is Nietzsche against Wagner, i.e. against the philosophy of art, in spite of everything. In the complicated terminal device, we have philosophy against the submission of art to philosophy. The idea was art delivered from philosophy, high art delivered from Euripides against art submitted to philosophy, a variant of Christianity. This was suspended in the possibility of high art. But if Wagner is not high art, it will become the orphan philosophy of art or the orphan of high art against art submitted to philosophy. This is where there is a break. This is where under his own name, Nietzsche, and not under the name of Dionysus or high art, but something involved against art submitted to philosophy, in the order of The Act, which is not authorized except by itself, without support or reference from the side of high art. This authorization granted to himself independently of any reference to high art ... politics has arrived where there was no high art, where there was nothing but Wagner. It has come from where Wagner attests to the absence of high art. The rush to madness and excessive nature of the conflict with Wagner is the index from which this madness has come close to filling in the deficiency of high art.

High art is Greek. Although it is named tragedy, it not only has to do with theater, but the opposite of theater, in a sense: all history of the tragedy and its termination are that of its dramatization. Euripides operates the suicide of tragedy with theater. Dramatization is the replacement of the conjunction of drunken dreams with the conjunction of impassioned thought, establishing the jurisdiction of the philosophy of art in the Socratic and Platonic sense.

That was the reminder.

Hence the question of high art as Nietzsche estimated by the possible return at some point, around Wagner, i.e. the possibility of the return of tragedy. What is at stake in this issue of the possible return of high art in a musician is legitimate: in tragedy as non-theatrical art, what counts is music (the conjunction of music and myth). This is the miracle of Greece, and of the Hellenic will: having been able to invest the power of myth through the Dionysian power of music.

Nietzsche is convinced that the return of the high art is the agenda of the day. From *Birth of Tragedy*, Wagner's return is less the sign of the return of high art. Wagner is a symptom and promise, not a realization. The return has not yet taken place: it is from the conjunction between Nietzsche and Wagner that Nietzsche awaits the return itself. If we leave aside Nietzsche's account of the story of the Eternal Return at Sils Maria, the return of high art supports the Eternal Return: high art can make a return. The Actual upon which the Eternal Return is entertained by Nietzsche is precisely this that the tragedy can make a return, and before an ontological principle, a de-temporalizing law of affirmation (it affirms the trans-temporal aspect of time,

it turns time into eternity). The protocol of validating the Eternal Return is the return of high art.

Tragedy can only really return from under the thought of Eternal Return. The return of tragedy is only the return if it is stated and thought of as the Eternal Return: it is left to Nietzsche to say if Wagner is proof of the return of tragedy. The return will also be the return in the element of thought of the return, and it is this which will make the affirmative fully, not in a reactive form of its repetition. We can say that basically, there is a proposal to Wagner by Nietzsche, not only an enthusiasm for Wagner by Nietzsche. The proposition by Nietzsche is that through Wagner, but also through Nietzsche, tragedy makes an affirmative return, i.e. a return which is the effectiveness of itself at the same time. This is why he became interested in the origin of tragedy.

### **New Course Three- Apollo & Dionysus [Drunkenness and the Dream]**

What we pointed out in *Birth of Tragedy*, is that Nietzsche offers both a genealogy and a definition of high art, i.e. art such that it is used to measure all true art, i.e. all art capable of establishing a new form of sovereignty.

I briefly recall that high art, and also the artist, the artist as a true type, the artist as a type of truth, the artist as a type of will to power; of high art, is defined as a point of conjunction. This is in my opinion the point that we must remember. This conjunction can be stated many ways:

- A conjunction of Dionysus and Apollo
- A conjunction of music and myth
- Perhaps, more essentially, a conjunction of drunkenness and dreams

And all this means that ultimately in art, in high art and in formal individuation, i.e. the pure principle of the appearance, is at the same time the donation of inevaluable life, or, even that the distinction of the glory of appearance as such is completely invested by the indistinct totality (sum) of inevaluable life, under the successive names of Apollo, Dionysus, myth and music, or drunkenness and dreams. We can also say that art is inevaluable life presented in the pure multiplicity of appearance.

At last, another crucial point: the recognizable localization of high art is Greek. High art, thought of in such a way, is immediately and above all else high Greek art, and we had insisted on this as well as high Greek art being called tragedy. Not only does this not have to do with theater, but it has to do in another sense with the opposite of theater. As for Nietzsche, as we have pointed out, the entire history of tragedy and its cessation, its interruption, is in a certain sense the history of its theatricalization. With Euripides, the theatricalization of tragedy is accomplished. Tragedy with Euripides commits suicide, and the crossing out of tragedy or the catastrophe of tragedy as high art is one and the same as its theatricalization. I recall that theatricalization is the replacement of the conjunction of drunkenness and dreams with the conjunction of passion and thought. Theater itself is the specific effect of a fully different combination, which in a sense is nothing but the degraded imitation of the 1st, which substitutes passion with drunkenness, and thought with the dream, also establishing from this point of view the ultimate jurisdiction of philosophy on art, of philosophy in its Socratic and Platonic sense.

This is where the question of high art as such is presented such that Nietzsche has at a given point, at some given point, estimated the possible return. We can say that what has been entertained around Wagner is precisely the issue of the possible return of high art conceived and defined in such a way, i.e. also, if you will, the possibility of the return of the tragedy. I recall that the challenge of the question of this possible return is false to propose a musician is legitimate precisely because in tragedy, what Nietzsche identifies is the primacy of music is the tragedy as a non-theatrical art, the theater is only the degraded simulacrum, and tragedy is the combination of music and myth in power or in the shelter of the music. It is the myth of the rhapsody inhabited and supported by the Dionysian genius of the musician. This is exactly what Nietzsche calls the Greek miracle, the miracle of Hellenistic will. This miracle has to do with having been able to invest the force of the myth with the Dionysian shelter of music. That this question of return is entertained around music in general, and Wagner, is not particularly surprising. And even after 20, Nietzsche believes that the return of high art is the order of the day, and that in a certain sense that Wagner is the sign of that return.

It is clear from *Birth of Tragedy* that for Nietzsche, Wagner is rather the sign of this return, than the return himself. If you look closely at even the most pro-Wagnerian texts of 1st Nietzsche, you can see that what is valid in Wagner is still in the scheme of the symptom and the promise, and not really the scheme of the execution, or realization. So the return has not yet taken place absolutely. It is in a sense from the collaboration between Nietzsche and Wagner, that Nietzsche expects The Actual accomplishment. I have told

you why: it is because it would be a return under the sign. In fact I am deeply convinced that if left the Nietzschean narrative on the side of a stunningly and revealing shot of Sils Maria the doctrine of Eternal Return, and we didn't need to take it all that seriously, I am convinced that the prospect of return of high art is what deeply supports the doctrine of Eternal Return. Ultimately, the essential proof of what there is, is that high art can make a return. I would say that the real upon which for a time Nietzsche entertains the question of the Eternal Return is precisely this, that tragedy can make a return. And before being a principle I may say ontologically, a detemporalizing law of affirmation (the return is that: the affirmation as it can never become, it is not carrying a temporal decomposition), it affirms in a sense the trans-temporal, it is this which turns time toward eternity (or the name Eternal Return). But in a certain sense, from the point of view of the situation, of the situation of thought and of schemes of will to power, the true protocol of validation of the Eternal Return is the possibility of the return of high art. There is being surprised when philosophical will is compared to Nietzsche as the artistic will. The Eternal Return is presented, or attested to where it is first of all proved as a return of the greatness of art, which has its essential stigmata in high Greek art. This is not surprising. Thus when I say that it is in the coupling of Nietzsche/Wagner that Nietzsche in fact sees the true condition of the return of high art, this means that tragedy cannot really return except under the thought of the Eternal Return. i.e. the return of tragedy is not fully a return, except as far as this return is thought and stated as the form of the Eternal Return.

That is why it is Nietzsche's responsibility to state in fact if Wagner is indeed evidence of the return of tragedy. We can say that this is intrinsic: the return will also be the return in the element of the return, of the thought of return, and that's what somehow makes it fully affirmative, not blind, and not pulled toward reactive or passive forms of its repetition, but fully affirmative as taken up and revealed in the sentiment of thought of its own role. One could say that at bottom (and this is gradually clarified by Nietzsche himself), there is a proposition from Nietzsche to Wagner, and it is not only the enthusiasm of young Nietzsche for the great patriarch, it is not simply the discovery of a father, for it then requires murder and assassination. There is a proposition. If Nietzsche is in the figure of sons, it is in the figure of a singular son that makes a proposition to the father concerning his fate. And his proposition is that by Wagner but also by Nietzsche, tragedy makes an affirmative return, i.e. a return that is at the same time the achievement of itself. That is why through and from the meeting with Wagner, it required Nietzsche to question the origin of tragedy, i.e. Wagner himself in the element of the return. For *Birth of Tragedy* is not actually dedicated to Wagner. It originates in Wagner as a possibility of the return, but what it addresses is the origin. What is opened up, is the return to the origin. *Birth of Tragedy* is oriented and thought of as the possibility of its return. So *Birth of Tragedy* already disposes of Wagner and in a sense disposes of Wagner, a possible figure of someone who returns, and this proposition (the subjective element of things), I have suggested that Wagner had in a sense pushed it away. In other senses, we will come back to it, this is a complex debate, but in a sense it is not the Wagner who is punishable. After all, perhaps it is actually he who ... [indistinct].



But the fact is that we can say that the origin of this drama that finished by making of Wagner a meaning that is at once impractical and haunting, is that Wagner did not know too much what to do in his own element, the artistic element of the proposition of Nietzsche having to think in the element of the return of tragedy.

At this point, the details of this proposition are clear. What was the device of thought from the interior of this proposition that was made to Wagner? There were 4 main points:

One could identify as a generic figure of tragedy, in the Eventality of its return what Nietzsche calls the Dionysian song, i.e. in a certain sense a new music, since it is always in the shelter of music that its conjunction to myth should occur.

The fact that such an art, if it exists, if it comes into existence, will be arch-politics itself, i.e. an overall process of re-identification. Such art is absolutely re-identifying, i.e. it brings the return of the identity of what is lost, as a return of the origin.

That the site is no longer Greece but would be Germany. Proof at the end of Master Singers of Nuremberg, the great hymn to statist German art, but it is in Nietzsche's terms the return of tragedy at the site of Germany. In a certain way this makes Germany the return of Greece. Germany is in itself whereby Greece returns. The real Greece, that of Aeschylus and Sophocles, that of Euripides and not of Socrates.

I have gathered this into a formula: in such a regard, Wagner, succeeded in Nietzsche's propositions, but in fact is not quite yet the Aeschylus of Germany.

From here on, a number of things occur: constitutively Wagner does not endorse Nietzsche's proposition. Nonetheless, he defends it with loyalty. For the record, the philologists (Germany is perhaps high art, but first and foremost it is the University!) fall on Nietzsche with folded arms and say that Nietzsche's book does not even for a second pull its weight before historical and scientific investigation. Moellendorf, a young burgeoning philologist, stretches out below this. And Wagner had obviously believed with Nietzsche in forming an alliance with the University. That interested Wagner. Nietzsche's proposition was complicated. But the idea that the university in the person of one of his bright young representatives endorsed Wagnerian art, interested him. Wagner was at once in the process of singular canonization with the support of the King of Bavaria and the court, and the support of European intellectuals, and that of consistent, solid, and immemorial Germany that took it quite strongly (fort mal). And Wagner had hoped for an alliance, a pact, an armistice with what might precisely be called philological Germany. This was another conjunction, a combination of music and philology. And he realizes that Nietzsche is actually not at all representative of the German university! From the moment when the high philologists begin saying that this is a crackpot, a fuss over nothing, everything is subjective in it. Wagner realizes that if he believes that through Nietzsche he makes an alliance with the other Germany which is not that of the romanticism of high art, but of the positivism of philological science,

academic and established, well there is something that makes it even more obscure to him what Nietzsche wants. What does he want, this Nietzsche?

The question intensifies. However, he defends it loyally, intervenes in the press to support him in his own name, Wagner, in the quality Nietzsche wrote in *Birth of Tragedy*. And then let's add to it the question: it is what Nietzsche wants me that Nietzsche certainly plays to the fact that we can answer: what this Nietzsche wants is my wife! The situation, as we have discussed, is triangular: we must not forget Cosima in this case. Cosima, whom we have seen in the letters of madness, Nietzsche called Ariadne, which is not nothing when one considers him as Dionysus. He said, "Ariadne my love": there is something declarative there. And then there are texts where Nietzsche is the seduction of Cosima through Wagner the enchanter, one of the main complaints against Wagner. In the eyes of Wagner, the question that he wants me is murky, complex. A question he did not use and that Nietzsche will make increasingly venomous. If we use terms that are descriptively rather Lacanian: from a certain moment, Nietzsche was anxious about Wagner, in the proper form that relates anguish to the question of does he want me?

Does he want me to give him my wife

Does he want me to give him a share of my glory

Does he want me to give him what is able to state that tragedy has returned?

Does he want me to give him my own name, and our names are combined?

I think there has been a fear of what Wagner to which Nietzsche has in a way responded with increasing aggression, i.e. the coupling of anxiety and aggression. It's a complex form, and the central point is the system of questions. The question has remained suspended rather as a threatening issue than as a question which ordered his answer. But all this, we can follow it to the track, and there is a huge body of literature trying to distribute the wrongs in the case, has Wagner unduly repelled or discouraged Nietzsche, due to vainglory, because he wanted a young man to sing hymns to his glory, or did Nietzsche attempt to parasitize off Wagner's glory, etc ... This is not of great importance except that it must be added that Nietzsche did not have a manner of dazzling elegance. I assume what I have called Nietzsche's interior holiness because the proper mode in which he is exposed is pretty radical. But ultimately it was not always very elegant in this case. It has a side like that where we no longer measure the presence and absence of simple criteria.

For example, an anecdote, but it is a symbol: he knew, relevantly, that Wagner hated Brahms, for the wrong reasons, and one day he considered it a feat, obtaining Brahms's final score, and placing it on Wagner's piano! It is the last gift, a poisoned gift. It is not to be blamed. Everything is significant: when in a sense Nietzsche, who did not like Brahms either (it was not propaganda) does that, it means the protocol by which he begins to engage in challenging Wagner. i.e. the ability of Wagner to be the representative of the return of high art. We could talk for a long time about this. But I say, finally to summarize these complex ingredients, of this triangle between Ariadne, Dionysus, and Theseus, which are actually Cosima, Nietzsche, and

Wagner makes this a trio, a trio of maximum symbolism, in truth the philosophical device, Nietzsche's device of thought that has collapsed.

I think from that point of view that we must absolutely support there being a first time in Nietzsche before madness, which is not given in terms of psychic collapse, even if there are constant troubles, lurking illness. It is a collapse, the collapse of a first device of thought. A collapse that will give a particular color to the terminal sequence of Nietzsche, a color that I would call the color of catching left to disaster. This is present in final Nietzsche, a kind of precipitation that is not only precipitation to the final crucifixion, i.e. the final abolition under the proper name Nietzsche, a self-sufficient name, but which is merely that a first control controls the necessity of all review, of all re-taking, as if a first systematization or first generic vision is challenged to the point where all elements that they dominated (and where it was making the elements of thought circulate) should be returned or re-articulated. Caught in disaster, because the first device of thought has collapsed. This is prior to 1889.

So it's true that there is a second Nietzsche. I think it is a second Nietzsche, in a sense that is not the traditional periodization of the work of a great thinker: of three successive Plato, of three Nietzsches, etc. ... I think there are two Nietzsches in a more essential sense: a second Nietzsche tries to make up for thought, with a 1st device of thought, in dramatic conditions. A collapse which again refers to the first fault, i.e. it is not taken or absolutely submitted. There is a path but there is a given moment where none of it functions any longer. I think that there is at the heart of this collapse, the theme of high art, and it is this theme that will collapse and

somehow break in two non-histories of the world, but the history of Nietzsche's thought. 1st break in 2.

I told you how I believe the 4 points are given in the Nietzschean device, I repeat:

Wagner's music is in no way immune to a genuine mythical creation, but on the contrary the ornament of a decadent psychology. Or even, Wagner's music is dissociative. This is a separation and not a conjunction in the form of high art between dreams and drunkenness. Or even that its greatness is small. There is greatness, but it is the greatness of the small.

Nietzsche will think that Wagnerian art is beyond any rupture, i.e. it is not a return, but an accomplishment. There is no return of the tragedy, the return of high art, but there is an accomplishment of nihilism, i.e. it does not start but finishes. Still this fundamental problem of those who dream of a break in 2 which is the typically indistinguishable character between what ends and what begins. There is a very fine scale. There Nietzsche comes to think that what he took for a beginning, or at least as a promise of the beginning, was actually a completion, was really the accomplishment of nihilism.

Nietzsche comes to think that in any case the location of high art cannot be Germany. He will enter a sequence of unleashed Germanophobia. Germany is the name of the obstacle of the return of tragedy. All this is controlled by the fact that Wagner the Euripides of Europe, furthest from being the Aeschylus of Germany. It is the Euripides of Wagnerians, too. The Euripides of European women. Hysterical, says Nietzsche, who knows.

Each of these points will be suggested by final Nietzsche, the one who keeps me more than the first. I would like to address each of these points:

*Point 1: The fact that Wagner's music does not establish myth, but is correlated with a decadent psychology.*

Let's take a little look at the Case of Wagner: it is a program rather than a case. Where we had the return of tragedy we have a case. A case of nihilism, precisely. I give you this point (precisely on the Wagnerian will to establish myth in the shelter of musical creation). "But you will say, the content of Wagnerian texts, their mythical content, their eternal content. Question: how do we analyze their contents? The chemist responds by transposing Wagner in modern real life. Let's be even crueler with the bourgeoisie view. What happens then to Wagner? Between us, I made this exposition. Nothing is more entertaining, more recommended for the walk, than to tell of the works of Wagner rejuvenated. For instance, Parsifal, a theology student after a good secondary school education, needed to explain his pure silliness or surprise after surprise. I believe I have told you that all the heroes, without exception ... stripped of their heroic finery, similarly, or uncannily like Madame Bovary. Conversely, he would have had Flaubert transpose his heroine in Scandinavian or Carthaginian style and after mythologized, to offer to Wagner in the form of a libretto opera. Yes it seems roughly that Wagner was never interested in other problems than those that interest small Parisian decadents. Wagner, always 2 steps from ...".

Just a point on this text: Nietzsche's thesis (between us, it must be said that the exercise is tempting, in Tristan and Isolde, it is this high monologue of cuckold). But what thesis is at stake? The thesis at stake is the following: it

is the creation of a myth, in the sense of *Birth of Tragedy*, tragedy is never a form of sublimation. This is not the sublimation of concrete available data. It is an irreducible process that is to itself its own appearance. The greatness of myth is innocent, it is native, it is given as appearance in appearance, it does not return to the magnification of whatever it is. Or if you want, what makes highness in general, in this case of the greatness of myth, is what is by no means an enlargement or expansion. There is in true myth something that makes it what it is, and its form of propagation or teaching is in the derivation of this being. Wagner is not a creator of myth in this sense because according to Nietzsche, one sees perfectly that it has to do in reality with expansion. I.e. there is a transposition or sublimation of elementary data of bourgeois life in the 19th century. What is going to be tested and tested against, i.e. one can chemically dissolve the Wagnerian myth and find the elementary bourgeois nucleus that there is within it. And inversely we can imagine how unlike an elementary bourgeois core, subjected to a treatment of enlargement, could be depicted as Wagnerian myth. We have already seen the dawn of this idea that perhaps there is not simply a modern myth, i.e. one thing is the trial of Wagner, to finally know it is Madame Bovary disguised as a Scandinavian, in Scandinavian tinsel. And thus not at all what makes the strength and uniqueness of the myth, which is to be in the naiveté of his being or his proposition, but in the background there is the fact that the modern is characterized by this mythical incapability. Perhaps all mythical creation ultimately falls under the symptom that is always this form of expansion.

So, still on this point, we touch upon the question of the diagnosis of modernity. "Let's repeat: Wagner is not admirable, is not likable except in



tiny finds, in the invention of details. It is perfectly justified to proclaim it as a mastery of the first order, our highest miniaturist who in the confined space fully concentrates on a sense of infinity and sweetness." Just now, we treated the question of myth in its relation with sublimation exaggerated in bourgeois reality, therefore as false myth, like a simulacrum of myth. There is something else. The problem is that of high form. High art is also and always a high shape. What is meant by high form? High form means some evidence of the totality. Why? Because the authority of the Dionysian principle on the Apollonian principle or the authority of drunkenness on the dream (which is the principle of high art), is what gives glorious appearance to... as such, the inevaluable life, to what builds. And so high art pairs with a form that is entirely in evidence itself. What Nietzsche will say is: that finally in high shape Wagner is worthless, high form belongs to the genre of Victor Hugo, i.e. large contrasting blocks, super-heavy effects, massive contradictions that excite the viewer and whose finesse has no obviousness. Such features describe special effects. So there is no more myth in Wagner, and there is no retaining of high form. It is cobbled, cooked, it has no formal authenticity, it is not a self-sufficient musical or artistic appearance. On the contrary, Wagner is excellent with detail, he is a master of inflection, the tiny, something that can captivate and intoxicate with a sudden inflection of musical detail. This is someone whose artistic unity is not at all high form, which is part of the effect, but in careful inflection, in the register of detail. The highest miniaturist of music, this man who is present as... establishing a huge opera to give shelter to the resurrection of myth, is actually the highest miniaturist in musical history. Someone who fits an infinity of meaning and sweetness in a cramped space. For Nietzsche, infinity is local in Wagner,

infinity is given as a point and not as a power of the totality, but as a fleeting thing.

As I have said before, I believe this corresponds to the most contemporary analysis of Wagner. This is exactly what is thought by Boulez, for example. The analysis of Wagner's musical genius by Boulez is precisely the extraordinarily flexible and virtuoso management at the microcellular level, where Wagner happens to draw an extraordinary advantage in the variability, tone, color, and inflection. We see something extraordinarily acute in Nietzsche's intuition. Only in the background is there also, as earlier, the question of: with modern art, would we not become incapable of high form. This will work against Wagner due to the Nietzschean disappointment with Wagner. We thought that with the return of Wagner with regard to high art, but it's ultimately modern art. And modern art is for Nietzsche incapable of myth, and perhaps also (this is the - that Nietzsche tries to both formulate and keep, since it is painful) that modern art is incapable of high form, and perhaps it is the essence of modern art to not have power except for in the tiny. Nietzsche will also say that Wagner is "the best connoisseur of tiny infinity." And symmetrical to this, that "Wagner practices counterfeit in the imitation of ..."

Nietzsche's thesis is that in Wagner, high form is an imposture. But on the contrary, it's not all an imposture. In terms of tiny infinity it is the best connoisseur. But perhaps modernity is indeed helpless in artistic matters under high form. This is the thesis of genius in detail. Perhaps it's true that "what nowadays can be done well, masterfully done is, and is exclusively, all that is small." Small is beautiful! This is the maxim that Nietzsche already

stated as the maxim of modernity. Note the "exclusively", and this is a general statement. Note that the statement doesn't only apply to Wagner. What is from our days, is exclusively what is small. You see that this small theme is opposed to the theme of high art.

At last Nietzsche comes to support the thesis that what characterizes modern art is the genius of smallness. One can use a formula to which Nietzsche is near: modern art is the biggest small art. It has a greatness, but its greatness is the greatness of the small. This first point is the opposite of the identification of modernity as a resource of high art or return of tragedy. Tragedy is absolutely what cannot be produced today. High art cannot be produced today. There is no return of tragedy. That's Nietzsche's finding. This finding goes through Wagner and goes beyond it: our time is not that of the return of tragedy, of the return of high art. I contend that this resulted in a crisis in the theme of Eternal Return. At the end of 1886, it has often been remarked, the theme of Eternal Return fades and almost disappears. One can really ask whether the constituent, revealed, Zarathustran problematic of the Eternal Return really still belongs to the late Nietzsche, to final Nietzsche. I think that it is seriously put in crisis by the finding that in any case our time is not that of the return of the high art, for the reasons I mentioned. Namely, the perspective of the return of high art was what sustained and vitalized the perspective of the Eternal Return. Thus in a sense we can say that for final Nietzsche, who remains the standard, i.e. the ability to fully affirm the inevaluable, the affirmative noon, separated to some part from the issue of the Eternal Return. And this separation is induced by the fact that Wagner is unable to function as the icon of high art but suddenly the very issue of the

return of high art is abandoned. So the pattern of return is not what drives *The Act*, and is no longer what commands The Act. This is very important. In the first vision, that we can call Nietzschean-Wagnerian (Nietzsche believes that Wagner is), the prospect of The Act is underpinned by the Return. The Act, the effectivity of The Act is in some sense the return of tragedy, or the foundation of new myths that Hegel would have called the return of the gods. We are still in the political return of the gods, in Nietzschean-Wagnerism. The Greek gods will return, in the figure of the tragic power of the shelter given by the music to new myths. But if that's not it, in reality the perspective of The Act is no longer supported by the logic of return, and I think that the final logic of Nietzsche is to abandon the perspective of Eternal Return in favor of another thing, i.e. the maxim of breaking in 2 world histories, but history without the shelter that this break makes a return, or is in the paradigm of the return. This is because eventually the law of modern art is miniature and not greatness, or where greatness has its place in smallness. This is what we can draw from this point. The main thing is that in my opinion the entrapment in the disaster of terminal Nietzsche would catch centrally on the relation between act and return, The Act and return of the origin. The Act could be thought without the shelter of the return of the origin, and once again the induction of that would be that tragedy does not return. Besides this incidentally explains why it is so important to constantly talk about Wagner. We can take it as an obsessive symptom, Nietzsche is truly obsessed with Wagner from 1887-88. In 88: The Case of Wagner, Nietzsche against Wagner, *Ecce Homo*, and he returns there constantly. Wagner occupies and obsesses Nietzsche's thought. But if we assume what is at stake (I recall that Wagner died in 83, 5 years previously, so this is not a

polemic vindication, Wagner does not respond, Wagner can no longer decide on the proposal of Nietzsche, which he has rejected). What is at stake in Wagner is that The Act needs to make a return. This is the key issue, the central issue. He makes all the land take witness to this point, because ultimately all those who are Wagnerian, the public of Wagnerians, are those who perpetuate the illusion of the return of the tragedy, those who share in the theme the return of the tragedy. We must show them that it's not that, that it is a necessary propaedeutic to an act which cannot avail itself of this return. It is thus necessary to destroy the Wagnerian camp that was uncovered so that it is exposed that the condition of The Act is not in the aesthetic form of the return of the tragedy.

I will merely sketch out this point. We can also say that what is at stake here is the break with the aesthetic vision of The Act or even with arch-politics as aesthetics. It will be argued that consequently it is also if I may say an anticipated break with the general system of ideological foundations, from Nazism, i.e. politics as German aesthetics. If there is a theme where Nietzsche rids himself of violence, precipitation, and almost anguish, it is the idea that The Act could be in the form of Germany as a new Greece, i.e. in the form of aestheticization of arch-politics. But we see that the means are almost default, the reorganization of all of this is quite difficult, that this precipitation, this collapse, this collapse of availability, this sincerity as well, clearly precipitated Nietzsche toward his own disaster.

Point 2: Wagnerian art is not a break or foundation, but the accomplishment of nihilism. The texts are innumerable. I take a text from the Epilogue of Case of Wagner. This means that Wagner is an imposture, in the precise sense of

Euripedes being presented as Aeschylus. It is The Actor of Euripedes, playing the role of Aeschylus. Here again Nietzsche will generalize: "but the imposture as that of Beirut has nothing exceptional nowadays. We all know the eminent notions of the Christian squire. This unconsciousness in the contradiction of terms, this good conscience in lies is modern par excellence. It is almost enough to define modernity. Modern man embodies a contradiction of values, sitting between two chairs. He says yes and no in one breath. Is it any wonder that it is precisely today that falsity will be made flesh and even genius, that Wagner was stirred among us. It's not without reason that I have called Wagner the Cagliostro of modernity. But we all have 2 in our veins without our knowledge and despite our ambitions, values, vocabulary, forms and formulas, standards and morals of diverse and opposing origin, and biologically speaking, we are false. To make a diagnosis of modern art, where should we start? Resolved by a stroke of the knife in this irreconcilable opposition of instincts, by exposure of their conflict of values, by vivisection undertaking on the most revealing clinical case, the *Case of Wagner* for the philosopher is more a kind of event. This is a real bargain. These pages are dictated by the recognition."

It is the recognition, the ultimate debt of Nietzsche to Wagner: Wagner is the exemplary clinical case of modernity. For the essence of modernity is imposture, the imposture of Bayreuth, is only theater or the theatrical form. What is this impostor? What is his essence? It's complicated, the essence of modern imposture, but it has two possible descriptions.

The first, elementary and already given, is that modern imposture is presented as the greatness of smallness itself, i.e. to present the genius of

smallness as a form of the return of greatness. This is analyzed constantly in Wagner's music.

But there is a second thesis: what is smallness? What is small? The high form of original tragedy is the simplicity of appearance. And thus the small is the duplicity of the real from the smallness is a constitutive duplicity, the inability of the simple, simple as far as it is the donation from the land of its gifts (as says young Nietzsche), the simple donation by the land of its gifts, simple affirmation (I recalled that in the third metamorphosis, the child is the emblem of greatness, and simple affirmation). Artistic greatness is the simple affirmation, as well. And artistic modernity is incapable of simple affirmation. It establishes art in duplicitous flexibility. Modern art is compelled to trickery, it's a duplicitous art. And this is its essence. Basically, Wagner is the most cunning of the cunning, he remains iconic, Cagliostro, the old magician, and as far as he is the most cunning of the cunning, he is the exemplary clinical case who reveals the fundamental trick of modern art which is this time to present duplicity as simplicity. This is a specific function of art. Modern art, the art of modernity, whose extreme trick is to disguise its constituent duplicity in simplicity, in the appearance of simplicity. Obviously this brings about the very symptom of nihilism, i.e. the inability of affirmation. Or even the developer of modernity as the reign of the false.

*Point 3: The Site of Arch-Politics cannot be Germany.*

Nietzsche's diatribes against Germany abound. The Case of Wagner: "no taste, no voice, no talent, the Wagnerian stage requires only one thing, the Teuton, i.e. obedience and good legs. It is deeply significant that the advent of Wagner coincided with that of the Reich, and these two facts show the

same thing, never was it so well obeyed, never so well commanded. The heads of the Wagnerian orchestra are in particular worthy of an era that posterity will call with fearful respect, the classical age of war".

Again in a few words, Wagner is thought of strictly as the contemporary of Bismarck, i.e. the figure of obedience, the German figure of obedience. I.e. the moment where art cannot even be presented in the innocence of a form of sovereignty. It is not even sovereignty in the sense of will to power, a simple sovereignty. It induces obedience and submission. It is a specious art, and ultimately, a captive art. German art is what is captured by Germany (in the historico-statist sense). This slope (tendency) had been addressed a little.

There is in Wagnerian art, and finally in the art of modernity, in addition to its incapacity with regard to myth, and high form, its duplicitous constituent character, there is a deeply static element. Nietzsche diagnoses this point, i.e. it is an art which is in a certain sense nationalized in its being, i.e. an art that is itself part of a dialectic of commandment and obedience. So, we have done a development on Nietzsche and dance: one can say that it is an art that has stopped dancing, an art that is at odds with something whose nature is not the dialectic of command and obedience. This German art, this statist German art does not represent any form of the return of the tragedy, nor a form of emancipation. It is an art that ultimately enslaves or bewitches at the profit of the form of the Reich, not an art that liberates or emancipates. But suddenly it is the same in Germany. In the first time it is presented as the very site of the return of tragedy. And here it becomes the essential obstacle in this return. In other words, if you want, Germany cannot be a site for



thought. This is certainly a big rupture in Nietzsche, difficult, painful and violent at the same time. Symptomatic of its very violence. We read many commentaries where Nietzsche's diatribes against Germany are taken into account from madness, considered aberrant, and in the order of unleashed and monstrous insult. As for myself, I think there is a deeper reason for the anti-German fury of Nietzsche, which is at once conflicting, contradictory.

The first reason is the same as that which had affected the imposture: it is necessary to destroy the theory of Germany as the privileged site of the return of tragedy. It was necessary to denounce Germany publically, not Germany in itself, or Germans as an empirical reality. We must denounce the false myth of Germany. For it is in the obstruction of The Act, henceforth. Anyone who thinks that Germany is a new Greece, or that Germany is identifiable as the very form in which The Act is prepared, is an obstruction to the possibility of The Act in its new definition, which is not just the return of tragedy in Germany. And so it is really necessary as well, a vindication, a necessary violence, required publicly and across Europe (where French is identified, as well as Italy ...). All this becomes quite important for Nietzsche. It is necessary for Germany to be ruined in its mythical pretension. This is ambiguous because Nietzsche shared this belief, quite simply, this German myth. He is even its co-author. It is an intimate renunciation, a break with itself, it is for this reason that it is so vehement, but at the same time logical. It takes an intense intellectual propaganda to ruin it, to deride German self-sufficiency as a pretense of being the site of the new Greece. This was important. We have seen what this myth was capable of doing.

The rushed determination that is also paroxysmal and desperate in Nietzsche's sense, to make Germany appear before the tribunal of his gross sufficiency and to denounce it as an obstacle of a living conception of arch-politics, was, I believe, finally focused, something which was ultimately relevant, and that Nietzsche had to rescue him from himself is a great intensity but once again, an exceptional honesty. What Nietzsche says: it is I who am German, and I say the impossibility that there is in being that. He invented himself a Polish biography, disgusted of being German. Regardless, it's iconic. More iconic than him in some sense, Germany more than anyone. Coauthor of Germany of the return of gods, of Germany as the privileged arch-political site, he has torn Germany from himself and has become Nietzsche. The advent of the proper name Nietzsche as the naming of the arch-political act has been, if I might say, made from its being yanked from Germany. That his name is not German. It was German, of course.

Through Nietzsche, an extraordinary form of breakout from Germany to itself. This is a vital point. It is necessary that Germany extirpates itself, and a Germany extirpated of itself is for Nietzsche a Germany that is disposed of in a certain improbable correlation to France and Italy. All the last texts by Nietzsche lurking around the development of this improbable form which would be Germany outside Germany (like him, in Turin) which would be connoted at the same time in an Italian and French way. This is the Nietzschean idea of Europe, Nietzsche is a prophet of Europe, thus conceived as a phenomenon of thought, where Europe is eventually constituted from Italy, from France and from Germany extirpated of itself. This is the European configuration for Nietzsche.

Point 4: Wagner is theater.

We return to the question of theater. I remind you that if we say that Wagner is not Euripides and not Aeschylus, we will finally say that Wagner is the one who has submitted art to theater, specifically submitted music to theater. Instead of the return of tragedy, he simply continued theater. On Wagnerian theatricality, its determining character, the mode in which it begins and ruins the high musical form, this is a characteristic passage on theatricality, on the question of the effect "of what it is necessary above all for Wagner to carry in roughly the same judgment as all men of theater today: a series of strong scenes, each more powerful than each other, and in the intervals a lot of clever silliness. He seeks above all to ensure the effect of his work, beginning with the third act. He proves to himself the value of his work by its final effect. Driven by such a sense of theater, we do not run the risk of writing a real tragedy unintentionally. Drama requires a rigorous logic, and Wagner has never bothered with logic, and this is not the public of Cornelius he had in reconciling, but it was only that of the Germans"

So on this text:

1. The essential point perhaps is that Nietzsche continues to oppose theater to drama. A decisive sentence: "Driven by such a sense of theater, one does not find the risk of writing a true drama without intending to." A real drama unintentionally, what is it? Real tragedy is the same as tragedy. Writing a real tragedy without intending to would be precisely in the element of return and innocence. In truth, a real drama could not be written without willing, because what we want in the sense of calculation always has to do with theater. Tragedy is not desired, for it is in some sense an artistic

demonstration of the appearance. It is not required in the strict sense, i.e. an object of a calculation of the effect. True involuntary drama is what produces the conjunction of dreams and intoxication regardless of the will of an effect. True art is an art that is indifferent to its effect. We could give a very general definition of theater (not just scenes or actors, etc ...): it is all art that wills its effect. It is a form of the will, like everything else. Theater is art that wills its effect, and Wagner in this sense is first and foremost a playwright including in music. It supports and considers its effect. And so it's very interesting that when one wills the effect, one cannot submit art to what I call a rigorous logic. And so it is a paradoxical but significant rigorous logic of art that arises only when one stops willing its effect. This is a typical Nietzschean maxim. The rigorous logic only arises when one ceases willing the effect, calculating its effect, being attentive to its effect. In a sense, perhaps it would be a definition of art, the logic of art, and its rigor is essentially involuntary, for any artistic intent can only be a will to the effect of art. And while we're in the calculation of the effect, there is no rigor or artistic logic.

And then of course, the last point is that the effect is also a representation of the public. Willing the effect, is to wish to reconcile the public. The ultimate development would be the following problem: if Nietzsche had formalized that, there would have been, in reality, three periods of art. This is a periodization of another order:

One could say that there is an epoch of high Greek art, and perhaps Nietzsche would return to the definition that he gives of it. But let's stay there for a moment: tragedy, the conjunction of dreams and drunkenness, Dionysus and Apollo. This identifies Greek art.

There would be Wagner: an exemplary clinical case of modernity.

Wagner is the theater, but the theater began with Euripides. The theater is folded into a distant modernity, it is theater as far as the calculation of its effect, which in a sense will divide theater in 2. What Nietzsche says, basically, is this: is the theater ultimately what the public is worth (not as high art, which is self-sufficient, the public does not come into play, and it is not calculating the effect but arising from its own appearance), since theater, going from Euripides, is built on the calculation of the effect. It is thought of as this, and not drunkenness. But it reconciles the public. The calculation of the effect is more or less sordid according to what the public is, more or less. Nietzsche will identify classic art (not in the Greek sense) as the art of the epoch of a public inquiring about the very nature of the effect (the public of Cornelius). This is theater, and it is not the return, tragedy comes from theater, but theater such that the audience is involved in its determination, giving it a strong measure. So it is true that it has to do with art that reconciles the public, and when the public is difficult to reconcile, it is a valuable art. It will gradually become an essential reference for Nietzsche, than this reference to French classicism. There would eventually be three paradigms:

- Greek art, if indeed we still support the proposition
- Classical art whose paradigm is French
- Modern art, whose paradigm remains Wagnerian.

What will happen is visible and quite strange, and it is the following. Deep, deep down, finally, the collapse of the theme of the return of high art will also be gradually abandoned from the theme of art itself. What will happen is this: it is not only the thesis of the return of high art which will

collapse, but the identification of high Greek art itself will gradually become ineffective, inoperative, or absent. This form of a native art which nonetheless still leads to the possibility of his return, will finally be absent. Nietzsche will consider this Greece mythical or as already being a German creation. Germany wasn't only believed to be new Greece, but was perhaps Greece itself. I.e. this Greece was dreamed up by Germany as the paradigm of its return. This identification there was too German (art from the conjunction of art, Dionysus versus Apollo, the dream versus drunkenness, degradation from Euripides, was already German).

Parenthesis: what is remarkable, in which one recognizes German Greece, is that it is always in the position of identifying a more fundamental Greece than the Greece that is apparent. It is a schema of thought that is fatal from German thought about Greece. One might think about Greece, but it is not classical Greece with Socrates and Plato, Nietzsche says, but Greece in the background, forgotten, where classical Greece is the degradation or forgetting. One must always restore a lost Greece in the German landscape. Not Greece as a total archeology, which is in question, but it is the essence of Greece to have been forgotten by what? Forgotten by the Greeks! This is the essential point. The Greeks, the bad Greeks have forgotten their own original essence. Greece has always gone through forgetfulness, test of forgetting herself in what appears as its classical foundation. We must identify what has been called the *presos*, Heidegger says, as the authentic Greece in its outbreak, before the knockout (Socrates and Plato wear the hat! The emblematic greats and the suspects of this knockout of the origin). It's quite German. Germany is itself identified in thought from the operation by which Greece has

forgotten itself. This is a singular schema: it is not only that Germany says that it will repeat Greece, a new intellectual world center. The modern Germans need to identify Germany not only as Greece, where Germany would be a repetition, but a Greece forgetful of herself, already buried a first time in the obliteration of its past. ...

Already a German construction in this vision of Greece, if we accept that in some sense what is at stake in all this is a philosophical identification of Germany, which is in need of the thesis according to which a native Greece, primordial and home to Being, and which was high art, *l'accointaine* of the poem and of thought, or the conjunction of myth and music. Greece has been ossified, crossed out. Germany appeared to be the operator and place where the thought description of this concealing and the promise of de-concealment. Nietzsche writes *Birth of Tragedy* because there is the German promise of the statist German art of Wagner. I think that Nietzsche at some point no longer believed that. Not just the idea that Germany was going to be the return, but the assemblage itself, the identification of Greece itself is precarious. If the identification of Germany is the key to Greek assembly, and conversely the de-identification of Germany challenges the Greek assembly. That's for sure. There is actually a loss of the theme of high art that called Greece the dream, myth, thought. The theme of high arts fades away gradually in Nietzsche, and what suddenly takes strength is classical art, the art of classical France. For if somehow theatricality is no longer measured by high tragic art, then what matters is the story of theatricality itself. What matters is high theater. What is high theater? This is what has a high public, since theater is always in the logic of calculating the effect. Thus the troubled

seeking of Nietzsche would be this: is there a non-histrionic theater, after which it was said that the essence of theatricality was histrionics? A non-histrionic theater, i.e. a theater commensurate with the classics. Indeed, Wagner has a German public! The statement means: after all, if there is no return of tragedy, and perhaps not even tragedy itself (German assemblage from Greece), the force is to agree that what there is, and what there has, in a sense, been for all of time, is theater, and if there is only theater, then finally the principle of evaluation is high theater, and so it is theater to which the public endows dignity. Theater such that its public makes it unfit to be a stage actor.

There is a form of what is indeed the era of classical French tragedy. I would willingly sustain that in terminal Nietzsche, classical French tragedy is certainly not a tragedy in the sense of *Birth of Tragedy* but tends to become the true paradigm of what art can do. This is indeed a renunciation to its mythical capacity. Art is capable of this, provided that the public is constituted as such. Which of course (as we expect for next time) means that it must be changed immediately, and it's the Germans. The problem is to reconcile the Teutons! As long as the theater will be devoted to a public Teuton, it will be Wagnerian. It will reconcile them by making them believe that it is high art, i.e. in the regime of the simulacrum and of the sham. I will conclude on this point today.

We could say this: if we abandon the topic of the theme of identification of the epoch through the return of high art, then we cannot completely take over the criticism of theatricality. This is because theatricality was precisely defined by the renunciation of tragedy. Theatricality is this il y



a, in the sphere of the art. Thus we must look for new standards on the side of theatricality itself. This is the meaning at the bottom of this story by Bizet. Carmen, she was able to laugh, the French against the Germans, but it is a lower layer. The real layer is why Nietzsche says Carmen and not Wagner? The real significance is that Bizet's Carmen is the best theater, and it is a French theater. We will see it in detail. This is cemented by a public that is higher, or whose dignity is higher because it does not pretend to be something other than what it is. This is not an imposture, it really does not take itself to be high art. And even to say this is not high art, is also in Nietzsche's favor. There was the normative character of high art, oblique to theatricality. Again if we go along with theatricality, everything is a public question: is the public captured or controlled by Germany society, is the public a contemporary of the "il y a"? But if the question is that of the public, then the ultimate question is not aesthetic but political. This has a price. So for Nietzsche it is arch-politics, directly arch-politics.

I would conclude this way: tragedy, the theme of the tragedy, leads to an aesthetic conception of The Act. This is certain. But theatricality leads to a political vision of The Act. And that is what Nietzsche found suffering to be suffering. The failure of the aesthetic potential of The Act, because the theme of high art has been affected. Consequently the obligation of a mediation of the standard by the public: the public needs to change. It is a political conception of The Act. Finally the theater has been, and is the intermediary between aesthetics and politics. This is the vector of a blind translation of the representation of the Philosophical Act of aesthetics to politics. And again this translation is also the passage of the treatment covered by the return to

an act that I would say, in all senses of the term, is without return. Evidently, Nietzsche's madness has no return.

## New Course Four – Wagnerian Art

In conceptual terms, I recall an important point. It means, that:

1. In reality, Wagner's music does not have as its essence a conjunction (as does high art), the conjunction of drunkenness and the dream, the conjunction of Apollo and Dionysus, but it is alone a dissociation (which follows from this). I repeat that its greatness is in its detail, and not in the manifest operation that it explains or employs, but rather in the miniature musical grasped in its minute details.

2. Wagnerian art falls short of any rupture: it is not the re-establishment or return of the rupture of high art, but it is the contrary of a rupture in the form of an achievement. It achieves nihilism. What one believes to be healing is illness, in its developed or superior form, and what one believes to be innovation is only an accomplishment.

3. It results from this that there is a dismissal of Germany as a possible site of the return, i.e. as a possible new Greece. In a certain sense Germany collapses with Wagner, Germany as the site of a mythical restoration of a people is disposed of at the same time that Wagner is succeeded. Which opens the question: what is the site of the arch-political act, of the Philosophical Act in its arch-political essence? Regarding this point there is a complexity of the national question of the last Nietzsche: one simultaneously sees an Italian allegiance, more and more pronounced, notably regarding music, from French references that are (extremely sustained) argued for highly, in what concerns the reference to Classic French art, theatrical or prosodic, the consolation of a fictive genealogy of Nietzsche himself as

Polish, as coming from the East. Behind the plan of this dreamed Poland, an essential Russia, he says that there is a form of joy in the Russian manner of being sad, concerning the musical or artistic inscription that is fundamentally Russian. There is also ultimately a theme of Europe which is developed more and more, a theme that is related to a remarkable anticipation of the idea of Europe to the idea of containing Germany, and I will put Germany, he says, in a corset of iron.

So on this last point we have developed in extreme complexity the last time, because it ultimately involves the question of the relation of philosophy to theater. Since I remind you that what is essentially Euripides for Nietzsche is the founder of the theater, theatricality arrives as the corruption of the tragic in the figure of Euripides. Finally we could say that Wagner as Euripides maintains an anti-theatrical hate of Nietzsche and the fact of the histrionic and theatrical character of Wagner as an actor is a source of Nietzsche's polemic against him. But ultimately the question is more intricate than that. If we take the issue another way: if Germany is not the site of the return of the high art, where is art in this? What is the reserve of the power of art, since ultimately that Wagner is an impostor, i.e. a miniaturist where one expected a founding myth. It is Euripides where one expected Aeschylus. But it should be emphasized that there is no alternative hypothesis. The removal of Wagner is the removal of the very hypothesis of the return of high art. When Nietzsche calls upon other musicians, whether this or that Italian, Peter Gast, or Bizet, we see that this is not an alternative to Wagner in terms of return of high art. It is another thing. The succession of Wagner is the removal of the hypothesis of return of high art, and it leaves

completely open the question of the form of the artist in the era of nihilism or the era of decadence. It consequently leaves open the hypothesis that the criticism of theatricality is equivocal.

It can be critiqued given the imposture of high art, but opens up the possibility that theatricality is unavoidable in the conditions of nihilism (i.e. that high art is an inconsistent reverie), and that it also opens the idea that 2 theatricalities ought to be distinguished: a theatrical that is completely corrupted, and a lively, more affirmative one. This can be understood well: Wagner's theatricality is an imposture with regard to the fact that it is presented under the form of high art. This is the essential point. There is a theatricality that subordinates music, there is a theatricality in which the combination of intoxication and dreams is a theatricality of an impostor, and as such it will be fully condemned. But the place is also cleared for a reassessment of theatricality itself and this leads to an opening of the re-evaluation of classical French art. French classical art that would be the possible paradigm of an art that is no longer conceivable under the reign of high art. If art is no longer to think at the behest of the Greek return of high art, we must change the paradigm. Otherwise we will be an impostor. This is what demonstrates the Case of Wagner: by clinging to the paradigm of high art, it only makes a theatrical caricature. If we deliver the question of art from the fantasy of high art (Greek fantasy), perhaps we will find a theatrical paradigm in reality, but a theatricality that is no longer chained to the mythology of high art. This is what designates French classicism, classicism and beyond, literary art, prose, references that are increasingly warm to Goethe, who is also in a sense a revaluation, a rise in power of a certain...

Perhaps at last, final Nietzsche would be opened, before the rush of madness as the name of The Act might have been a division of theatricality itself as the strict maintenance of an objection made to Wagner (in the part of the deception) to have enslaved the question of high art under the question of the theater.

That said, it is true that the trial of Wagner as the Euripides of high art, just as Euripides is the Euripides of Aeschylus and Sophocles. He fulfilled what cannot be a paradigm. If we say that Wagner is Euripides, it can be seen in detail. I would like to resume it in detail. In Nietzsche there are very specific definitions of Euripides. That is accurate. I recall that for Nietzsche tragedy is a conjunction, i.e. its power is properly the power of a conjunction, and power is given in conjunction with fulfillment of a conjunction, this conjunction being the conjunction of drunkenness and the dream, with in some way in this idea (I will return to it) the singular conjunction of the infinite and the finite. If we look closely, we see that the orgiastic Dionysian character of which is given in the form of drunkenness is lifted, and it delivers the infinity of life itself, while the Apollonian dream is the finished figure [form] of form. It is true that the conjunctive power of high art is to hold together with a completely unique creative alchemy the finite form, in the form of the dream, and in the form of drunkenness, the infinite of life. Euripides is another conjunction, namely the conjunction of thought and passion. In other words, Euripides is someone who substitutes thought with the dream and passion with drunkenness. In an operation which is a Socratic operation. Nietzsche will therefore undertake to show in a certain sense that Wagner does the same thing, i.e. that he is also overwhelmingly a man of the

idea and not a man of dreams, and he is a man of passion and not a man of drunkenness. 2 texts on this, drawn from the Case of Wagner.

On the fact that Wagner was a man of the idea, this will lead to a systematic reconciliation between Wagner and Hegel that is fully interesting. Wagner is in a way to Nietzsche's eyes the Hegel of music, i.e. he makes the productive continuity of the musical flow become an idea, principally. In this sense, he is the Hegel of music. I will read you the Case of Wagner: "Hegel is a madman, but not only a German one; he is a European madman. A madness that Wagner has understood, felt, immortalized, but has only applied to music. He invented a style that keeps an infinite significance; he became the heir of Hegel. The idea is to make music. And as one has understood this in Wagner! The same kind of man who is infatuated with Hegel is infatuated with Wagner. At school we are going to write as Hegel. This is the adolescent who understood that these 2 words were enough: infinite and meaning, for he felt incomparably comfortable. It's not through music that Wagner has won over adolescents; it is through the idea. This is what is most unequivocal in his art: the manner in which he plays hide and seek behind 100 symbols, the polychrome of his ideal that has irresistibly led adolescents toward Wagner. This is the Wagnerian genius of cultivating trouble, his art of clinging to clouds, of gliding and sailing through the air, in short precisely what Hegel in his time had seduced and bribed with. Hegel as Wagner has seduced and bribed teens with their exceptional talent to be simultaneously everywhere and nowhere. This everywhere and nowhere must be interpreted in the following manner: it is the idea that by which pretends to look like the dream or drunkenness, cloudiness is the ubiquity of the idea,

character vague and multifaceted, whereupon it simulates, it is the simulacrum of the... Wagner, like Euripides, is someone who has the power of the ubiquity of the idea with true musical expansion. From this point of view, music is controlled by the multifaceted forms of the idea. At the same time, Wagner is also a man of passion. So he makes two characteristic substitutions for Euripides. I will read you the passage, still in the Case of Wagner, "but it is above all passion that overthrows. Let us be clear about passion. Nothing is more advantageous than passion! We can ignore all the virtues of the counterpoint, no need to be scholarly - passion works every time! Beauty is a difficult thing, let's keep beauty. And specifically, melody. Let's denigrate, my friends, or else take the ideal seriously; let's denigrate the melody. Nothing is more dangerous than a beautiful melody. Nothing corrupts the palate more surely! We are lost if we begin loving beautiful melodies. Theorem: the melody is immoral. Demonstration: Palestrina. Application: Parsifal. Better, the absence of sanctified melody. And here is the definition of passion: the passion of acrobatics of ugliness on the tightrope of disharmony. Let's dare to be ugly, Wagner has indeed dared. Let's courageously reject the mud of disgusting harmony! Let us not be afraid to get our hands dirty. This is the only way we will become natural." In this canonical charge against the passionate dimension of Wagnerism, we need to decipher a bit beyond his irony. In reality, what is called passion in this case (and just as I recall) is substituted for drunkenness, is the subordination of the musical construction in its immediate effect. As always: we must understand the idea and passions should be thought of from the interior of the musical question, and they are not external attributes. If Wagner is at once a man of the idea and of passion, in place of being the man of dreams and the



man of intoxication, even his music testifies of it (and not declarations about it), it is immanent in music. The idea rules music because it was what leads musical dramaturgy, and it subordinates musical direction to theatricality. Passion rules music because it subordinates musical construction to the effect of disharmony or the passionate moment of music.

This will lead Nietzsche to emphasize that in Wagner, what fundamentally counts in music is its color, tone, and even more specifically the timbre. There is a theory of Nietzsche's theory according to which Wagner is someone who has placed the singularity of timbre at the heart of the musical effect, through what is diverted from the teaching of classical masters who weave the issue of melody and issue of harmonic structure. He says it just before: "The color of sound is decisive here, its exact nature doesn't matter. It is above this that we must refine. What good do we waste our efforts for? Let's sound unique in sonority, obsessively so. The more we will introduce the timbre, the more we will find spirit. Let's get on each other's nerves, beat them to death. Let's have lightning and thunder, all shaken up."

Aesthetically, it is the idea of what Wagner opens up through music; it is the dictatorship of the tonality in the sense of tone, color, timbre, against the regulation in some architectonic manner of musical discourse. To summarize, we can say that at the heart of his music, Wagner is Euripidean on one hand, because he subordinates the conduct of musical discourse to the form of the idea. i.e. in a sense, music itself will become illustrative rather than intrinsic, and it will stop being pure music. Furthermore he is the man of passion in his music because he will gradually privilege the timbre over other parameters of his musical configuration. Here we are. To conclude this

point, we can say that Wagner himself surrenders to the same operations as Euripides, the double substitution of thought to the dream, and passion to drunkenness, but in some sense what Nietzsche will say does not even have to do with conjunction. There is substitution, but there is not really a conjunction. Between passion and idea, there is actually something Wagnerian discourse that is dissociated. We will not go into details (we would need Wagner). Nietzschean critique does not even recognize the status of Euripides in Wagner, as far as Euripides would perform a certain theatrical conjunction of thought and passion, but in a certain way, which is also why he is a decadent, Wagner himself is good at produces the subordination of music to the idea, on one hand, and the subordination to immediate passion on the other, but in dissociated forms. This is why it is a music that is not always in The Act of promising, i.e. which its revolution always differs from. Nietzsche analyzes well how the organization of Wagner's musical discourse consists of accumulating tension without ever resolving it. There are intrinsic reasons for this: if Wagner's music builds tension without resolving it, whether it is a broken promise, or it is kept hanging, but it finally settles this suspense, and it is precisely because it does not truly realize the conjunction of thought and passion. It leaves them in a dissociation that music can only irritate. Music is this dissociation itself. We could say that Wagner is finally the timbre of the idea in this dissociated state, the timbre of the idea. Certainly, the idea invested in sound, invested in the uniqueness of sound, of timbre; but this timbre of the idea does not produce a true architectural conjunction. It is in some way the promise that we will really have the idea, but the idea itself is always concealed, in the suspense of the tension accumulated in the tonality or timbre. And thus this is why we

could say that what is ultimately covered by Nietzsche in Wagner is a dissociated theatricality. Wagner's music is the real of dissociated theatricality which is carried out as the timbre of the idea or as the unresolved cumulative promise. So ultimately it's in this regard that Nietzsche will appeal more and more to a theatricality that is in the least non-dissociated, i.e. he will call it simple, right. But a simple, right theatricality is certainly a theatricality, always in the registration of the idea and its passions, and not drunkenness and the dream of high art, but at least it does not leave itself in a state of dissociation, nervousness and promise. One can say that it would appeal to a sober theater. He calls it a non-hysterical theatricality. There would be a long development to make in Nietzsche's category of hysteria.

We can say that Nietzsche is actually among the philosophers who have attempted to make hysteria a category, i.e. the designation of a type. Nietzsche's typology refers to the ambivalences of power of this type. As always, even the hystericization of music by Wagner is a complex operation. Hysteria is a category of Nietzschean typology. Sure, it means to a degree what he calls a good little woman, but not only this, for it also refers to Wagner. There are even passages where this category is used by Nietzsche to describe himself. The record of its definition in power is always ambivalent. So theatricality to which he is going to appeal is a theatricality that would have been de-hystericized, i.e. where dissociation explodes. The hystericized theatricality of Wagner leaves a dissociation, the idea as a timbre. Hence the contra-valorization of what would be sober theatricality and also sober music. The problem being that any evidence of the paradigm of sober theatricality, or what is meant under the name Bizet, for example, is surely

not in a position to support the Philosophical Act as an arch-political act. This is better than the Wagnerian dissociation, but this better is not a better such that we could (as we hoped to do with Wagner) sustain it in The Act's maturity. This is not on the same plane. It is in a more complicated and restrictive circuit that finds in any case that there is theatricality which is sober or dissociated and hystericized, and to conclude that sober theatricality is higher. But that does not give the arch-political undertaking of Nietzsche the support that he could expect from the perspective of the return of high art. What does not constitute the same support is not on the same plane. Thus it follows that in final Nietzsche there is a type of rapid wandering, if I may say so, in the determination of the question of knowing whether there is something else. If the artist of high art is not the type of the arch-political rupture (the Case of Wagner: the artist-type in the Wagnerian sense turns out to be an imposture), and if on the other hand, Germany can no longer be the site for this, there are two questions: is there another type, another site?

This is where Nietzsche will wander, in the strict sense. He will become a European nomad. He navigates Italy as a form of this distance. He will become a nomad of his own thought, which points to the double question: Is there a site of this Act? (What nation? What configuration of nations) and does he have support for it other than the form of high art which would invest in a certain sense the possibility of The Act? Situated in the final posthumous texts, Nietzsche establishes all the possibilities in this regard. For example, it revolves around science. Nietzsche's relation to science, the scientific is a question that is in itself very complex. There is the question of whether science or a certain science, even beyond the intermediate positions

of Nietzsche, is close to science, if science does not produce a form of power which would eventually relay the failure of high art. I quote a text from the year '88 to indicate the complexities of Nietzsche's thought on this point: "Compared to the artist, the apparition of the scientist is actually a sign of containment, a lower standard of living. But also a gain in strength, rigor, force of will." Quite complicated, i.e. the apparition of the man of science is the sign of containment or some decline in living standards (in Greece after the time of tragedy), but also a gain in strength.

Thus a lowered standard of living, a gain in strength, rigor, and force of will. So there would be a balance: if the artist-type will faint, the man of science can arrive. Overall, it is certain that the arrival of the science man type is an inflection, a slight negative curvature of the movement of establishing values through life. What life creates in the form or type of the man of science is not in the same degree of wide power that it creates in the artist-type (not in the sense of Wagnerian histrionics, but the sense of high art). But there is also greater strength, a gain in strength. So it's like this if you want to examine more closely (science compared to art), but at the same time more focused. And in terms of broader evaluation, the artist is superior. In terms of local force, i.e. of invested power, the scientist may be higher. But ultimately Nietzsche will stay there, and not opt for it. He will not reconstruct a device in which the form of science will finally arrive at the stance of the form or type of the artist.

He will maintain the idea that the figure would have been the artist, if he had been in the form of the return of high art. He also turns towards the issue of amorous power. Regarding this power, Nietzsche asks him (as he

often did, with the figure of Lou Andreas Salome, for example), but in final texts, there is an evaluation of the matter of love from the point of view of energy. There are texts in which he states in some manner that love makes us generous, i.e. wasting. The strength of love is such that one can waste vital energy for nothing, in some sense. But these are sketches, and they are always re-folded or reused by the idea that this wasting, so this affirmative dimension, despite everything, (dilapidation as such escapes asceticism) but it is rather a kind of release, a loss in another sense, and there is something that by default strays from the point of application. Our way is to look at love in its comparison with the resources of war. Nietzsche speaks of Bizet: Bizet is finally sober. And then there is love, but not in the sense of Wagner: "At last love, love transposed again to its original nature, not the love of a perfect blank, of a sentimental sanctum, but love conceived an inevitable fatum, love that is cynical, innocent, cruel, and it is precisely what nature is. Love in its means: war. In principle: the sexes' deadly hatred." War, deadly hatred does not have an element of devaluation. There are passages where the war is raised in some manner as a form of affirmation. We see this in *Carmen* by Bizet. "Beloved Carmen, it was I who killed you." This is not an indication that there is an intrinsic hatred in love. For basically, love that is cynical, innocent, and cruel, as far as it is an unforgivable war between the sexes, is in a sense a form of childhood, something like Dionysus the child. It could consequently also be a figure ... but what is not appropriate, what is not appropriate and what makes everything there also be considered as a folding in on itself which results in it not supporting the arch-political gesture in the sense of high art, this is only the hatred between the sexes, in its cynical, innocent, and cruel dimension, and in a certain manner it does not find its

principle of inevaluable affirmation. Something like that. i.e. love from this point of view can be a force, and great strength, but it is compelled to repeat, it insists upon its own war, but it does not create its immanent affirmation as a rupture or otherworldly odyssey. I.e. it is a force that indeed squanders its own assistance. It is ultimately quite superior for Nietzsche in the idealized sentimentality found in pseudo-Wagnerian mythology. Cynicism, innocence and cruelty is a real principle of life, which is made asphyxiated and deleterious in the principle of Wagner's music. This is not ideal sentimentality. It is truly the new real of a war. But it has no universal space of opening. For ultimately it is in the insistence of its own rupture. So obviously science, love, Nietzsche then interrogates politics itself in '88 in a pressing manner, and that will be what he will call the theme of high politics. We spoke on this at the beginning of the year. In a certain sense, "political" is a fundamentally ambiguous word. What this high politics must mean, is also the full termination of any policy, as supra- or arch-politics. So in a sense Nietzsche does not find, in any immediate sense in politics, any word of the typical form of a possible support of the philosophical gesture. This is obvious since he has disqualified the political revolution. We have talked about it in a detailed manner. He disqualified it, and he ultimately saw in it an egalitarian resentment, and so in a sense for politics, history offers nothing, nor any more, finally, that Wagner offers high art, history does not propose high politics. In his time, a possible form would have been in the register of the revolution, for sure. But as this historical theme of revolution is disposed of by him in the category of resentment (an Event that is far too noisy, as Zarathustra will say), politics is for Nietzsche entirely to come. He

will have to found it. So politics in his sense dissolves in arch-politics and thus cannot be supported. This is what he announces.

So you see in some sense that if we seek to represent Nietzsche's intellectual landscape in the year 1888, i.e. what there is, what there isn't, for this man who is alone in Turin, and who, alone in Turin, announces he will break the history of the world in two? What is there, and what is there not, as a possible resource for this Act? There are in posthumous fragments of lists, which are in fact almost desperate, what may serve as support. There is a general theme of the triumph of the will to nothingness, and then there are even some lists of things to hang on to: there is the pagan spirit, there is art, there are Greek Sophists. There are some things, but very few of them. If we try to constitute the backbone, the vertebration of this landscape of thought to the extreme of Nietzsche's lucidity, we can say:

- There is no high art (a key point)

- Love is a form of insistent consummation - this is a war without peace, a war without end.

- Science is too narrow (that's its own... its force or rigor is paid from a lack of generality or extension).

- High politics is yet to come, and it is what has to do with bringing about the possibility of The Act

So what there is, and we will come back to it, is indeed Nietzsche. What there is Nietzsche both in a very true, and quite disinterested sense. And Nietzsche tracks down signs that would show that it is indeed Nietzsche



who is there, like when he is pleased to be recognized in the street. When his tailor was very polite to him. You see how far the research of what there is: what there is, is possibly some traces of this *il y a*, what there is for Nietzsche. And Nietzsche is obviously honest, sincere, to save these traces. Not at all with glory or vainglory, but in the desperate search for the question of knowing that since there is nothing else and in particular no Wagner, there must have been Nietzsche, at least. Madness came here, naturally. The madness came when finally the fact that what there was, was Nietzsche, an absolute overinvestment of this singularity. Thus he heard the title Nietzsche against Wagner. Nietzsche against Wagner, it is an extraordinary collection. Basically this is the last book on which he had worked, this is the last thing he composed. He wrote the *Case of Wagner*, he still needed Nietzsche against Wagner. This is an issue, an extraordinarily moving text because you cannot help but read it as the text of someone who arranges his papers before madness. It is entirely made of fragments of previous books; it is not a creation, but a classing: he takes the texts he devoted to Wagner from *Birth of Tragedy* left to *Case of Wagner*, and wants to show that in classing, one sees a basic logic that is given in *Nietzsche against Wagner*. This man is thus trying to classify both his life and work strictly from the point of view of the issue of Nietzsche against Wagner. But what does that mean, finally, *Nietzsche against Wagner*?

In the 1st basic sense: it demonstrates that there has always been a gap between Nietzsche and Wagner, of course. But this is not interesting. In reality what he wants to say is that there is no Wagner and thus look carefully, there is no need for Nietzsche. It is Nietzsche instead of Wagner,

fully against Wagner, in the place where he should have been, where he should have found the return of high art. There is a point to mention in passing, which is that Nietzsche against Wagner also designates a complete change of perspective. It refers to a complete change of perspective. Because Nietzsche cannot come exactly into the place where Wagner is, because Wagner was identifiable from the point of the artist's specificity, i.e. the point of the question of high art. So it's something else, something else because Nietzsche himself knows that he, Nietzsche, is no longer the artist of the return of high art, and that at the least on this point, he is like Wagner. He is as powerless as Wagner to bring about the return of high Greek art. He will keep at the most the imposture that there was at the core. If we say Nietzsche against Wagner, by storing the papers of this great history, if it is the last thing we tell people, namely that there is no Wagner, so there is no Nietzsche, we must see that the arch-political act will not actually have an artistic character. It will not be supported or invested in the power of high art, it will not be providing a people of its re-establishing or founding mythology. There will be none of that. It will be only Nietzsche's "fold". But this has no importance to us. For what matters is in reality what it means, this Nietzsche against Wagner, that it is ultimately necessary to account on philosophy itself. And even for Nietzsche this is a great conversion. He wrote at the same time that philosophy is the criminal of criminals. This is an anti-philosopher madman. But if this is not art, love, science, etc. ... ultimately it's what gives support or material or execution to The Act that consists of breaking into two histories of the world. ? What comes in the name of Nietzsche? We know that when it has been invested or crossed by madness, it will be all the names, all possible names, it will be the name of all names; it will be the naming itself.

But this here is the ultimate tipping. We saw at the beginning of the year that this is the question of nature itself, the status of its undertaking. But otherwise, what arrives under its name? This issue makes a return for Nietzsche when we have Nietzsche against Wagner. We know what "Wagner" is, maybe it's an imposture, high art corrupted by theatricality, but we know what it is. But what is Nietzsche, for Nietzsche himself? The name "Nietzsche" names what for Nietzsche himself? It does not name an artist, a scientist, etc ... there is no listed type, like the others ... reviewed. And so I would argue that *Nietzsche against Wagner* is at the end of ends, the revenge of philosophy against art, from the point of view that the name Nietzsche is able to support. High politics will be initiated by the philosophizing declaration and exclusively supported by it. It will be in this truly silent sense, i.e. not musical. Yet to the end Nietzsche will go on maintaining nostalgia for art. He will leave a kind of intimate adherence to the rule of things through art, and we sense this, although Nietzsche against Wagner somehow gives or refers by itself the nudity of philosophy. For final Nietzsche, philosophy divested politics of the return of high art, divested of typical forms of support on which they rely; it is able to be its own declaration and its own declaration is arch-politics itself. It is lonely, as lonely as Nietzsche in Turin, indeed. I would say on this point of view which is almost the last page of Nietzsche against Wagner, the last passage of Nietzsche's epilogue against Wagner, so really it is something that you can mean by testamentary, directly concerning The Act, since it is the last passage of the last text written by Nietzsche. You can only be seized with emotion thinking about that. We basically have the last sheets that Nietzsche thought should be classified into public view for

the audience, before being silent, powerless to speak, i.e. ultimately in The Act from which one can no longer escape, The Act in which one is frozen.

I have said to you that *Nietzsche against Wagner* is a compilation, a classified text. It is a text taken from The Gay Science. You could say that it does not have to do with a truly terminal text (GS 82), but the text is the title of the foreword of GS. It's strange to see this text of the foreword as an epilogue. This text of declaration and opening, becomes terminal and testamentary. It changes status. It was published in October 1886 and published in June 87. It is a text that I consider the legacy of the penultimate period. I consider that from '86, i.e. after the 4th book, Zarathustra ('85), which is the beginning of the end (there is a difference of tone in the 3 other books). The 4th book is where we will find the complications that will cause the final Nietzschean rupture.

From '86 after the fourth song of Zarathustra, the categories of standard or current Nietzscheanism are absent: this point is very important. They do not disappear in their mention or their naming, but are absent as living categories or susceptible to support thought. What categories? That of the eternal return (mentioned in the plans, that's all). It is no longer active. You know my interpretation on this point: I think that this category of eternal return was organically linked to the hypothesis on the return of high art. I think The Actualization, the subjectivity of the eternal return of the category was first and foremost the promise of the return of the possibility of high art, and with it the collapse of the device of the return of high art. This category becomes not false, but abstract. And Nietzsche never clings to an abstraction. When a category becomes abstract, it is dead, in a sense. Similarly, the

category of *Will to Power*. Imposture of building a book under that title, as did his sister, who under this title is intended to focus on final Nietzsche. It also passes into the status of abstraction. In my view it is because of the very concept of will, which was in *Will to Power*, but not able to refer to the experience of final Nietzsche. The truly involuntary character of madness is being prepared, in anticipated consideration, in the abstraction of progressive death that becomes the category of *Will to Power*. Breaking into two world histories is no longer a program of the will, and is no longer called "will". Sarah Kofman says explosion, the non-Christian dynamic, breaking into two, it is an Event..., i.e. a politics of its own in The Act no longer in terms of Will to Power, but in terms of transit or on the Event which transits or grasps its act. The category of Superhuman disappears, as related to the politics of new values, which indicates the triumph of active forces over reactive forces. It is more than that in the final Nietzsche: keeping the term of the affirmation does not mean the creation of new values. The affirmation is, to the contrary, acquiescence to the invaluable, which is not given in the form of the creation of new values. Or provided that there is a perspective of the Superhuman, it can be defined as man freed from all forms of sovereignty, lacking any configuration of sovereignty. But there is no reason to call this man the Superhuman.

So from 1886 on, the eternal return, will to power, and the Superhuman are abandoned. And the text of *Gay Science* from '86 belongs to the terminal sequence, from this point of view. "Morality: we are not with impunity the most profound mind of all time, but one is no longer without reward. I'll prove it with an example. O what horror we have when

enjoyment, enjoyment coarse and thick and dark as the sensualist, our educated public, our rich and powerful conceive it. How contemptuous irony do we listen to henceforth, the flons flons of the great fair, where the cultivated man, the city today, does violence through art, reading and music to meet at their spiritual enjoyment in high reinforcements of spirituality. As the theatrical considerations of passions tear our ears; this agitation of the senses that cultivated plebeian love, with their confused aspiration to the sublime in exploded grandiloquence, in overload, which is foreign to our taste. No, if to ourselves, who are convalescing, we still need an art, it is a different art, an art that is mocking, light, fleeting, divinely intact, divinely artificial, rising like a pure flame in a cloudless sky. Above all, an art for artists, and artists only. After that we know where we stand on what he requires: joyfulness, full joyfulness. We who know, know certain things all too well, or as we learn henceforth to forget, to know nothing well in our art. Perhaps truth is a woman who has reason not to reveal her reasons. Perhaps its name is in Greek .... O these Greeks, they understood life. It is essential to stick bravely to the surface, to the arid, appearance, sounds, words in all Olympian appearance . The superficial Greeks in the force of depth and very space to which we return, we, the neck of the spirit breaks, we who have climbed the highest and most dangerous summit of contemporary thought, and who from there have a look around, a condescending look at our feet; are we not, in doing so, Greek, worshiper of forms, sounds, words, and thus artists." This is how the last page of the last book of Nietzsche ends.

I'd like to make several punctuations on this text:

First, it is a typical subjective attack which we had discussed: Nietzsche will henceforth have to take up the full greatness of The Act. "You aren't the deep spirit with impunity all the time": not only this time but all the time, since The Act, I remind you, is breaking in two world histories, and not only overcoming current nihilistic decadence. The text is under the sign of this subjective attack that brings the name Nietzsche to the position of carrying out The Act.

Second, the entire beginning of the following passage is a mockery of what may be called the sublime art, the derision of subjective sublimity in art. In other words, the idea that there is high art here is mocked, derided and considered a great fair. The great fair, it is not so much art itself, the contemporary art of Nietzsche, but the ideology of art ("the cultivated man, the city ..."). It is the concrete form of the absence or denial of the return of high art. Specifically, the fact that there is not high art, and well that's the great fair. We could give it its modern name, the great fair is culture. Culture is what remains when one has not forgotten everything (as told by the brave Herriot, himself forgotten), but culture is what remains when there is no return of high art. This is the trace, the public trace of the broken promise of the return of high art. It is a great fair. We see that Nietzsche is bent on it especially since he has contributed to it, for a time at the announcement of the return of high art. There is a manner of tearing oneself from it.

- Thirdly, it should be noted that in the text we find the dubious character of the very necessity of an art ("if to ourselves who are convalescing, there must once again be art ..."). It is not yet clear that art is once again necessary. If there is no high art, you can perhaps completely do without art,

or in any case you must do without art in the form it takes in culture. Thus the doubtful character of the necessity of art itself. And provided that there will be one, this will be an art with characteristics quite different from those announced by high art. It is an art that bears no trace of the conjunction. Its typical form is no longer the conjunction (drunken dreams, Dionysus and Apollo). This is no longer the form of the conjunction, but it is essentially a simple art, but not in the sense of foolish or not complex; simple in the sense that it is not exactly the order of the conjunction (no longer Wagnerian dissociation). A right art is an art that shows right as a pure flame in a cloudless sky. An art marked by an essential simplicity, with the decisive attribute of lightness (airy, fleeting, light, mocking). It is an art that no longer summons nature's powers as they were convened under the figure of Dionysus in high art: a divinely artificial art. This is an essential point, an art that no longer summons any people: this is no longer art which has the organic function of providing a people its myths. It is an art for artists, only for artists: it is strictly an art that is not for the community. The subjective name of this simplicity of art will be gaiety. It is subjectified in joyfulness. Joyfulness, any joyfulness. Between us, the text has nothing joyful, but it's ironic. This subjective tonality of final Nietzsche: it is a turn that makes everything lighten, promised in gaiety, essential simplicity, the pure flame, the blue sky, and at the same time what prepares for an absolute disaster, its own disaster. It is true that there is a sacrifice here. This devolution of the world to gaiety, old, yes, but which affects it to the heart of the question of art, its function, its necessity, what it can do, this theme is carried out to madness. Until Nietzsche became a kind of indescribable wreck. Thus, joyfulness as a subjectification of essential simplicity. An art for artists, let's



understand that he no longer summons the uniting of a people. It is an art that is also blind, an art whose simplicity is made of oblivion. It is a forgetful art. Let's learn to know nothing well, to forget well. It will be blind to itself, wholly consumed in its simplicity. It is an art of the return of the origin but a current art.

From this point of view, what will happen (perhaps this is the most profound metaphor) is a change in status of the word "Greek". What is Greek, being Greek? The Greek naming continues. Ah these Greeks! As for the penultimate sentence, it is extraordinary that this sentence of Nietzsche is "are we not Greek" at the last moment, all the classified papers, even that. Nietzsche says he will slay Germany, but he will remain German if by Germany, one means the indestructible character of being Greek. It is still there, but Greece has changed direction. Greece is no longer the summoning of a people by the conjunction of the dream and drunkenness, myth and music. What it was originally, in a German tradition, the people, the community gathered under the symbol of its mythical shaping supported by the intensity of drunkenness and music. I.e. the myth that configures the people by giving them a blind power, that was Greek. But here Greece means the pure consent to appearance. This is the appearance as radiantly taken in its appearance, that is all. No function of the institution of the origin, of the summoning of a community, of the foundation of the mythical spirit of a people, of aesthetic regeneration of a race. All this is completely dropped. Being Greek is to love this *il y a*, as far as it is this *il y a*. We can say that Greece tips over completely from the side of Apollo. After all, Apollo was the glory of the appearance as such. Dionysus was the bottom of the inevaluable, the

multiple power of life. Apollo was the solar appearance taken in its pure form. I would thus say that Greece has basically become the solitude of Apollo, but solitude in a twofold sense:

First of all, Apollo's solitude for it is decoupled from Dionysos; then, Apollo's solitude is unleashed from the theme of the configuration of a people.

That applies to itself, in itself, for anyone. And which was more for anyone than Nietzsche in Turin, an exile among everyone, whom nobody cared about. For him it is what is of worth, for anyone. There is something like Nietzsche Becoming anyone in this text on Apollo. This is his princely hand, his princely true side, the prince of The Act as anyone sharing Apollo's solitude. So it is the artist, with, again, the last word: aren't we artists Greek? Until the last moment there was this idea. But Greek and artists change meaning. The artist is a worshiper of appearance, that's all. This is synonymous with Greek, but as Apollo. Worshiper of the show, the sensible appearance. It is holding it in a radiating classicism. Indeed a worshiper of sounds and words.

So this is what the text says. Only, the problem is what relation there is between what is said and the question of The Act, i.e. the non-Christian explosive of breaking in two world histories? It classifies and puts it last, but what relation between art as Apollonian solitude of the adoration of appearance and the assurance of breaking in two world histories in arch-politics? Finally the question of what is the relation between being an artist and being a philosopher? Between being an artist and being a philosopher, there is a disjunction, a fissure in final Nietzsche. It was said that the theme

of Nietzsche deploys the theme of the artist-philosopher. Nietzsche would be the inventor of this form which is often mentioned; reality but rather was a tear at the end of this theme, and even a disintegration. The philosopher-artist is caught in an essential disjunction that makes the artist basically become the mourning of high art, i.e. the renunciation of conjunction, or if you will, Apollo's solitude. The philosopher has entrusted to it The Act, without the resource of art, which is a wounded solitude. There we are. And finally the ultimate question asked to us by Nietzsche, is in my view an enigma for art, an enigma about the nature of the relations between art and philosophy. There is a legacy of Nietzsche on this point: what is the nature of the relations between art and philosophy?

It is bequeathed by the same explosion of the theme of the artist-philosopher, by the disjunction that explodes in terminal Nietzsche. We can summarize what we finally agreed on in this legacy. What is the content of this legacy? What does Nietzsche leave us, in this disjointed state?

The theme of high art whose paradigm is Greek. It started before him, and transited after him, but it is an essential moment. Philosophy, says Nietzsche, philosophy, is a free and Hyperborean spirit (not the ascetic Christian), and anti-philosophy (the Nietzschean version of the philosopher), the philosopher discerns the principle of high art and supports its return. The link is clear, under the hypothesis of high art: discerning the principle and supporting the return. This is Nietzsche of the Birth of Tragedy. The ambiguity of the relation to Wagner is already there. The principle of art is a paradoxical conjunction, but one where we can say that it is the last resort of the infinite and the finite. The task of philosophy is to discern in high art the

proper mode of the conjunction between the finite and the infinite that it offers, and to support the return. I suggest naming this disposition the romantic disposition, i.e. Nietzsche was romantic, and suggested an outpouring of romanticism (he called Romanticism a great show). One could call the romantic this form of link between art and philosophy which in philosophy sets the task of identifying in art a form of singular conjunction between the finite and the finite. Nietzsche has given it all sorts of names: tragedy ... there is such a disposition in Nietzsche.

- There is the theme of art as a unity or radiant intensity of appearance, art as a formal principle focused on the intensity of showing, i.e. in a sense as the formal capturing of life itself, as reaffirmation of life in the element of appearance taken in its form. What is the duty of philosophy in this case? The duty is to show that in this case, art is not to be crowded, crushed by the question of truth. The task of philosophy is to deliver art that is not only the radiant proposal of appearance itself, of all the threats imposed on it by philosophy in its ascetic, critical, Christian form, which claims to entrust art to its task, its duty, educational capacity, and informative will. The philosopher supports art in its pure vital vocation, i.e. in the pure intensity of its appearance, and to deliver it from a destination to the true, good, and well. Philosophy is at the service of letting art be as it is. The subjective principle is a principle of simplicity and cheerfulness, a principle of subjectivity. It is the principle of pleasure: the purpose of art is to please, and this is not to instruct, educate, to direct the good towards the truth, the good, or to be profound. It is to please, precisely in the sense of pleasing in the pure flame that rises to the blue sky. I propose to call this arrangement the conventional

arrangement. In this sense, Nietzsche was also a classic, and he has also argued it once he has exhausted the inconsistency or imposture of art. From Nietzsche alone do we inherit a classic configuration and a romantic configuration that is intricately knotted. Eventually this will be concentrated in the mystery of the artist. He is a fundamentally equivocal and versatile figure. The artist as a type summarizing Nietzsche's complexity:

As far as he is thought of as a man of the conjunction, i.e. as an artist of high art (there is Aeschylus, for example), given the artist is a man of the conjunction, he is a man of truth, despite everything. For after all there is a Nietzschean concept of truth, and it is indeed him, the man of tragedy. The truth is tragedy. Not only is truth tragic, but tragedy is the truth: through a miracle, the Greek will comes to be held in conjunction where separation makes an ascetic damnation and misdirection of humanity. Because ultimately the unleashing of reactive forces is linked to the dissociation of what tragedy joins to. It is only by working in this dissociation that Socratism, then Christianity will be able to enslave humanity in the unleashing of reactive forces. It is the moral, i.e. essentially untruth in Nietzsche's sense (vital affirmation). This tragedy is the truth. Thus the tragic artist, the true tragic artist, is indeed a man of truth as much as a man of conjunction. This is perhaps the only man of truth recognized by Nietzsche.

- On the other hand, in another sense, which is given to him from high art, the artist is Apollo's solitude, i.e. the man of simple appearance, i.e. the contrary of the man of life illusion. The man of the useful life illusion, one that strengthens power circumstantially, without conjunction (i.e. the truth). Hence Nietzsche will say that the artist is a type of truth and sometimes a

type of illusion, which allows him to recognize in Wagner his identity as an artist. But Wagner cannot be recognized as an artist (impostor) because the figure of the artist is equivocal, and can be taken between 2 different meanings.

Therefore the Romantic disposition, Classic disposition, the ambiguous figure of the artist, where are we in the relations of art to philosophy, and how have we crossed Nietzsche's field?

The key question is what constitutes art, with regard to philosophy, in the possibility of relations that are intricate and elusive, even contradictory, the question of what this pertinent unity is. What does philosophy call art, and what is the relevant unity? This is not simple, and in Nietzsche there is Wagner, tragedy, the artist, and Carmen. There is a variability of naming: the author, the work, a sequence or a genre. This question is paramount. If after Nietzsche we wish to consider the question of the relations of art and philosophy, there is a question of determining the pertinent unity of this relation; is it the work of art that gives art, the work of an artist, or the artist? Often it is the artist who is in a sense more important than the work. Is it something else? (Tragedy.)

There is a primary element of demarcation, and it could be decided in Nietzsche himself that as we adopt the theme of the work as a pertinent unity for philosophy or the type of the artist, or of unique sequences (tragedy), one nodes art and philosophy differently. We open up different hypotheses on the relation of art to philosophy. I will leave this issue for next time, to address directly: if we try to think about the question of the relation between art and philosophy, what is the specification of the very presence of art? What

does philosophy call art? In Nietzsche himself, there had been great complexity in the issue of the question of the naming of philosophy of art prior to the question of relations, which initiates the relation. That will be for next time...

### **New Course Five - Knottings [The Penultimate Course]**

...Having said everything, or at least the essential, leading us to Nietzsche's legacy on the question of art, and specifically on the question of the node between art and philosophy, in the contemporary guise of this question, I think it's still all the same as far as Nietzsche, or Nietzsche's anti-philosophy, are concerned. The question learned this century is: where are we in the relation between art and philosophy, a complex and controversial question. We have demonstrated that the question of art was evidently both central and deeply divided in Nietzsche To recall to just how true this is, and how it has remained central to the end, I would like to read you a fragment from spring 88, which is after all a true hymn to art: "Art and nothing but art, it alone is what makes life possible, and it is the great temptation that leads

to living, the great stimulant that pushes us to live. Art, the only antagonistic force superior to any denial of life. Art, anti-Christianity, anti-Buddhism, and anti-nihilism par excellence. Art, redemption of what one knows, of what one sees, which wants to see the terrible and problematic character of existence of one who not only sees, but lives, and wishes to live the terrible and problematic character or existence of the tragic man and warrior, the hero. Art as the redemption of one who suffers, provides access to states in which suffering is willed, transfigured, deified; where suffering is a form of great joy." There we are!

Still to the end there is art, nothing but art. This thesis is, in a certain sense, one could say, the last word of Nietzsche's anti-philosophy. That is the very moment he writes, "The philosopher is the criminal of criminals," and he writes the conjunction, "art and nothing but art." One could argue that there is a general movement which in some manner sacrifices philosophy to art, in the name of its superior force and transformation of life, including, essentially, the life of suffering. And at the same time we have seen that from inside this powerful generality that finally devotes existence to art, and, inversely, saves or relieves existence through art, there is a split, division, and extreme complexity of development that forms the motto, "art and nothing but art," to stumble, really, on a more essential question which is, "what is art?". Art and nothing but art, of course. But ultimately, art. In this hymn, art is supposed as far as its existence. As far as there is art, then yes, art and nothing but art. But what is art, and is there art? These are questions that the masked philosopher must address, whatever the antiphilosopher's devotion to art may be.



On this question, there is in final Nietzsche:

On one hand a 1st assemblage, a 1st device, revolving around the theme of high art and the collapse of this device, around Case of Wagner

Along with a hasty sketch of something else, which in some way remains, on some level, undecided.

Thus Nietzsche has bequeathed us (1st point), the question of art, contemporary art, whether there is art, as a formidable and by no means evident question. By no means evident, even taken up in the shadow of the near-certainty that in any case there is no high art, i.e. art which would be in the form of the eternal return of Greek art (this is the return of Greek art or primordial tragedy).

And we had said last time that ultimately this split makes Nietzsche's legacy on the question of art a complex legacy for us, which in no way settles, in one form, as a hymn to art, in the 20th century, as a superior aesthetic form of existence, but enters one of the most difficult considerations to resolve and decide.

We had said that there is in Nietzsche the legacy of a possible Romantic disposition, re-transformed, reworked, which would be the tragic disposition, strictly speaking, the modern tragic disposition, whose philosophy would identify the principle, support the return, as Nietzsche had done for a long time around and concerning Wagner. And this is where one can say that the central maxim is that the artist of high art is he who performs the paradoxical conjunction of the finite and the infinite.

Parenthesis: I use the word "conjunction", in the sense of a conjunction of the dream and intoxication, and of the Apollonian and the Dionysian, to indicate that this is not dialectic. I quite agree with Deleuze (this is not in a configuration of contradiction, in the sense of the Hegelian movement, but it is a conjunction and almost a forced one, at that, and in this force we find the Nietzschean concept of power, i.e. that the power of the artist is precisely joining in strength with something, while by itself it does not allow itself be conjoined. It has the puissance of the conjunction itself. This is what forms great tragedy. The conjunction of the finite and infinite is really a conjunction and not the Becoming or succession of one by the other, or a movement of contradiction.

Emerging in the final Nietzsche is a conventional arrangement (with a genealogy), where art is taken not in the power of the conjunction but rather a principle of simplicity and cheerfulness. There is an absence of any depth, basically related to the previous conjunction. It would spill over into the Apollonian form as such, i.e. the taste and the commitment of the appearance taken in its form. In this case we could say art is essentially finished. One could even say: art is the content affirmation of finitude. So there is that, this double provision.

And then the artist, who is a figure left by Nietzsche in a fundamentally equivocal status. I would like to mention that this idea of the character who is fundamentally equivocal is a decadence of the modern artist. Precisely because it is no longer taken in the simple power of conjunction, of high art, but taken in a simple movement which is itself not found on some level in modern art, this idea that the artist who is

fundamentally equivocal will have a very large artistic posterity. I also think of the novelistic universe of Thomas Mann. Actually, this universe is haunted or inhabited by a meditation or immanent return of the theme of the equivocal nature of the artist's figure, distributed somewhat metaphorically between health and disease, as if there had been something in the artist which is always in imposture to assert as a health as well essentially a disease. I.e. to deploy in the form of formal splendor something that is actually in its inmost being pathological or perverse. And the artist, in Mann as well, will be flushed out with creative sincerity to the point where at bottom it is possible glory in artistic appearance, and he alone, of immanent givenness that is precisely deprived of any health. It is thus in a sense the power of the powerless.

So in reality it would be necessary to relate this point to the ambiguity in Nietzsche from the relation between art and sexuality (compare with the last time we discussed this). This question of the relationship between art and sexuality is omnipresent in Mann, metaphorically or directly. It is true that Nietzsche has a sort of great ambivalence on this point: he also argues simultaneously or in short diachronies, that:

High art has a policy of joyfully and affirmatively considering sexual orgiastic element, from Birth of Tragedy (and then this is accompanied by the anti-ascetic polemic, Christianity as the fundamental device that represses instincts)

And he argues at the same time that the artist is essentially a chaste figure, i.e. a figure that does not abandon itself to the immediacy of sexual desire. This is quite a Freudian theme, i.e. that after all there is only one

libidinal energy, a single reserve of power. And if we squander it in pleasure, it is as far as lost for art. If it is executed, it is not sublime.

So we have two examples on this point:

- Posthumous Fragments, but in the moments Nietzsche revisits the whole of his work, both for writing *Ecce Homo*, his biography in mind, and to write Nietzsche against Wagner (I said the last time that there was in Nietzsche this emotionally moving terminal aspect of ranking papers or some of his papers). Unfortunately for the rest of his papers, it is his sister who ranks them. She has not given a second thought to doing this. She has ranked some of them the same. And what he classified revolves around the re-routing of his work. I re-punctuate upon this point: he does it in part because it has become essential to state that there is Nietzsche. The point should not be lost sight of. It is not at all testamentary itself. It is the whole scheduling of evidence publicly that there is Nietzsche. Nietzsche himself is a category of thought in Nietzsche terminal, not a person in psychology. It has to do, then, with educating the public validation of the Nietzschean category where I had said that it comes from where high art was a failure, the category was going where high art was in failure, the category was going to hide, as I said, the explicit opening with the collapse of the theme of high art. This is the deep meaning of the title "Nietzsche contra Wagner".

In one of those texts where he revisits *Birth of Tragedy* (his final stage), in November 88, he speaks of the orgiastic mystery "that ensured the Hellenic through these mysteries? Eternal life, the eternal return of life, the promise and consecration of the future in procreation, a triumphant yes to life beyond death and change, real life, global survival in the city and in the community,

the sex ratio, the sexual symbol thought of as the most venerable symbol in itself, the true symbolic epitome...". So the sex ratio and sexual symbol thought of as the very concentration of Hellenic heritage, which is in other parts depicted as high art, and adds, "I do not know a of any symbol higher than sexual symbolism. It took Christianity to make sexuality base. The concept of immaculate conception was the worst psychological baseness ever achieved on Earth ..." So we have on the first side: the idea that finally high art in its Greek origin is crucially related to the question of the sex ratio, the symbolism of the sexes, and that there is an essential node to consider between the sexual dimension of existence, without the form of sin, without it being marked by the form of sin, and the ability to affirm life in the form of high art. The lack of asceticism, the absence of repressive figure, the absence of disfigurement of sex as such by Nietzsche is assigned to the highest affirmation of the vital power. It is a Dionysian text.

But by October of 1888, and thus at the same time, and in passages that were left or correlated: one finds here the artist: "Still, on average, the artist is actually under the duress of his mission, of his will to control,, a temperate man, often even a chaste man. The dominant instinct required of him does not allow him to exert himself at will. It is a single force that is spent in the artistic design and the sexual act. There is only one kind of force. Succumbing to this, wasting oneself in that, it is treason for an artist. This betrays a lack of instinct, and will, this can be a sign of decay; in any case, it depreciates his art to an incalculable point. I take the most unpleasant case, the case of Wagner. Wagner, bewitched by this incredibly unhealthy sexuality that was the curse of his life, knew only too well what an artist loses when he loses in his own

eyes his freedom, his respect for himself. He was sentenced to be an actor. His art itself becomes for him a constant attempt to escape, a way to forget, to stun. This alters, and ultimately determines the character of his art. Such an un-free man needs a world of hashish, of strange mists, which are heavy and enveloping, all kinds of exoticism and symbolism of the ideal, even if it were only to get rid of his own reality. Such a man needs Wagnerian music.

Thus, I do not wish to dwell upon this issue but it is still significant. In a certain sense, the division that I propose to perceive in the doctrine of Nietzsche's art can also be spoken of in these terms. It is a purely Apollonian text, i.e. an entire text that is entirely on the site of the control of form. We must not forget that the Dionysian form of art surrendered firmly, but surrendered affirmatively: it is that of the surrender of art in the form of life. While the Apollonian form is the form in control. Of course, the one and the other have their affirmative and reactive dimensions (compare with Deleuze on this point, an excellent analysis). But the Dionysian affirmation is in a sense precisely in the surrender or an almost unconscious yes to vital power. While the affirmative dimension on the Apollonian side is made up of formal mastery that submits the appearance to affirm the pure appearance. Thus it is quite clear, as we said last time, that this combination no longer belongs within final Nietzsche. In a certain manner, we continue to find valuations of the Dionysian element, and there are also the valuations of the Apollonian element, increasingly considerable indeed, and it's the classic side that prevails gradually, but the conceptuality of the conjunction (which regulates the principle of art in *Birth of Tragedy*) is weakened. There somewhat of a split, which happens to no longer hold everything together, not only in art

itself, but not in art itself but also in the thought of art and sexuality. Sexuality will also be considered from the Dionysian side as the superior symbol, where art is nourished, and from the Apollonian side, from the mastery of form, as an outright squandering of energy (like a loss of power). This will have a great literary and artistic fortune after Nietzsche, in Mann and others, with a psychoanalytic glaze above it. But ultimately the question will be established in the following terms: what does art have to do with sex? The question turns explicit, and you see that has not, strictly speaking, awaited Freud's psychoanalytic device. It is explicit in Nietzsche, but it is an issue that is really not going to take up the form of relation between sexual energy or libido, and art, but more insistently, it is already fully present in Nietzsche's text on Wagner, and will take the form of a question that is the relationship between perversion and art. This is what will become the insistent question, as if in a certain way the theme of affirmative Greek sexuality which Nietzsche talks about in the first text, was an issue that could no longer be modern, and was in truth mythical. You should see that this sexual symbolism is ordered in procreation, and it is civic sexuality, sexuality in the toils of its collective destination, even when it is celebrated in the manner of this orgy, it is this sexuality that is celebrated. For Nietzsche it is like that.

And contrarily, in Wagner, this is the theme of a morbid sexuality that is overlooked, and it is ultimately a perverse or perverted sexuality. I think from this point of view, art itself becomes a sexual analysis and it is presented or proposed also as an analysis of sex and particularly as an analysis of its versatility, i.e. in its non-univocal character. There is no unanimous view of sex, either in its standard or prohibited form. So it looks like the art of the

early century in various forms (quite striking in paintings) was haunted by the question of the relation of artistic resource itself, not just sexual - in terms of mere energy - but in the versatility of its effects. And indeed on a terrain I do not exactly believe to be that of a problem of sublimation. This here is the point: it was not exactly in terms of not wasting energy in an oddity of all kinds, but it is necessary to reserve it for the formal simplicity of Apollonian art, and it is not in the classical view, but in this vision which introduces or ties the question of artistic ability itself to the question of the versatility of forms of sexuality. To give an example, we can say that *Death in Venice* by Thomas Mann is a kind of symbol of that. That's its subject. That is why it is an exemplary text on this point (Visconti understood that well). The subject is not so much death, as mentioned in the title; the question: what is the artist able to think from the point of his art, of his own desire? This is the question. I think this has been a question that in fact is quite central. It is often taken under the scheme of the intrusion of psychoanalysis in the form of art. I believe this is the 2nd point. I mentioned it in Nietzsche to show that more originally before the shrink, and in the most immediate manner, the meditation in thought that he proposes for it, there is a destination for art itself, for post-Nietzschean art, that is appropriated as internally at stake from its future, the question of its relation to the versatility of the sexual. This is present, and absolutely essential in Nietzsche. There we go!

We had concluded that by saying: finally, the most insistent question Nietzsche leaves us, in this complex panorama, is ultimately that of: what is philosophy as understood by the name of art? It's too easy to say what is the essence of art or what is art? It is a timeless and general question. The



Nietzschean question, its torment through which this question of high art is most greatly specified: there is nothing but art, and it saves life. Alright, but what is understood by this name of art? This question is all the more disturbing when trying to recapture in Nietzsche that basically, there is a circularity in Nietzsche on this point. There is a circularity because on a closer look, the statement that art is what saves life, it is what raises suffering, etc ... is also, in truth, the only definition of art it ultimately offers. I.e. that art saves life, but what is art? What saves life. There are not so many other definitions. It is the non-Christian, non-nihilistic form of the relation to life. This is the only real anti-nihilistic power. But if you wonder about the assignment of this power, as in what is its trait, its singularity, what gesture or procedure it is, there is very little. In a sense, I would argue that one of the enigmas that Nietzsche leaves is that art is omnipresent in his work without somehow being identified, or identified in quite disparate and fugitive protocols. Because of this essential circularity which is that we recognize in this thing that allows living, but in a sense, this is precisely what it is, the power that enables living. But in the question what is really understood under this name, the political Nietzsche is very difficult to reconstruct.

But I think that on this point he has left a real question, even with this slightly obscure circularity. A real question which is precisely what philosophy is in a state to understand under the name of art has indeed become problematic, quite problematic. It is a question that has no evidence.

I would not say that this attests to a crisis in art, for example, although Nietzsche argues this to the extent of there being a collapse of the principle of high art. But I think that the question of philosophical identification of art

is a matter which is greatly muddled. It is perhaps muddled from the moment it became clear that this identification could not be made in the register of an aesthetic. And it will be argued that the last aesthetics is actually that of Hegel. What do we mean by aesthetics? We mean by aesthetics precisely a mode of functioning of the name of art in philosophy. It is a certain mode of functioning of the name of art in philosophy called art in philosophy. And this functioning, which is very original, which we may think in this sense of Hegel is the last form, consists of identifying art in its relation to the idea. Art as the specific instance of the idea. The idea in the sense that otherwise, such and such philosophers will give it (e.g. Plato's Idea, Hegel's Absolute). But there, in a general manner, philosophy is tied to art by examining art as a singular figure at the heart of presenting the idea. Art is one of the modes in which the idea is present. Even Kant's aesthetics is still under this maxim in complex ways, including in the registration of the fact that it has to do in some manner with the presentation of the idea without concept. The general theme of aesthetics, finally in this sense, is when even the theme according to art is present in the form of the idea. Something like that. In any case it is a node of the sensible and the idea, which can be presentative, devalued or on the contrary revalued, but it is a node of the sensible/idea. It is the relation between art and philosophy in terms of aesthetics. Basically, you see an aesthetic that's what sets art i.e. in its place. From the point of philosophy, it is an operation of philosophical placement of art. And like any placement it is done in a space of places, and therefore virtually always in a hierarchy of presentations of the idea. Hence, finally the fact that we almost always acknowledge an aesthetic in the fact that between other things that proposes a hierarchy of the arts themselves, because the

placement of art with philosophy is also an intrinsic placement of the arts in the space left to art. We would have fairly simple criteria. It looked like quite simple criteria, for example in aesthetics, art is always placed, i.e. in reality compared to other things, arranged in a space of placement which establishes its uniqueness or its difference by relation precisely from other forms of the idea (philosophy, or science), and then finally this placement is refined, is singularized, or carried out in a hierarchical arrangement of the arts, in a classification of the arts, philosophical classification of the arts, because obviously the arts is the proper mode in which the place of art is fulfilled. The role of art is never fulfilled except by the deployment of the arts. So there's going to be a topology, and any aesthetic is a topology of the arts. On one hand one art, on another hand, another art. Finally we can say in the lexicon of metaphysics that there will be a higher art and lower arts. A hierarchy will be arranged. The mode of its node of supreme art to the idea is the antechamber of something else, while on the contrary there is a more inferior art that is knotted to something else. So here I call aesthetics a generic form of node between philosophy and art, and one could say that it is in the order of placement. And once again, the empirical sign of the order of placement, is the philosophical ability to offer a philosophical classification of Fine Arts. And so in an aesthetic we must see that philosophy intervenes in a manner of evaluation, and it provides an evaluation of the arts, and all placement is also an evaluation, a comparative evaluation, hierarchical, so that aesthetics is also normative. One cannot necessarily say that it distributes a principle ... concerning works, but it is normative categorically, concerning the general system of fine arts. If we roughly examine Hegel's doctrine, it is an aesthetic in this sense, perhaps the most accomplished one, and we find there what we

just said: classing, classification, and simultaneously the history of arts, and as you know, it is accompanied by the thesis that art is finished. The thesis of finished art, one must understand it. This does not mean there are no works of art, or there will be none: art will not bring anything new to thought.

Where art is now capable, philosophy is capable in a sublime manner. Art is relieved of his duties. That does not mean he does not continue empirically. Hegel's thesis is a thesis of placement, but it is historicized, it is a thesis of the end. Actually, I think what Hegel states, and justifiably so, is in my opinion the end of aesthetics; not the end of art, but the end of the aesthetic disposition of the relation of philosophy to art. There is something that is completed there, but this is not art, not even in the sense that Hegel mentions it. I do not, and we cannot believe that art has fulfilled the destiny of thought which is its own, the innovative singularity of its invention, the proposition that is its own, that it was relieved of the philosophical appropriation of the absolute idea, but what we can believe is that the aesthetic node of art with philosophy reaches its terminal edge. Thus the inherited portion of philosophical intelligibility of art would become obsolete with Hegel, and have completed its virtues of thought with Hegel. We could argue that. Hegel marks not the end of art, but the end of this particular disposition of the philosophical in art, namely aesthetics. This would be the final aesthetics, something like that. For Hegel, there is an identification between the end of aesthetics and the end of art, since its thesis is that philosophical appropriation of art exhausts its essence. For Hegel, aesthetics is the last thought of which art is capable. So the end of the aesthetics can be interpreted as the end of art. This is not inconsistent. For we must separate

the two things, if we do not think that the philosophical investment exhausts the essence of art. There is no end of art, but the end of the aesthetic assemblage of the relation of philosophy to art ... Nietzsche is a modern thinker of art, because his approach to art is not subject to an aesthetic. Nietzsche is the one who considers thought at the end of aesthetics as a form inherited from the node of philosophy and art. It is thus a dimension that could be called post-aesthetic from the Nietzschean relation with art. Take note that we cannot bring the philosophy to art in the categories of aesthetics. I note in passing that this Actually applies to the relationship of philosophy to the system of its entire conditions.

We cannot argue in modernity that the relation of philosophy to science can be done in the order of knowledge. But in a sense, the thesis of knowledge, in the relation of philosophy to science, bears the same relation that philosophy has to art. This is where there is an overall crisis that does not concern procedures that are involved; art, science, but it concerns the way that philosophy is tied to these procedures. It is roughly the undermining of aesthetics, of the theory of knowledge, or epistemology, but also the difficulty of political philosophy. On the particular issue of art, the importance of Nietzsche is in trying to establish itself in a non-aesthetic relationship to art. This is his greatness. And then what is bequeathed to us regarding this point, if we share this issue, and I deeply believe that we share it; in effect, we are all orphans of aesthetics. The attempt of the refabricate, to hem it up, is reactive. There is not, and there will be no aesthetics in modernity, and no longer will there be epistemology or political philosophy. It's good for the

academic group. So Nietzsche has left us this point, but it indicates or specifies to us that there are difficulties. This difficulty is twofold.

You could consider it on the side of philosophy: i.e. is philosophy as such capable of a relationship with art other than aesthetics? Is it not, if I may say, viscerally aesthetic on this point? That's the first question. You see the importance of it: if in some sense philosophy is actually incapable of a relationship with art other than aesthetics, the collapse of aesthetics after Hegel is only a symptom of the collapse of philosophy to the test of art. At the end of the account, modernity would be a time when the philosopher is unable to stand the test of art. And this would be a symptom of his own dereliction: the test of art would be in reality fatal for philosophy. It would demonstrate its incapacity, because as aesthetics is obsolete, it does not happen to settle in a relation to art that is at all inventive or renewed. Now that it's evident Nietzsche shares this conviction, to some degree, that's the very problem. He does not agree with it fully, but he shares it to some degree, i.e. to some degree he is really an anti-philosopher, and he says that the need for anti-philosophy, the polemic against philosophy, is educated by art. The test of art organizes anti-philosophy, and not philosophy. We'll have the maxim: art, nothing but art, which does not mean anything but: not philosophy. So the first question: assuming that ultimately philosophy is to some degree identified by aesthetics, then the thesis of the aesthetics of collapse is a thesis on philosophy, and not just on the relation of art/philosophy. If philosophy is subjected to the test of modern art, what is noticed is its inability to sustain this test, for it still attempts to restore the ruined category of aesthetics. Another way to say it is the following:

aesthetics is a position of control. Philosophy is the master, especially the master of art. Aesthetics is philosophy holding upon art the discourse of the master. It indicates the place in a hierarchy. We could say that Nietzsche is symbolic of the removal of any ability to exercise control over art. It would be this: basically, philosophy has always tried to have with art a relation of control, and with the statement of the end of art we reach the height of this control, but it is also indeed its collapse. Removed from its possible position of control of art in its aesthetic configuration, philosophy is finally disposed of its identity, if it is true that the identity of its discourse is that of the master. This gives the following question: Is philosophy capable of maintaining a relation to art that is not a relation of control? Can philosophy wish to do something else with art than master it? It is well known that a solution proposed in this century has been reversed, i.e. it is art which is the master of philosophy. The tendency found in this century: since philosophy should be removed of its form of control with regard to art, in this removal, it is art that is the true educator, the form of invention, breakthrough, blinding revelation, and philosophy shortly behind. There is also some of this in Nietzsche. Art is the great education of those who know, art is the real master, the master of life. This would leave us a second question: can philosophy have a relation with art that is neither control nor submission? i.e. at the bottom where we indeed renounce the aesthetic project, without having to shout "art, nothing but art," which deifies slightly.

The word "deify" in Nietzsche's text: art is a deification of life and of suffering. One could say this: Is philosophy capable of proposing in contemporary conditions, of art and itself, what might be called a free relation

to art? This would undoubtedly be the question Nietzsche has left us. What is meant by free relation, is a relation that is not taken up on one side or the other in the form of control. What is a free relation that is not negative, or in the form of control?

That is the first question on the side of philosophy. We will return to it in our final session. But you see that the point is as always when it has to do with freedom and equality. What is an egalitarian relation between philosophy and art, an egalitarian relation that envelops the radical principle of differentiation of the two. So oddly enough, the key point is to understand that at one end and the other it has nothing to do with the same things. It is the absolute condition for equality. If it is the same thing, you are in a form which is inevitably a form of rivalry. If it's the same thing that circulates between art and philosophy, one wonders which is carried out more completely, radically. Ultimately, given the dialectic of Becoming of the absolute idea, philosophy raises art, there has been an era of art, but it is completed. So the key point, which in Nietzsche is obscure, is ultimately the intelligibility of the fact that the operations in thought which are at stake in the 2 cases, are not the same.

The side of art begs the question: what does art think? With the background of the fact that what he thinks is not in rivalry, subsuming, or placement, for example, of what philosophy thinks. A free relation assumes that at some given point there is not a circulating category something that circulates between the two, which is shared between the two, which is expressed by the two, and that makes for some inextricable [sensory] node where it is then captive in a process of control.



So the first job would be to deliver art from circulating categories that render it homogeneous to philosophy, and mutually, removing philosophy from categories that make it homogeneous art, and establishing a radical disjunction. This disjunction is not established by Nietzsche. It reverses the hierarchy. Ultimately, for Nietzsche, it is philosophy that is finished. But then what happens? Art, nothing but art! But on this particular point, in my view, Heidegger does not say anything really. He says metaphysics is finished. And provisionally at least that there is a poem, but it is a reversal of the Hegelian theme that art is finished and tied to philosophy. The free relation that I speak of cannot settle in a reversal, but what is required first of all is a disjunction. And so the question would be: if the question that art thinks, that philosophy thinks, is disjoined, one must assert the heterogeneity. The difficulty, then, is as follows: asking the question "what does art think"? If it is philosophy that asks this question, it is re-established in control and ultimately it will offer a new aesthetic form. So we are absolutely constrained to the following thesis which argues that art itself thinks what art thinks. Art will be understood not only as a thinking but also necessarily as the site of this thought. And this here is the *sine qua non* condition of the egalitarian relation. It is not merely a question of disjunction, and to say that philosophy thinks art is that it restores thought to a position of control, and eventually aesthetics. Thus, the true consequence of the ruin of ethics to which Nietzsche is a fundamental witness, is that art must be seen as thought, and as thought of the thought that it is. This is not a reflection, but it must be intrinsic, i.e. art should in its effectiveness be thought of what it is, the thought that it thinks. And of course not as far as he would propose an aesthetics. It is clear that art and artists can borrow from philosophemes and fabricate aesthetics.

This is not the issue. Within the rigorous meaning of aesthetics, it doesn't have to do with that. The process of art itself must be the element of identification of its own thought. Furthermore, it is quite essential to maintain that such has always been the identity of art, and not to reserve this attribute to contemporary art. We must insist on this because it is quite important in my view. You know the doctrine that contemporary art should be aware, an art showing its own operation, an art whose subject is art, etc. ... is a common site of modernity. One would say: yes, artistic modernity, it is an art that has received self-consciousness sufficient to testify of its own protocol. So a painting that shows itself as a painting, music that carries the dialectic of its own operations, a literature that starts in the abyss of its own text. That characterizes artistic modernity. It's not the thesis that I support here. I argue a thesis on contemporary art as an avant-garde form carrying art to an immanent consciousness of itself. Or in other words: it has to do with establishing a new relationship between philosophy and art, and this relation should not be based on a thesis that singularizes the artistic sequence itself. But it should as always retrogression to the whole issue, by assuming that art has always been the thought of thought. Why is this important? Because otherwise, one makes this characteristic a consequence of the ruin of aesthetics. If we think that only contemporary art has reached a form of self-consciousness, or a form of thought that it is, it will be said that this is because it has ceased to be thought by philosophy in the element of aesthetics. So it's a consequence of the un-knotting of the interiority of art to its own thought. Thus the form of modernity where the time of splitting would itself be philosophical, namely in the ruin of the aesthetic device would be the real opening up, a clearing of artistic modernity. We would have the story of a

liberation: with the collapse of aesthetics, art would be freed from control and thus appropriate the immanent categories of its destiny. It will be said in other words that art is delivered or renewed by the end of metaphysics. But that's not it. As for me, I do not think that; I do not believe in fidelity to final Nietzsche, that this is a negative Event in the history of philosophy, i.e. the collapse of aesthetics or even the collapse of metaphysics, which commands the internal destiny of art. I think that the form of a new node between art and philosophy offers an immanent identification of art as the characteristic of art, quite simply, and not as a characteristic of art at the time of the collapse of metaphysics. This characteristic is timeless, like any real characterization.

So if we at last narrow down the issue, we could also say:

- On the side of philosophy, it has to do with assessing the role played by aesthetics. What role has aesthetics played? One could say: it was mastering art, fine, but why was it so important for philosophy? What did it have to do with in this case? Plato eliminates  $\frac{3}{4}$  of it in order to master art. He exiles the poet, and only allows the patriotic song and still nothing else. In the assessment of this case, and if we give it a technical form: what role does aesthetics have in the classical philosophical disposition? And it has to assume the categories of a relation to non-aesthetic art, which are not a vassalage or kneeling in front of art. One would have gained nothing, finally. One would have redistributed control. I believe that the element of balance can in no way be neglected. One is not at the end of knowing what role aesthetics has played, and what was the meaning of this node Nietzsche demonstrates its collapse, he testified to it, he took it upon himself to be the

historical witness to a time when the relation of could no longer be aesthetics, and to some degree tipped into the unlimited apology of art.

If we take the question from the side of art, the essential point to know is what, and how should the artistic procedure proceed for it to be thought from thinking as such? This brings us back to the question from last time: to think about it, art is a thought but is also immanently the thought of what it is. What is the unity of this examination? What is true unity? We had seen that there were three options for it. What does Nietzsche mean by art? There are at least three possibilities. We understand art as the work of art or works of art, or indeed there is very little meant by it in Nietzsche. Its cutting art is fairly around the work. When he speaks of Wagner he is not singling out a texture or a work that interests him. There is the artist, another figure of possible unity, and this is a very important category, but fundamentally equivocal. And then there are categories of another type, for example, that of tragedy. It is not reducible to one or more works, but is a category in itself, but it is not reducible to the artist or artists, or consists as a subjective unity. There is a unity of examining, constituted by any evidence. It is a category of investigation. What is there at stake in thought?

So it seems to me that there may be a 2nd sequence of summoning in Nietzsche which is fully different, re-summoning or repunctuating Nietzsche or a completely different way, focusing less in some sense on conceptual theme gradually forged from 1st Nietzsche, which revolves around will to power, but paying more attention to what I would call strictly the core of Nietzsche's anti-philosophy, i.e. in a sense calling upon philosophy to endure Nietzsche's anti-philosophy and to find there information on the protocol of

its own reconstruction. So it would not be Nietzscheanism, strictly speaking. The form of Nietzscheanism was always undecidable. In fact it was, as we shall see next year, the same as discussed in Wittgenstein, but in a proper mode in which philosophical uncertainty calls upon eminent figures from his opponent, i.e. one that has always denounced it as illusion or suggested therapy. Not to rally around this anti-philosophical perspective but to make it a test plan for a restoration, from a new perspective, where philosophy might prove itself capable. I think that something like that is happening, including in the work you submitted to me on Nietzsche. It is around the true meaning of the Nietzschean act that the issue is brought up, more than in the attempt to restore a Nietzschean conceptuality in the modality of critical genealogy or the destruction of the ascetic form of nihilism. This is my first remark.

So it seems to me to result directly from the opportunity to revisit the issue of history. These comments on this 2nd Untimely Meditation are specifically oriented toward the question of politics in history. This indicated that the question, "what is thinking about history?" Can we think of history?" is what it means, and in fact, is a question that is fully important and difficult from our actuality. And after all, in the circumstantial collapse of the Hegelian-Marxist view of history, the theme or anti-historicist interrogation of Nietzsche has held our attention. Or let us say in other words, we can imagine that we are in an age that is struggling with the legacy of historicism, in its inherited great figure, after all, of the Hegelian system. It is certain that *2nd Untimely Meditation* explicitly targets certain figures of historicism, that it

develops the vital necessity of the supra-historical. And that undoubtedly what brings your attention to the text is the symptom.

The 2nd, which interested me a good deal, is the matter of an involuntary survey, which is, what texts have you discussed so far? I forbade us from taking into consideration the works of 1888. So what texts were you going to discuss? The survey has given us this: almost the only book that you have discussed is the *Birth of Tragedy*, a book that argues organically and deploys a number of theses. This has been brought up. And then maybe at last the fact that the question of art is understood directly as a challenge, and not understood in a manner that is diagonal and complex. So first the *Birth of Tragedy*. And then after it is the *2nd Untimely Meditation*. The *2nd Untimely Meditation* is a text on history. And it is the 2nd text you have questioned enthusiastically. So it seems to result directly from the opportunity to revisit the issue of history. These comments on this *2nd Untimely Meditation* are specifically oriented toward the issue of the politics of history. This indicates that the question "what does history think?", and "Can we think of history?" What that means, in fact, is a question that is quite important and difficult from our actuality. And after all, in the circumstantial collapse of the Hegelian-Marxist view of history, the anti-historicist theme or question of Nietzsche has held your attention. Or let us say otherwise, we can imagine that we are in an age that is struggling with the legacy of historicism in its inherited great form, after all, the Hegelian system. It is certain that *2nd Untimely Meditation* has an explicit targeting of certain figures of historicism, that it develops the vital necessity of the suprahistorical. And that

undoubtedly, what has held your substantive attention to this text is the symptom.

The third text addressed is *On the Genealogy of Morals*. What can be said about *Genealogy*, is that it has to do, much more, if I may, of a careful and critical examination of classical Nietzsche. *Genealogy* may be considered especially from the perspective of Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche, which places at its core all non-dialectical opposition to reactive and active forces. It is also at times almost a book, a text that is strongly constructed, and which is attached to the Genealogy, questioning it from the point of view of internal forms, from its conceptuality and its consistency. That is why it seems to me, furthermore, to be a critical review, a critique of common sense, of the term of the classical Nietzschean device, i.e. the genealogical and critical device. These were the remarks. We will not conclude, but close from this viewpoint where we had arrived. I remind you that the issue we had considered as the issue left by Nietzsche was that of the node between art and philosophy, the node between art and philosophy that one may envision.

Either on the side of art (under the issue that may be this node if art is not the return of high art), or on the side of philosophy (wondering what might be the categories of the capturing of art by philosophy, that is not of the order of the Platonic exclusion, nor of the suture or conjunction that one points out in Nietzsche).

On these issues I will attempt to give you some ideas, to point out some hypotheses. I inform you that I've said this elsewhere (you might recognize it), and that finally the central question also seems to me to be what is necessary to understand through art from the point of view of philosophy.

What is the pertinent unity of the exposition of the artistic process, such that philosophy as such is captured? A unity grasped without either art or philosophy coming to occupy a question of control in this correlation.

I would say to establish, once again, the condition of an egalitarian pact between art and philosophy. To establish the unity of the consideration of the question of art, one must examine these different possibilities. We must return to these possibilities. The identification of art in the strict sign of the work (by art one means works of art, and nothing else), the artist (writer, genius, creator) would be another relevant unit, with a complex of work, his works and something else as well, which is not resolved in the simple totality of works considered, and then in the 3rd site of sequential categories, ultimately, as tragedy for Nietzsche. Tragedy is a sequence of existence of what he calls art. A sequence which has its birth, its peak, or center of gravity and its form of internal corruption (Euripides). That defines something that one will call art, but on the basis of a category that neither allows itself to be dissolved, either in terms of the work or in terms of the artist, which is no longer a kind in the sense of academic classification, but a singularity.

Here we are. Next time I would make some assumptions on these issues, on the 2 sides, i.e.:

1. On what conditions can philosophy, while it is de-aestheticized, i.e. freed from aesthetics, or an aesthetic project, i.e. establish a relation with art other than what is contained in aesthetics, i.e. not "art, only art."

2. On what conditions can we identify art as being both a thought and an immanent thinking of this thought? I'll sketch it out.



### **New Course Six : On Philosophy, Subjectivity & Art**

...The Nietzschean Act is the dissolution of any form of sovereignty, not the emergence of a substitute form of sovereignty. In this theme of the artist-king, to which Borreil dedicated a book, one finds this peculiar historical situation, which marks both Romanticism and post-Romanticism,

Nietzsche I, Seminar 1992-1993. Translated & Edited by Wanyoung E Kim

i.e. it covers its broad stratum for nearly the entire 19th century, where the function of art and the artist becomes somewhat preeminent, and where as I proposed to say, any part of philosophy undertakes to suture or conjoin itself to the artistic process in a fully unique way. That's it for the news.

I've corrected your homework. It is not purely formalistic or academic work. But for the most part, between them, we feel a commitment, a personal decision to focus on this, on the correlation that is attempted or practiced between Nietzsche and ourselves. This 1st actuality, where basically, the central theme was, well, let's say, the Nietzsche of the people's vitality, or let's say, the critical Nietzsche of nihilism, thought of as the one who points out the paths or means to overcome nihilism, of reclaiming the people's mythical origin, etc...

Thus it seems to me, that there might be a 2nd sequence of summoning Nietzsche which is altogether different, re-invoking or re-emphasizing Nietzsche in a fully different way, focusing less in some sense on the conceptual theme progressively forged from the 1st Nietzsche, who revolves around will to power, but paying more attention to what I would strictly call the core of Nietzschean anti-philosophy, i.e. in a certain sense it calls on philosophy to endure Nietzsche's anti-philosophy and to find there the information on the protocol of its own reconstruction. So it would not have to do with Nietzscheanism, strictly speaking. The figure of Nietzscheanism has always been undecidable. In fact it was, as we shall see next year, the same as discussed in Wittgenstein but from the proper mode in which philosophical uncertainty calls forth the eminent figures of his apparent opponent, i.e. the one who has always denounced the illusion or proposes

therapeutics. Not to rally around this anti-philosophical perspective but to constitute the test plan for its reconstitution, from a new perspective, whose philosophy could prove itself to be capable. I believe something like that happens, including in the work you have submitted to me on Nietzsche, and it has a lot to do with the true meaning of the Nietzschean act that brings up the question, more than in the attempt to reconstitute a Nietzschean conceptuality in the mode of the critical genealogy or in the destruction of the ascetic form of nihilism. This is my first remark.

The 2nd, which has interested me a great deal, is the matter of an involuntary survey, which concerns what texts you have discussed. I forbade us from taking into account the works of 1888. So what texts were we going to talk about? The survey has given us this: practically the only book that you mentioned is *The Birth of Tragedy*, a book that argues organically, and deploys a number of theses. It has been mentioned. And then perhaps finally, the fact that the question of art is approached directly and simply, and not in a manner that is diagonal or complex. So first the *BT*. And then after the *BT* there is *The 2nd Untimely Meditation*. *The 2nd Untimely Meditation* is a text on history. And it is the 2nd of these texts that you have examined enthusiastically.

Thus it seems to result directly from the opportunity to revisit the issue of history. The commentaries on the *2nd Untimely Meditation* are specifically oriented toward the issue of the politics of history. This points out the question, "what does history think?", "Can we think of history?" What this means, in fact, is a question that is fully important and difficult from our standpoint. And after all, in the circumstantial collapse of the Hegelian-

Marxist view of history, the theme or anti-historicist question of Nietzsche held your attention. Or let us say otherwise, that we can imagine we are in an age that is struggling with the legacy of historicism in its great inherited figure, after all, the Hegelian system. It is certain that the *2nd Untimely Meditation* explicitly targets certain figures of historicism, and that it develops the vital necessity of arch-history. And there, what undoubtedly draws your substantive attention to the text, is the symptom.

The third text is *On the Genealogy of Morals*. What can be said about *Genealogy*, is that it is much more, if I may say, a careful and critical examination of Nietzsche classic. *Genealogy of Morals* may be considered, particularly from the perspective of Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche that places at its heart all non-dialectical opposition of reactive forces and active forces. It is also at times almost a unified book, a strongly constructed text that is attached to the *Genealogy*, questioning it from the point of view of its internal figures, its conceptuality and its consistency. This is why it has to do with what seems to me a critical view, a critique of common sense, in terms of the standard Nietzschean device, i.e. the genealogical and critical device.

These were the remarks. We will not conclude but close from where we had arrived.

I remind you that the issue we considered as the issue left by Nietzsche was that of the node between art and philosophy, the node of art and philosophy that one could consider:

1. Either on the side of art (on the question that that may be this node if art is not the return of high art)

2. Or on the side of philosophy (in wondering what could be the categories of grasping of the grasping of art by philosophy, which are neither of the Platonic order or exclusion, nor any longer of the suture or conjoining that one can point out in Nietzsche).

On these questions I will attempt to give you some ideas, and point out some assumptions. I mentioned to you that I have said this elsewhere (as you may recognize), and that finally the central question also seems to me what must be understood by art from the point of view of philosophy. What is the relevant unity of exposition of the artistic process, such that philosophy as such is grasped? Grasped, such that neither art nor philosophy come to occupy an issue of control in this correlation.

Regarding this point I would like to start by making a kind of census of figures inherited from the node. The line of investigation on this issue seems to me to be taken up as follows. Finally, while everything is concerned in the history of the question on the point of knowing what is the position of art with regard to the truth, truth being taken as an organic category of classic philosophy. In other words, what judgment has philosophy brought to the relation of artistic phenomena to what it would consider its organic or constituent category (namely, the truth)? This is why I would distinguish two essential and macroscopic relations between philosophy and art, according to which philosophy ultimately holds that truth is absolutely exterior to art (i.e. that art is no more than imitation), or as it holds on the contrary, that the truth is rather strictly exposed by art itself (i.e. art is the formal instance, if one can say so for the infinity of truth). Thus what interests us is what these provisions entail about the philosophical limitations of art itself, the order of

statements of philosophy on art. In the first case, if we say that art is basically irreducibly linked to the form of the semblance, or is even inherently mimetic, there will often be 2 consequences:

The first is a philosophical suspicion toward art, which is naturally linked to this fact is that is presented as, we should say, the charm of the truth or truth in its sensible form, and consequently it is presented as the truth in a form capable of capturing emotions, whereas the fatality of truth rests outside it. This will be the first consequence, in the tradition inaugurated by Plato; art will divert suspicion of the truth, and divert from the necessary diversion that leads to the truth, for it is the semblance of an immediacy, that of a truth which operates in the immediacy of the sensible realm. The heart of the process is here, elaborated in the critique of the mimetic of the second manner. Art is presented as if it could exist while not striking the immediacy of the truth, and consequently it is what detours from dialectic, in the sense of the labor of the truth, the long Detour, as Plato says. And so one will consider that it is art from which one must detour, to rediscover the true detour. What is at stake is less the imitation (it simply states that the truth is exterior, but if you could see that, it would not be a big deal). What is serious is that art really functions as if there were an immediate instance of truth. We must strike a rigorous review of suspicion to regain the territory of the dialectic detour, which alone allows access to truth as such, with its movement.

The 2nd consequence is that at the heart of this suspicion, art will be monitored. I.e. art is what should uniquely be from the point of view of philosophy that is monitored. Then what does monitoring mean? Monitoring

means to say that as far as art is a semblance, semblance from the immediacy of the truth, one must monitor the truth where it is the semblance, or truly the truth.

One must appropriate the immediate form from the result of the detour. In other words (and this is monitoring as such), immediacy is in reality a result, the result of what the detour permits us to conquer, and in which we will consent to portraying the appearance of the immediate, which is in reality the appearance of the result of the detour in the semblance of art.

This is why we would call this relation a didactic relation. Ultimately, there is a didactic vocation of art. Art is under the possible control of effects of the semblance which are proper to it, as the effects of the articulated semblance of an extrinsic truth, where the principle truth is not art. Art is a monitored immediacy, or second immediacy. It must be added that the instance of the control, where the territoriality of control is possible for one can measure art by its double effects. From the moment the truth is extrinsic, i.e. where the semblance is controlled, or the immediacy is 2nd, we will reveal its actual effects, and make them public. The public relation always includes, ultimately, the relating of the question of art to the question of its effects.

Rousseau, for example, who belongs to this Platonic tradition, writes: "The shows are made for the people and it is only by their effects upon the people that one can determine their absolute value." In the didactic node between philosophy and art, the absolute of art, effect or absolute quality, it is under the control of public effects of the semblance. Public effects that are themselves standardized by extrinsic truth. This scheme is not only an outdated configuration by Plato and Rousseau. This is obviously the

disposition that Brecht argues, for example. I do not go into details, but this case is interesting: there is an expressly didactic theater conception of theater, which means exactly that the place of truth is indeed extrinsic, and that theater's function is in some way to show what it is extrinsic to itself, to show that the truth is extrinsic; this is the true order of the control in the semblance; finally, theater will present the possible forms of subjectivity of this extrinsic truth. How this extrinsic truth will be appropriated or not, is precisely what the theatrical configuration will outline.

The phenomenon of distance is crucial: it is precisely the mode of difference that allows the legibility of the subjectivity of truth, as far as it is extrinsic. It follows from this that theatricality is by no means the normal presentation of truth. In this sense Brecht's invention is not dogmatic, and it doesn't consist of organizing the totality outside the semblance of truth. Instead it will show the order of the distance and its multiple subjectivity, through which –what- will indicate –what-? Though it is not the truth (which is extrinsic to the artistic configuration as such) but the forms of its courage. The subject of Brecht is the following: what are the terms of the courage of the truth, or conditions of cowardice with regard to the truth. Because the courage of the truth is an equally theatrical form of subjectivity. That's why it is evidently the figure of Galileo that is central: Galileo is the relevant person here, and it is through him that surroundings are discussed and debated, not truth (science extrinsic to the theater, and theater will not place in the semblance this truth concerning the movement), and it is not a semblance of truth but the artistic organization of the decisive question of subjectivity of the extrinsic truth, notably the conditions of its courage. The



point that art slips is where truth as a subject is not self-evident. That the truth is not self-evident is finally the theatrical form arranged for educational purposes. The ultimate goal is to convey this form of courage, to project the visible system of conditions. So I recall that Brecht was aware of this point of view from a certain subordination of theater to what he called philosophy. The master of the game in didactic dialogues is commonly called the philosopher, and it is he who is the master of the procedure. Brecht had a fundamental dream of creating what he called a dialectic society of friendship. Finally theater convened in such a society, less to please than to give to each person the courage of truth, i.e. to become a friend of the truth, of dialectics. Bringing in friendship for Truth. This is the first node.

There is a 2<sup>nd</sup> node, at the opposite extreme, which holds that art alone is really capable of the truth. Nietzsche belongs to this end to some degree. We can call this scheme, this node, the Romantic one. The y axis is that art alone is truly capable of truth and in this sense art is the self-accomplishment of the abstract indication of philosophy. Or even that art is the real body of truth, or produces this real body of truth. We can also say that art is the descent of the infinite in the finite form, something like that. In this perspective, art is the deliverance of the subjective sterility of the concept. It is art itself that is in fact the absolute as subject, to put it in Hegel's formula. Or even, a formula which Nietzsche would distance from all the while frequenting, which is that art is incarnation. Let's say that art is actually the real figure of the truth as far as it occurs in the sensible, i.e. in the identifiable form of truth that otherwise is only the abstract promise of the concept.

We thus have 2 opposing nodes. In Nietzsche, we can say this: in the academic form, truth and art are finally in a form of disjunction, and this form requires a singular regulation from philosophy. This regulation can be at most an absolute disjunction (exclusion, banishment by Plato). There is only patriotic music. The nature of the dialectic scheme does not involve teaching this disjunction but offers a standard. In the conceptions elaborated by Brecht, one has the norm, i.e. the disjunction which is termed “distancing”. The distance is properly the manifesting of disjunction.

While, in the Romantic scheme, one has a conjunction (which is what Nietzsche argues for), save for the essential being a dialectic conjunction. For if it is said that art is the descent of the infinite to the finite, or the assumption in sensible finitude of the infinite of an idea, we are still in the process of dialectic succession. Thus we would have on one hand a disjunctive normalized schema, and on the other hand a connective scheme that is in general dialectic.

In the second case, art is politics for philosophy. It is a true and insistent question, and still it is at the heart of the device constituting philosophy. Even for Plato, it is striking to see that Republic X finishes by saying: “everything that one has done was good, but what was particularly good was that one has made poetry, and what is truly formidable, and what one has done best (i.e. the banning of poets). In this Romantic figure, it is decisive. If art is truly capable of the path of truth, it is central, and philosophy is the denegation of its abstraction to the Real of art.

In the two nodes, one fixates attention, or focus upon the artistic procedure, whether in the modality of a standard disjunction, or in the

modality of a dialectic conjunction. The problem is that after all there are still philosophies which art has left alone. The Classic sequence opens with Aristotle: it is not a problematic tearing, and one is not cornered by the dilemma of expelling everything, or genuflecting to them. Art is neither an instance of embodied sacralization of the truth, nor a danger that the semblance exerts on the immediacy of the truth. Art does not disturb Deleuze, Spinoza, or Levinas much. Everything is fine, they are not in jeopardy. This is contrary to Romanticism on one hand (which is a Platonism returning to meaning), and constitutes disorder for philosophy. The Classics are not in jeopardy: there is a third node, neither didactic nor Romantic. This node, I believe, originates in Aristotle; who is already quietly writing a policy without considering the need to take extreme measures. The man of truth can go to the theater and read poems, and it will not destroy his sight of the truth. What is the nature of the device I would call the Classic device? I believe that the crux of the matter is as follows. Clearly, in this node, we shall also consider how art is essentially mimetic. It endorses the concept of art as mimesis and as pretending. Thus, strictly speaking, truth is not immanent to art but extrinsic to it, and at best, perhaps, a semblance. This device shares the Platonic conviction, but concludes differently: the conclusion is that it is not too serious. Art is in the mimetic dimension of the semblance, but this is not a serious problem.